June 17, 2013
Demonstrations
have followed one another in Laayoune, Smara, Boujdour and Dakhla since late
April, leading in some cases to violent clashes between Sahrawi
pro-independence activists and the Moroccan security forces. The largest rally
demanding self-determination was reported on May 4 in Laayoune, the capital of
the Rabat-controlled Western Sahara territory. Though the Moroccan government
restricts access to the area in times of tension like these, the arrival of
foreign observers or journalists (such as that of six American and British
journalists of the International Women’s Media Foundation starting on April 28)
has allowed for a sense of protection and has encouraged and empowered
protesters. Meanwhile, the Moroccan government response to these protests has
revealed contradiction and miscommunication: the Moroccan minister of Communication
claimed that calm and normality prevail in the “provinces of the South,” while
his Foreign Affairs and Interior colleagues blamed “external parties,” namely
Algeria and the Polisario Front, for plotting to destabilize this area.
This
escalation of protests began just as Moroccan political officials and diplomats
breathed a sigh of relief regarding the international management of the Western
Sahara issue. In mid- April, they had spent two weeks on the verge of a nervous
breakdown after the U.S. circulated a draft resolution by which the UN Security
Council would extend the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO) to include the monitoring of human rights in both the
disputed territory under Moroccan control and the refugee camps ruled by the
Polisario in Tindouf, Algeria—the two main scenes of the long-stalled Western
Sahara conflict. During this period national newspaper headlines declared: “the
U.S. abandons its ally,” and “America slaps Morocco in the face,” reflecting
the government’s frantic efforts to kill the motion.
Besides
the media outcry, the state of total mobilization included an unscheduled
crisis meeting of major party leaders with advisors to the Royal Cabinet that
openly bypassed the post-Arab Spring elected government and parliament. The
participants categorically rejected what they described in a statement as
“partial” and “unilateral” initiatives aimed at “distorting” the MINURSO
mandate. In response, Morocco canceled, without explanation, the “African Lion”
annual joint military exercises with the U.S. army, and sent a high-level
diplomatic mission to “transmit a message” from King Mohammed VI to the
governments of several permanent members of the Security Council.
The
proposal to update or standardize the mandate for MINURSO to bring it in line
with other peace keeping missions that assume responsibilities in human rights
vigilance was applauded by international human rights NGOs. However, Rabat saw
it as an imminent black-and-white victory for the Polisario Front and
pro-independence Sahrawi activists, after a decade-long strategic shift that
has turned human rights into a central bone of contention.
Short-term
developments provide a rationale for the U.S. initiative, including the
departure of Hillary Clinton who had been a supporter of the Moroccan
government in the first Obama administration. This is compounded by the
increased lobbying and influence of the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice
and Human Rights, a group committed to the Sahrawi cause, in Democratic Party
circles. Furthermore, Morocco’s withdrawal of confidence from the UN Secretary
General’s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, in the
summer of 2012 (eventually re-accepted after U.S. and UN pressure) didn’t bode well
for Morocco’s standing in Washington. This past April, Ban Ki-moon’s last
annual report on this conflict also recommended “further international
engagement” in the monitoring of human rights in both Western Sahara and the
camps.
Ultimately,
however, the proposal to broaden MINURSO’s role represents the culmination of a
medium-term strategic reshaping of the Sahrawi pro-independence movement, a new
dialectic between groups on the ground and in exile, not unlike that witnessed
in the Palestinian case as a result of the first Intifada. The first
conspicuous phenomenon was the emergence inside the Moroccan-controlled
territory, less than a decade ago, of an increasingly politicised associative
elite that opted for a non-violent discourse based on the principles of
international law and human rights; this granted it growing visibility,
legitimacy and support in the international sphere. Since 2009, the Polisario
Front has tried to regain the initiative by fostering contact and connections
with associations such as the Collective of Sahrawi Defenders for Human Rights
(CODESA), which formerly operated on a seemingly autonomous basis. The renewed
alliance was staged during the unprecedented visits of prominent CODESA
activists to the Tindouf refugee camps (the first of which took place in
September 2009).
Such
innovative approaches caused undisguised anxiety among the Rabat authorities,
who had been enjoying great receptivity within the international community
after the launch of their Autonomy Plan (under Moroccan sovereignty) for
Western Sahara in 2007. This led, in parallel, to increased political
repression in the contested territory (as shown by Sahrawi activist Aminatou
Haidar’s refused re-entry to Laayoune and hunger strike in November 2009 and
the violent dismantlement of Gdim Izik’s protest camp a year later) and to a
defensive withdrawal within the diplomatic sphere.
In short,
the emergence of on-the-ground actors and human rights issues introduced new
parameters to the stalled conflict. The UN-led resolution efforts, legally
attached to the Morocco vs. Polisario Front dual scheme, have been rather slow
to take the new realities into account. The recent unforeseen initiative of the
new Obama administration and its UN Ambassador Susan Rice, who did not consult
with other members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara at the UN or
Personal Envoy Ross, was therefore a potential turning point. Yet it was
doomed, facing insurmountable resistances. Much to the relief of the Moroccan
authorities, the terms of the U.S. draft resolution were watered down, against
the clock, during the successive discussions within the framework of the Group
of Friends and the Security Council itself before the final vote, on April 25,
and eventually the U.S. stepped back from its original proposal.
The
failed expansion of the MINURSO mandate aborted a change of approach that is
necessary—on moral and pragmatic grounds alike— for any resolution of the
conflict. Regardless of different views on the future of the Western Sahara, respect
for human rights is a non-negotiable common denominator that the international
community should back at all costs and, ideally, it is also a way to overcome
zero-sum approaches and change the dynamics that have rendered this issue so
intractable.
Irene Fernández Molina is a
research fellow of the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the College of
Europe (Natolin Campus).
This
article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online
at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/06/10/breaking-deadlock-in-western-sahara/g9lh