Chinese astronaut Liu Yang, on board the Shenzhou 8 spacecraft, June 17, 2012. An Xin/ Imaginechina/Corbis
February 10, 2013
In the mid-1980s China
began to open its theretofore closed space program internationally, offering
commercial launches and seeking opportunities for cooperative programs, even
though it still had a steep learning curve to climb in terms of its capabilities.
China already had the foundations of a launch vehicle family, the Long March (LM),
itself based on the Dong Feng ballistic missile first launched in 1964. Long
March launched China’s satellite, East is Red, in 1970 but the political
extremism of the Cultural Revolution between 1966−1976
devastated the scientific and engineering communities, dramatically slowing
satellite and launcher development.
Qian
Xuesen, considered the father of the Chinese space program, was actually
educated in America and employed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory before being
caught up in McCarthyism. He was deported in 1955 and thereafter, was
unsurprisingly bereft of warm feelings toward the United States. While Qian
provided the backbone of rebuilding the Chinese space program, he and others
suffered harsh treatment—some were even killed or committed suicide—by the
cultural revolutionaries who targeted mainly intellectuals.1
Scientists and engineers had to be marshaled and labs reconstructed before
China could even attempt to catch up with, or at least lessen the distance
between it and other spacefaring nations, such as the United States, the then
Soviet Union, Europe, and even Japan. Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders
recognized it was important to do so because space equated with technology,
technology required industrialization, and industrialization brought economic
development as well as international prestige, which translated into
geostrategic influence.
China’s timing for
re-entering the global space community was propitious. In the 1980s, the space
shuttle was the centerpiece of U.S. space efforts; originally intended as a
transportation system to a space station, it emerged as an expensive trucking
service into orbit after the space station was placed on indefinite hold by the
Nixon administration. The Soviet Union was in domestic turmoil and economic
free-fall, partially due to trying to keep up with the U.S. military’s
Strategic Defense Initiative (dubbed “Star Wars”). The Europeans and Japanese,
then as today, had plans for space activity but found it difficult to follow
through, largely due to bureaucratic politics and domestic priorities for
government funding. Political will in these early front-runners in space was
weak or waning.
China, on the other
hand, with centralized planning not responsible to fickle politicians or
electorates, initiated ambitious human spaceflight and robotic lunar
exploration plans in the 1990s that are reaching fruition today. Consequently,
as of 2013, China can be said to have “caught up to” or even surpassed other
early front-runners in space by some definitions, like current human
spaceflight activity. In other areas, however, China is still playing catch-up,
hindered by its own domestic foibles and, more recently, hints of the same
tentative political will that plagues other countries. Therefore, it is
important to separate the fact of its achievements from the fiction often
reported by the media, and to understand the problems that make the
delineation of future Chinese intentions difficult at best.
The Chinese Moon
Goddess
Chinese space
activities—all national space activities—are inherently competitive for two
related reasons: geopolitics and dual-use technology. Together, these factors
create the perfect environment for what is known as a security dilemma, where
countries pursue options (often involving technology) which ultimately are not
in their best interests because they are seen as provocative to other
countries. These other countries may
respond in kind, leading to a spiraling of capabilities, and increased risk.
Nuclear weapons are a good example. The challenge for spacefaring nations is to
resist the sometimes-powerful temptations to pursue activities that will
ultimately lead to such a security dilemma. But military threat calculations
are largely based on capability, rather than intent, and dual-use space
technology clearly offers capabilities valuable to militaries. That can render
questions of “intent” irrelevant in some circles.
China is pursuing
development of a full range of satellite capabilities—including communications,
navigation, and reconnaissance—and is clearly making significant progress.
