December 18, 2012
There are two possible trajectories for
the current Syrian crisis. The first is a purely military scenario in which the
opposition forces engage the regime in a bitter war of attrition until its
annihilation. The success of such a course of action, however, is difficult to
guarantee, and the cost to the country, its infrastructure and its civilian
population is likely to be catastrophic. In fact the more probable outcome is a
protracted bloody stalemate, leading to the collapse of the state, sectarian
genocide and the fragmentation of the country with significant blowback into
neighbouring states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.
The second trajectory would feature a
political resolution. Negotiations would bring about the departure of the
Bashar Assad’s regime along with a peaceful transition to democracy. Such a
political outcome is the one clearly favored by the international community and
was strongly endorsed at the latest friends of Syria meeting held in Marrakesh
on December 12 both in statement and in action (by not publicly agreeing to the
provision of any military assistance to the Syrian opposition). It is also the
option that should be favored by the Syrian people since they too have no
interest in seeing their country succumb to the fate described above.
There are certain conditions that must
prevail in order for the preferred political outcome to have any chance of
success. The first and foremost of these is that both sides must be prepared to
engage in a political process with the ultimate outcome of a peaceful
transition of power to a newly elected government. Currently, however, the
situation in Syria is one of stalemate on political and military fronts;
progress on both is needed simultaneously in order to break this stalemate.
First, the regime and its core pillars
of loyalist military support have yet to acknowledge that their situation has
become critical, let alone perilous. On the ground it appears that the regime
has lost large swathes of territory, including vital border crossings and major
chunks of the road transport networks. There are reports of disagreements
within the Assad’s inner circle over the military strategy and tactics it has
employed in response to the uprising. But it is equally important to note that
no major city in Syria has fallen completely into the hands of the opposition.
Damascus, Dera’a, Aleppo, Idlib, Deir Al-Zor, Homs, Hama and the coastal cities
of Lattakia and Tartous are all still partially or wholly in the control of the
regime. Even in the fiercely contested city of Aleppo the regime still controls
anywhere between 30-40 percent of the city on a given day.
The regime maintains significant and
untapped reserves in and around Damascus despite the growing shortage of
reliable manpower and the steady degradation and loss of war material, such as vehicles tanks and
aircraft still. The feared and fanatically loyal Fourth Division, the
Republican Guard and the Special Forces, who are equipped with the best that
the Syrian military has to offer, are waiting for orders. Add to that Assad’s ballistic missile (SCUDS)
and the chemical weapon arsenals. None of these critical resources have yet
been committed with any seriousness in the ongoing battle. (There are reports
that SCUDS have been used for the first time recently against opposition held
territory in the north).
Furthermore the opposition military
forces do not seem to have the ability (e.g. manpower) or necessary military
equipment to break regime forces entrenched in the cities or even to neutralize
those significant reserves being held in cities like Damascus. The regime’s
strategy, therefore, has been to contract, abandoning the countryside and
holding the major urban centres along with strategic military installations and
airfields. The regime’s knowledge that it can reach and hit any part of Syria
it chooses with its long-range artillery batteries, missiles and aircraft at
will has further fueled the statement.
A military impasse endures in major
cities, particularly Damascus, the political and administrative capital of
Syria. Many senior ranking officers in the military and Assad’s inner circle
seem to believe that they can still contain the situation or at the very least
maintain the status quo for a significant time to come. Incidentally, it is a
view shared by the Iranians and the Russians, the main backers and mentors of
the regime. Thus, it is unlikely that the Assad regime will be in any mood to
negotiate or consider alternative options that may be available to it in the near
future.
Entering negotiations to hand over
power to the opposition requires the regime’s loss of one or more major
urban cities. The potential ability to seriously threaten core areas of
Alawites, Assad’s tribesmen, and Damascus simultaneously would be significant
game changers. The loss of Aleppo and Idlib would put opposition forces within
reach of the Homs and Hama hinterlands, core areas of the Alawite communities.
The loss of Deir Al-Zor would lay open the desert road Tariq Al-Badiya that swings
across the eastern steppe through Palmyra and opens up the eastern and southern
approaches to Damascus, where fighting is on-going. Such a threat would force the regime and its
Iranian and Russian mentors to reconsider their calculus regarding the containment
of the crisis, making them more likely to seriously engage in alternative
options, such as negotiations for a transition.
