September 16, 2015
Over the past few weeks,
disputes have grown over whether to extend Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
President Masoud Barzani’s mandate for another two years. Barzani’s political
rivals have sought to make any extension conditional on establishing a
parliamentary system in Kurdistan. However, Barzani and his Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) are refusing to yield power or to introduce any of the
meaningful changes demanded, insisting the president has every legal right to
remain in office. The resulting deadlock has exposed divisions within the
political elite and illustrated the extent to which political and personal
interests are driving decisionmaking at the expense of pluralism and rule of
law. The new dynamics among the Kurdish population and political class could
eventually realign government and party structures, but the entrenched
interests of both the KDP and its opponents are blocking this transformation.
The missed opportunity for institutional reform will cost all political parties
dearly.
Barzani’s term was
already extended for two additional years in June 2013, despite the two-term
limit imposed by the draft Kurdistan constitution. None of his adversaries—or occasional allies—expected him to
step down at the end of the extension on August 19, 2015. Rather, the issue has
been whether they could use the mandate’s renewal to wrest power from Barzani
and the KDP. Their program to transform the regional government from its
present presidential model to a more parliamentary one would severely limit
Barzani’s power and significantly bolster the executive authority of the
Kurdistan National Assembly and of the competing parties themselves. This would
allow for a greater distribution of power between the KDP and other
parties—something its biggest rivals, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
and the Gorran (Change) Movement, have sought to achieve for over five years.
Barzani and his party
have consistently rejected calls for such a parliamentary system, which would
challenge the exact power they seek to maintain. On August 19, the KDP
prevented a quorum in parliament, blocking an initiative that would have
reelected Barzani but stripped the presidency of key powers. The KDP has also
refused to yield concessions during prolonged negotiations with the PUK and
Gorran, reinforcing wider suspicions that the president and his KDP are
determined to maintain the corrosive autocracy that has increasingly
characterized the KRG. On August 10, Barzani publicly likened efforts to deny
him an unconditional extension as a coup, and
the peshmerga subsequently supported him with a very overt display of force in
Erbil, further fueling the perception that neither Barzani nor his party is
willing to accept reform.
The KDP’s rivals have
contributed to the current impasse. The call for a parliamentary system was too
much for the Barzani family, and the PUK and Gorran were unwilling or unable to
offer a viable alternative, showing their own inability to compromise. The only
potential deal revealed a divided opposition. The KDP did agree in principle to
an initiative PUK Deputy Secretary-General Barham Salih proposed on August 10.
Salih’s “Project
for National Reform” would have
established a senior committee (composed of the KRG president and prime
minister, their deputies, and representatives of the major political parties)
to oversee a two-year restructuring of Kurdistan’s judicial, security, and
administrative institutions. Had parties and personalities united behind the
plan, they might have forced Barzani and the KDP to make some gradual
concessions, although critics of the initiative argued that it was overly
conciliatory, leaving the president and his party in full control of key
committees and the KRG itself in the interim. Ultimately, however, the plan
collapsed under the weight of internal rivalries, both within the PUK and
between Barham Salih and Noshirwan Mustafa, head of the Gorran Movement.
Mustafa refused to support the plan, preferring instead to protect what he sees
as the Gorran monopoly over reform in the Kurdistan Region.
The KDP has remained
steadfast, refusing any deal that threatens the status quo. Party negotiators
have said that the most they will accept is a national referendum to extend
Barzani’s term (or even parliamentary elections), safe in the knowledge that
the vote will go in the KDP’s favor. Time is on the KDP’s side. While the
stalemate persists, Barzani will take advantage of his mandate’s legal
ambiguity to continue to govern as before. The president and his party know
that any eventual compromise will leave Barzani in place. Moreover, they may
also be calculating that the longer it takes for the drama to unfold, the more
impotent their rivals will appear. In the meantime fear of internal instability
will grow, and the United States will reduce their own pressure on the KDP to
compromise, fearing further distractions from the war against the Islamic
State.
In the short term,
despite infighting between the main parties, the KRG is likely to remain fairly
stable. Extending the president’s mandate—with or without any concessions—will
simply reinforce the popular perception that Barzani and the KDP are entrenched
in power, discouraging popular critics from challenging the regime seriously.