China’s development of its own satellite navigation system, Beidou (also known
as Compass), began operational testing in 2012, and is expected to provide
global coverage by 2020 through a constellation of thirty-five satellites. It
also has plans for increased earth observation capabilities, including new
polar and geostationary weather satellites, high-resolution imaging satellites,
radar satellites, and microsatellites for a variety of purposes—most to be
developed solely by Chinese manufacturers. Of the just over one thousand
satellites currently in orbit, America, Russia, and China own the most: the
U.S. has 443, Russia 110, and China 93.2
China is also
expanding its launch capabilities. The Chinese Long March 3B is currently
its most powerful rocket in use, capable of lifting approximately eight tons to
Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The LM-5, currently in development, will more than
triple that capability to carry 25 tons to LEO. Development however, has been
plagued by repeated delays, with 2014 the latest target date given for its
maiden voyage. Besides its three remote launch sites currently in use, China is
also building a new launch site on Hainan Island to accommodate the LM-5.
China’s most
publicized space activities are those related to the manned Shenzhou and the
robotic Chang’e programs. Originally known simply as Project 921, the Shenzhou
program was approved as a three-step plan for human spaceflight in 1992. China
has been relatively open about it, and has stuck to the plan: send humans into
orbit, demonstrate advanced capabilities through a small laboratory (the
Tiangong program), and finally, build a large space station. The prototype
Tiangong-1 has been and will be used to conduct experiments in conjunction with
the Shenzhou 8−10 spacecrafts, with Shenzhou 10 currently
scheduled for launch in June 2013. That will be followed by the launch of
Taingong-2 (2013−14) and Tiangong-3 (2014−16).
The Tiangong spacecrafts are not space stations intended for long-term use, or
to be permanently manned, but form the basis for a small laboratory to test
technologies similar to those tested by the United States during the Gemini
program, including rendezvous, docking, and life support. Tiangong is likely to
host manned missions later in its evolution.3 At 8.5 tons, Tiangong is smaller than both
Skylab (about 80 tons), and the 30-ton space station China has always planned
as the culmination of its 1992 three-step plan.
Launch of the larger
space station requires the availability of the LM-5. If China is able to meet
an anticipated 2020 date-of-operation for its space station, that will be about
the same time the currently orbiting U.S.-led International Space Station (ISS)
is de-orbited, making the Chinese version the de facto replacement. There is a
certain irony in that, as China had long wanted to participate in the ISS
program, but was stymied by the U.S. from doing so; first with the rationale
that China had little to contribute as a partner, and later by objections from
blustering U.S. politicians of the inclusion of a non-democratic nation in a
program symbolizing an “international family of spacefaring nations.”
China is executing the
robust Shenzhou human spaceflight program at a pace simultaneously incremental
and accelerated: incremental in its timeline milestones and accelerated in its
milestone achievements. For example, between Yang Liwei’s first-ever manned
flight in 2003 and Zhai Zhigang’s spacewalk in 2008 there was only one other
Shenzhou program flight. Compare that to the number of flights that occurred
during the Mercury and Gemini programs, and one finds a much higher number of
U.S. launches, with smaller steps taken by each. Shenzhou 9, launched in June
2012, included China’s first female taikonaut, Liu Yang.
Chang’e is the
mythical Chinese moon goddess for whom the robotic Chinese lunar program is
named. Chang’e 1 was launched in 2007 and operated until 2009, and demonstrated
China’s capability both to put satellites into lunar orbit and to return
imagery. Chang’e 2 was launched in 2010. After flying in a
closer-to-the-surface lunar orbit and providing imagery with a high resolution
camera—pictures essential for an anticipated soft-landing Chang’e 3 mission in
2013—Chang’e 2 left lunar orbit for the Earth-Sun L2 Lagrangian Point, to test
Chinese tracking and control capabilities. Prior to China, only the United
States and the European Space Agency had visited L2. Chang’e 2 then set out for
an extended mission to asteroid 4179 Toutatis. Chang’e 3 will be the first soft
lunar landing since a Soviet expedition in 1976. Chang’e 3 and 4 are precursors
for an intended Chang’e 5 lunar sample return, though that mission also
requires use of the still-in-development LM-5.
The
complex structure and opaque nature of the Chinese Communist government system
and the behemoth bureaucracy that implements government decisions often makes
Western analysis of Chinese decision-making a difficult challenge. It is known,
however, that while civilian politicians through the state council make decisions
about what space programs China will carry out, the military has a significant
role in program execution. While partly a function of the People’s Liberation
Army having traditionally been entrusted with execution of programs considered
of important national interest, the military value of the space technology
being developed is key as well.