What will shake up the stalemate and
potentially force the senior military officers within the inner circle, and
possibly even the Assads themselves, to reconsider?
In order to bring about such a
significant shift, the opposition military forces need to acquire the necessary
qualitative resources to topple those first dominoes and break this military
stalemate. Advanced anti-aircraft and
anti-tank weapons as well as secure communication equipment are a prerequisite
but not sufficient. More importantly, the opposition must have in place a
credible negotiating body to engage the Assad regime and hold them accountable
for the enforcement of whatever provisions for a peaceful transition are agreed
upon, notably the safety of the core Alawite areas and their protection from
retribution attacks. This last point is of major concern to the Alawite
minority that forms the rump of the loyalist forces to regime. It is likely to
be a deal breaker if it cannot be guaranteed.
Recently some progress has been
made with regards to the emergence of a credible negotiating body from the
opposition. The National Coalition for Revolutionary Forces and the
Syrian Opposition, also known as SOC, was formed in Doha on November 8-11. SOC
represents the unification of various opposition factions under a twelve-point
agreement plan headed by Moaz Al-Khatib (a cleric and former imam of the
Ummayad Mosque in Damascus). His two deputies are Riad Seif and Suheir Atasi
(both prominent dissidents and activists); a third is still to be named by the
Kurds. Another position, which is thus far poorly understood, is that of secretary
general, to be held by Mustapha Sabagh (head of the Syrian Businessmen Group).
One month into
its formation, there are few details known about the precise structure of the
new coalition, or the mechanisms for decision making within it. Nor is there a
timeline for achieving its political goals. All this points to a clear lack of
strategy and planning on the part of those who put this coalition together and
those currently leading it (despite the best efforts of a valiant few).
Of even greater
concern is the increasing and disproportionate representation and influence of
Syrian National Council cadres within the new coalition. The poor performance
of the SNC (the predecessor of SOC) is legendary. Many in the opposition both revile and delegitimize the SNC’s leadership. But these same SNC leaders and senior
cadres now represent almost 40 percent of the new coalition. George Sabra, the
head of the SNC, has even demanded and been given a deputy position in the new
organization. The unfortunate overpopulation of SNC members in the coalition
means that the SNC’s rampant malfeasance and personal bickering will be
transferred to the new coalition. The SOC will be stricken with the very
malaise that afflicted its predecessor.
Such challenges
have significantly hampered the ability of the coalition to agree on the makeup
of a transitional technocratic government. In spite of cajoling and intense
pressure that had been brought to bear on the SOC leadership, no transitional
government was established in time for the December 12 Friends of Syria meeting
held in Marrakesh. The urgency with which many in the international community
were pushing for such a transitional government is hardly surprising given the
fragile nature of the coalition and the tensions already emerging between its
various components.
In fact, a
technocrat dominated transitional government—removed from the current political
opposition circus and its leadership—would provide the sort of credible body
that the Syrian regime might be willing to negotiate a transition as and when
the time comes. But for such a body to be credible, it would also need to have
some sort of command or influence over the opposition’s armed components. At
the very least, the technocratic entity must be able to guarantee the
acceptance of any binding agreements made on behalf of the opposition as a
whole.
The formation
of this joint military council is significant because it enables coordination
between the SOC, the emerging technocrat government, and the opposition’s
brigades. There are indications of efforts toward uniting the main military
brigades of the opposition, with the recent announcement of the formation of
the Higher Council Joint Military Command headed by General Salim Idriss. In
their press statement the council declared its commitment to freedom, justice
and equality and identified itself as Islamic and moderate. The new joint
military council has five regional commands covering operations across Syria.
So, if slowly,
the conditions needed to bring about the Syrian regime’s necessary shift in
position are gradually being checked off, such as the apparent coalescence of
the opposition’s disparate political and military entities, along with their
latest advances on the ground around Aleppo and Damascus. Assad’s international
backers are seeing the writing on the wall. That Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Mikhail Bogdanov announced recently that the Assad regime may fall—and the latest comments by Syrian Vice President
Farouk Al-Shara’a that the Syrian army cannot defeat the rebel force—can
be read as a reflection of such a shift. All that remains now is for the regime
to recognize that it is time for the Assads to leave: time to negotiate a
transition or face eventual collapse and annihilation.
Amr
Al-Azm is an associate professor of Middle East History and Anthropology at
Shawnee State University.