Although criticism of Barzani and the KDP has risen at the popular level,
extensive patronage networks shore up their capacity to silence any dissent.
Kurdistan’s economic success over the past decade, combined with the security
threat posed by the Islamic State, will convince large swaths of the Kurdish
population that there is enough value in the status quo to protect it, at least
for now.
However, in the longer
term the latest dispute will tarnish the public image of both the KDP and its
rivals, potentially undermining their popular support. By refusing to consider
a practical compromise, all parties involved—the KDP, PUK, Gorran, and
others—have highlighted the chronic personal rivalries between them. If the PUK
now acquiesces to an extension, it will leave itself open to allegations it is
too close to the KDP—as happened when it blessed Barzani’s term extension in
2013. Public support for the party has declined significantly over the past two
years, forcing them to resort to voter fraud. A weakened PUK could benefit
Gorran, but it would be a pyrrhic victory. The episode has illustrated Gorran’s
own opportunism, and for all its talk of reform, Gorran’s leadership has been
putting personal politics first, robbing the party of a real opportunity to
push collaboratively for gradual, well-defined changes.
Barzani and the KDP could
end up paying the highest price. Their dogged determination not to yield to
demands for change will cost the party (and, by extension, the KRG) broad
popular support. The attempt by the PUK and Gorran to force the KDP’s hand on
Barzani’s mandate may have been futile, but it nonetheless reflects their
constituencies’ growing frustration with the KRG’s increasingly ineffective
governance. Despite a KDP boycott of the Kurdish National Assembly in June,
opposition parties still had enough seats to achieve quorum—a warning to
Barzani that he cannot assume that things will always go his way.
The inability of the PUK
and KDP to share power and govern effectively is also widening divisions
between their popular bases. Public dissatisfaction among some party leaders
could push the PUK and Gorran to seek greater autonomy for Sulaimaniya while
the KDP barricades itself in Erbil and Dohuk. Beefed-up checkpoints remain
along the unofficial internal border, and Gorran members were hassled on
their way into Erbil. In addition, discontent with the political class as a
whole is growing at the local level, due in part to months of unpaid salaries
and shortages of electricity, water, and gas. Behind closed doors, even the
peshmerga criticize the corruption, wasta-based appointments, poor chain
of command, and a lack of training or supplies that has led to recent
battlefield blunders and casualties. Like the civilian population, a large
number of peshmerga are reportedly going AWOL and smuggling themselves to
Europe.
The Kurds face further
challenges securing and governing the disputed territories, such as Ninewa and
Diyala, that they have acquired over the past fifteen months. The KRG has never
been good at governing large non-Kurdish or anti-KDP populations, and many
Arabs and Turkmen who prefer not to live under Kurdish rule will chafe at—and
ultimately challenge—KRG tutelage.
Deteriorating economic
and fiscal conditions will further test KRG cohesion. Falling oil prices,
interrupted exports via Ceyhan, and the reduction in budget transfers from
Baghdad have hit the KRG treasury hard, leading to delays in paying
public-sector salaries and a growing fiscal deficit. Fiscal pressure has played
into the ongoing political crisis; last month, the (KDP) minister of natural resources and the (Gorran) minister of finance traded blame over which ministry was responsible for
oil-receipt shortfalls. In addition, increasingly necessary austerity measures
could impact party patronage and leave the KDP vulnerable to popular criticism,
given how closely the KDP is associated with the current independent-export
policy and overall fiscal control of the KRG.
Ultimately, the situation
will undermine Barzani, his party, and the political class. The ongoing threat
of the Islamic State will provide some short-term cover for the KDP, allowing
it to use the security crisis to keep opponents at bay and to dampen dissent.
However, the KDP’s rival-cum-allies will eventually seek to take full advantage
of any perceived government failures to revive reform efforts.
This article is reprinted with permission from
Sada. It can be accessed online here.
Christine McCaffray van
den Toorn is the Director of the Institute of Regional and International
Studies at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimaniya. Raad Alkadiri is an
analyst of Middle East and Iraqi politics and a former advisor to the UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.