China is clearly
expanding its military space capabilities in areas from command and control and
meteorology, which have proved critical in enhancing terrestrial force
effectiveness, to space weapons. In 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons test, destroying one of its own defunct weather satellites using
a direct ascent, kinetic-kill vehicle. Impact resulted in more than 3,000
pieces of space debris being created. The debris will take years to dissipate
and in the meantime threatens potentially catastrophic damage if it collides
with active spacecraft, including the ISS.
That test confirmed
for many countries that space is a congested, contested, and competitive
environment, for which they must prepare. Events that followed—the United
States conducting Operation Burnt Frost in 2008 to destroy one of its own
malfunctioning satellites using missile defense technology, the Chinese
“missile defense” test in 2010, and India’s 2011 test of missile technology
potentially useful to the development of ASAT capability—are indicators of the
kind of security dilemma spiral that can happen. While each of those activities
was conducted in ways to minimize debris issues, the potential threat to the
space environment in non-test circumstances is clear. If there was any upside
to the 2007 Chinese test, it was the frightening realization by all countries
of the fragility of the space environment. Mankind’s dependence on space
assets—including through GPS (one of only two global utilities, along with the
Internet) communications, meteorology and remote sensing—makes it in everyone’s
best interest to cooperate to maintain that environment.
China has now
recognized this need to sustain the space environment and cooperated on
relevant issues, particularly the space debris issue. Given that China was
scheduled to host an international meeting on the issue only days after its
2007 ASAT test that significantly worsened space debris, and resulted in China
cancelling the meeting out of embarrassment, some analysts see its current
cooperation as somewhat hypocritical. At the very least there is a certain
irony in that the U.S. military, which has the most sophisticated tracking
abilities, has had to warn China of potential collisions between its own space
junk and its own satellites.
A New Space Race?
Though China has a
robust exploration space program underway, what has not been officially
announced is a manned lunar mission. Individuals in China sometimes speak about
manned lunar landings as a given (sometimes just to chafe and spin-up U.S.
officials), but that is not the case. Outspoken space advocate Ouyang Ziyuan, a
geologist and chief lunar scientist for Chang’e, for example, has long and very
publicly endorsed a manned lunar mission—his comments are often mistaken by
Western media as official government policy. He also hints at exploration of
the moon for Helium-3, a potential fuel for a fusion reactor. Mining Helium-3 as
an economic rationale for lunar exploration once made its way through
Washington circles as well—though no fusion reactor exists where it could be
used. This rationalization can signal efforts by scientists to quell political
skepticism.
It has only been in
recent years that a manned lunar mission has been seriously discussed in China,
first within the space community and then among decision-makers. Chinese
officials prudently first focused on testing requisite capabilities through the
manned Shenzhou and robotic Chang’e programs. While there is certainly
enthusiasm among some groups, there is also skepticism—just as there was in the
United States regarding the Apollo program—among some scientists and
politicians that such a program would require too much focused funding in one
scientific area, at the expense of others. Still, Chinese leaders are aware
that China has reaped significant regional—and global—geostrategic benefits,
including the demonstration of technical prowess and attracting students to science
and engineering programs, as well as dual-use military capabilities, from its
space efforts.
Even with the planned
upgrades and expansion, however, China has not approached or surpassed U.S.
technical competence in space across the board—another claim often made by
politicians and found in the media. Clearly, however, China is currently more
active in exploration than the United States, while the United States
transitions to a more public-private approach to space. Contrary to what is
often reported, however, there is no space race between the United States and
China.
The George W. Bush
administration largely ignored China’s human spaceflight accomplishments,
though some members of Congress used them to try to generate a new lunar race
(along with the requisite funding for NASA to execute its return-to-the-moon
Constellation program). Government funding offered for Constellation, however,
was nowhere near what was needed to actually implement the program in a timely,
effective manner, but rather only enough to keep it alive. When President
Barack Obama was left to finally pull the plug on Constellation, his realistic
options were few, if any. Now, with President Obama’s 2010 National Space
Policy transitioning the U.S. space program into one of more private sector
involvement in low Earth orbit activities so NASA can focus on new
destinations, China is racing only itself—or maybe India—to the moon, where the
United States already triumphantly went more than forty years ago.
The Obama
administration has been more open to the possibility of cooperative space
activity with China than was the Bush administration. Nevertheless, for reasons
including the belief that China will find a valuable military reason for humans
in space (something neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was able to
do), allegations of spying and even human rights, some members of Congress,
such as Dana Rohrabacher and Frank Wolf, have been adamantly against any such
cooperation. Wolf even inserted language
into the NASA funding legislation prohibiting bilateral NASA cooperation, or
even communication with, China.
Though both India and
China deny an Asian techno-nationalist race, where technology becomes symbolic
of national power (toward regional and global influence), actions sometimes
speak louder than words. India once proudly proclaimed it was interested in
space only in ways that would benefit the Indian people, like communications,
weather satellites, and remote sensing. More recently, however, India has
acquired plans for space that are far more expansive than directly relevant to
the Indian people.4 The Indian space program now includes human spaceflight in
its plans, as well as the development of significant military space
capabilities, including those that could potentially be used as space weapons.
The term Shashou
Jian, translated as Assassin’s Mace, often finds its way into analyses of
Chinese space ambitions. The term is used in ancient Chinese strategy to
reference use of an asymmetric weapon to rapidly and decisively defeat an enemy
who relies on conventional strengths. Today, the connotation is the development
of a new technology to defeat an enemy. With space technology so heavily
dual-use, the idea that China could develop a Death Star or some such fantastical
super weapon, is easy to suggest yet is based on little evidence. (Ironically,
President Obama was recently presented with a citizen’s petition to have the
U.S. build a Death Star. The White House rejected the proposal.) The same,
however, is true for any country. Recent U.S. interest in 3D printing to
assemble replacement parts and tools for the ISS5 could certainly be seen differently by
other countries: as the U.S. having the potential to create crude ASATs in
space, for example. While the possibility of any country developing an
Assassin’s Mace exists—and perhaps because it does so—extra care must be taken
to minimize misunderstandings, which could lead to catastrophic events in space
that have the potential to threaten space assets valuable to all people in all
nations.
Code of Conduct
China is a country of
such size and diversity that analysts can find evidence for any hypothesis they
seek to prove. Consequently, some analysts see virtually all Chinese space
activities as nefarious. Others argue that the Chinese space program is
inherently competitive, but with cooperation incorporated as well. (There is a
term sometimes used called “coopetition” which, while facile, does convey a
likely accurate portrayal of the situation.) Further, Chinese intentions are
likely neither entirely benign, nor totally nefarious.
Where
China is concerned, because of the dual-use nature of space technology, largely
everything it does in space can be—and has been by some analysts—considered a
threat, especially in the United States. It is certainly appropriate that U.S.
analysts, especially military analysts, consider worst-case scenarios, but
political prudence and economic necessity demand careful and thorough analysis,
to differentiate wild speculation from valid conclusions. Unfortunately, this
has not always been the case.6
The importance of
recognizing the frequency with which misperception, miscommunication, and
misinterpretation occur between the U.S. and China (and other countries as well
perhaps) cannot be overstated. Recently, a short piece on the military affairs
website AOL Defense looked at the poor sources used by some U.S.
analysts to support claims about the development and testing of a Chinese
spaceplane7—the point being that
while activity is certain, it is not useful to hype threats. This only adds to
the security dilemma problem. The problem is that when everything a country
does is considered a threat, the real threats may not be adequately
addressed.
Realistically,
analyses of the intentions of any country are considered through a
nationalistic filter of another country, a filter of geopolitical
considerations. Therefore, consideration of the geopolitical relationship
between the U.S. and China is useful. The U.S. “pivot to Asia” or “rebalancing”
policy that redirects U.S. strategic attention from the Middle East to Asia has
resulted in considerable consternation in China. Concerning space specifically,
restrictions imposed by Congress on the NASA budget prohibit bilateral
interactions of any kind with China—after the Obama administration indicated
interest in increased interactions—and baffle the Chinese regarding who makes
U.S. policy, and what it is.
On the other hand,
Chinese military modernization, seen as expansive and alarming in the U.S. and
Asia, generates concerns. Additionally, the techno-nationalist rewards China
has garnered can generate regional suspicion, if not rivalry. That is perhaps
most evidenced in India’s recent expansion of space goals into
heretofore-ignored areas.
It
also appears that Japan is going to challenge the “soft power” influence China
has garnered from its space program with developing countries, by supporting
and funding third party efforts. Initiatives through the Asia-Pacific Regional
Space Agency Forum (APRSAF)8, an eclectic group of
thirty-five countries (and even more international organizations) ranging from
China, Japan and Myanmar, to Israel, Germany, Canada, and Kazakhstan, serve as
an opportunity for Japan to assist developing countries. China has coveted the
idea of being the leader of space initiatives in developing countries.
Also on the horizon
for consideration is China’s potential perspective on a draft International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (CoC), initiated by the European
Union in 2008 and conceptually supported by the United States in 2012. Several
points can be drawn from that issue regarding apparent Chinese positions about
space that are relevant to the future.
China has consistently stated a policy of using
outer space for peaceful purposes and opposing weaponization or any arms race
in outer space. With Russia, China submitted a draft treaty in 2008 on
Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of
Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) at the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament. China clearly prefers legally binding agreements to address
multilateral policy questions. The European CoC, however, is part of a “soft
law” trend, using Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) to deal
with threats such as misperceptions and miscommunications that could heighten
tensions and lead to escalation—without a legally binding agreement that might
be impossible for some countries (such as the United States) to ratify due to
domestic politics. Any TCBM that will aid in abetting the many
misunderstandings already discussed and those likely in the future will be
useful—and China appears to recognize this.
The voluntary nature
of the CoC has been cited by Lu Jiqian, professor at China University of
Political Science and Law, as a “big obstacle” for China.9 But although China
favors a legally binding treaty, Chinese representative Wang Qun stated at the
UN that TCBMs are not at odds “with efforts to prevent an arms race in outer
space, and such TCBMs are useful supplements to legal instruments.”10 Chinese analyst
Jinyuan Su from Xi’an Jiaotong University has suggested that substantive
differences between a treaty approach and a CoC approach focus on the failure
to ban ground-based ASAT, a lack of a verification regime in the treaty, and
the failure to constrain space-to-Earth weapons, and potentially make the CoC
unacceptable to China (and perhaps other states).11 China has also made it clear that it won’t
agree to any arrangements that will potentially affect its development in the
military space domain, a view also likely shared by other spacefaring nations
as well. Here is where misunderstandings may arise over dual-use technology and
sovereignty to develop capabilities.
Meanwhile,
China is forging ahead with space program expansion.12
A massive new factory in Tianjin, a port city not far from Beijing, will be
completed around August 2013, and begin operations later in the year. Floor space of the facility is estimated at
about 100,000 square meters, or 1.08 million square feet, big enough to allow
for product construction and testing.
The
main products to be produced in the facility are modules for China’s space
station—the flagship of its currently approved human spaceflight program—and
powerful reconnaissance satellites, undoubtedly for military use. Tianjin
facility officials say the facility will be capable of producing six to eight
large spacecraft each year. These are the space station modules that require
the Long March 5 for launch. The location of the facility may be for ease of
transporting the module to the new launch facility on Hainan Island.
Representatives
of the China’s General Armaments Department, responsible for military
satellites (among other areas of spacecraft development, including the
anti-satellites weapon developed in 2007), were present at the groundbreaking,
evidencing military involvement in the facility. China clearly intends to
expand both its overall number of satellites in orbit and the types of
satellites. By 2020, China will likely have about 200 satellites in orbit, or
about 20 percent of the total. Whether for civilian or military use, or both,
remains to be seen. In any event, more spacecraft in orbit raises the potential
for collisions, incidents or misunderstanding regarding intent in general,
further raising the importance transparency of actions, and a Code of Conduct.
Politically,
however, issues of domestic politics must also be considered regarding the
potential for China to support a Code of Conduct. Little substantive
decision-making can be accomplished on controversial policy issues during
periods of political transition in any country, which is currently occurring in
China. Initially, it was suggested that China (like India) was not supportive
of a CoC because it felt excluded from initial negotiations. However, it has
been mostly Indian analysts rather than Chinese analysts suggesting this view.13
China seems to be closely studying the costs and benefits of a “soft law”
approach to the multitude of issues (space debris high among them) related to
the sustainability of the space environment and it has not ruled out that
approach. Part of what China will likely be looking at is whether support for a
CoC will weaken or even nullify the PPWT, and with it, geopolitical advantages
garnered from co-sponsoring a treaty on a subject of concern to a great many
nations—and which the U.S. has consistently blocked. Politics and diplomatic
strategy is a many sided prism where gain in one area may have to be weighed against
losses in another.
Whether
China will lean toward the promotion of cooperation or competition in the
future will be known by its adherence to best practices—in other words, actions
will speak louder than words. China has shown that it is a spacefaring nation
in for the long haul. Its exploration programs will continue and potentially
expand to include a manned lunar mission. And its military capabilities in
space will expand as part of a general military modernization. For China to
continue to reap benefits from space—both in the military and exploration
realms—it will have to join with other nations to protect the sustainability of
the space environment. That self-interest gives cause for optimism.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author
alone and do not represent the views of the U.S. government, the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Navy.
1. For a complete history of early Chinese
space efforts see: Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, A Place for One’s
Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956−2003. The American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 2009.
2. Union of Concerned Scientists’
Satellite Database.
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html
3. See: Amy Klamper, “Official Details 11-year
Path to Developing China’s Own Space Station,” Space News, April 14,
2010. http://www.spacenews.com/civil/100414-path-china-space-station.html
4. Joan Johnson-Freese, “The
U.S.-India Space Partnership: Who Gets What?” World Politics Review,
2011.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8839/the-u-s-india-space-partnership-who-gets-what
5. Rachael King, “3D Printing Coming
to Manufacturing Space—and Outer Space,” Bloomberg Business Week,
January 9, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/technology/3d-printing-coming-to-the-manufacturing-spaceand-outer-space-01092012.html
6. See, for example, Gregory Kulacki,
“Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union
of Concerned Scientists, 2009. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/Kulacki-Chinese-ASAT-Literature-6-10-09.pdf;
Gregory Kulacki and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Memo to U.S. China Economic and
Security Review Commission,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008.
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/memo-to-uscc.pdf
7. Joan Johnson-Freese and Gregory
Kulacki, “Chinese Spaceplane: Chimera or Object Lesson in Threat Analysis,” AOL
Defense, September 27, 2012.
http://defense.aol.com/2012/09/27/chinese-spaceplane-chimera-or-object-lesson-in-threat-analysis/
8. http://www.aprsaf.org/initiatives/about/
9. Li Juqian, “The Future of the
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: From Mission
Impossible to Mission Sustainable?” in Decoding the International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities, ed. Ajey Lele (Pentagon Press, 2012),
120
10. Xinhua, “China Calls for Viable Plan
for Complete Nuclear Disarmament,” Xinhuanet.com, October 8, 2011.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/08/c_131178266.htm
11. Jinyuan Su, “How Far is China from the
European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” e-International
Relations, July 30, 2012.
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/30/how-far-is-china-from-the-european-code-of-conduct-for-outer-space-activities/
12. Bradley Perrett, “Chinese Factory to
Build Outsize Spacecraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January
28, 2013.
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_01_28_2013_p27-540056.xml&p=2
13. Ajey Lele, “Space Code of Conduct:
The Challenges Ahead,” The Space Review, July 16, 2012.
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2119/1; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan,
“Asia and a Space Code,” The Diplomat, January 4, 2012.
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/01/04/asia-and-a-space-code/
Joan
Johnson-Freese is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S.
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. She is the author of numerous books
on space programs, most recently, of Heavenly
Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space.