Enactivism

Probably the leading exponent of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this).
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online papers ). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein (who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century which I have also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I won’t dwell on it here.

This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you don’t. Much clearer is Fodor’s characterization which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2.

This is classic Hutto high level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin so can’t say how much of this text is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of “information” and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.” Yes and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with great (and unmatched) clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago.

I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I don’t see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the mind works at Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful activities” etc., helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of culture? Beginning and end of story.
Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible, is an even better filter for folly. In sum an excellent book with various faults which I try to correct.

Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016).

Video here: http://youtube.com/watch?v=Lar9ezwwEJE

In this work, I shall argue for the concurrence of genetic phenomenology and enactivism in their accounts of the structure of experience, and in their implications on the metaphysics of mind and nature.
In particular, I shall claim that both genetic phenomenology and enactivism lead to a kind of qualitative relationism, which constitutes an alternative to the prevalent conceptions of the intentionality of perception: qualitative internalism and qualitative externalism.
With qualitative internalism I refer to the thesis that perception implies the arising of certain subjective, qualitative appearances in the perceiver’s mind, when he or she enters into a causal relation with external, mind-independent objects that are endowed with purely physical-mathematical properties. This conception, then, claims that the qualitative properties of the objects of perception are merely subjective and, from the metaphysical standpoint, leads to scientific naturalism. However, qualitative internalism is not only at the basis of reductive physicalism, but is also presupposed by some forms of non-reductive naturalism, which claim that the physicalist ontology of nature has to be broadened to account for the emergence of the phenomenal properties of mental states (property dualism, strong emergentism).
Qualitative externalism, on the contrary, is the thesis that perception consists in the direct relation with mind-independent objects that, in themselves, are endowed with both qualitative and quantitative properties. This thesis, then, leads to direct-naïve realism, and it can also be seen as the basis of projects for the naturalization of the mind, which are based on an enlarged conception of nature (naïve naturalism).
However, both qualitative internalism and qualitative externalism conceive perception as a relation – mediated or direct – between mind and world defined as two pre-given domains that are each “in front of” the other.
In contrast to both qualitative internalism and qualitative externalism, I shall argue that the combination of genetic phenomenology and enactivism leads to a kind of qualitative relationism. In particular, this view must be developed in two steps, one preliminary to the other: static and genetic. From the static point of view, we must distinguish between sensory contents of perceptual states (sensations) and the qualitative properties of perceptual objects, which come to be constituted through the intentional animation of sensations. From the genetic standpoint, in light of the genetic deepening of transcendental phenomenology, sensations (subjective) and sensible properties (objectual) must be conceived as dynamic and relational properties that are genetically co-constituted in the temporal articulation of a flow of primal impressions. In particular, in light of this account, both subject and object of experience turn out to emerge together in a process of dependent co-origination. The latter notion, precisely, is put by the enactive approach, in its original proposal by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (The Embodied Mind), at the heart of a view that replaces the neat duality of subject-object with a relation of dependent co-origination.
Thus, I shall argue that the qualitative relationism that follows from the combination of genetic phenomenology and enactivism can be put at the basis of an enactive-correlative approach to ontology – an enactive ontology – which investigates the genetic co-constitution of different ontological domains.
In this way, the relationist and genetic analysis of experience developed by genetic phenomenology and enactivism leads to a non-substantialist and non-reductive account of the relation between consciousness and nature, which looks at their fundamental correlation, constituting an alternative to mainstream naturalism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Through the reference to Varela’s project of neurophenomenology, in particular, I shall claim that this approach, which looks at the co-emergence of consciousness and nature in reciprocal dependence, constitutes also a fruitful method for the analysis of the correlation between phenomenological data and neuroscientific data, which does not reify neither of the poles of the experiential relation.

A matter of degree: Free will and decision making in light of the enactive approach to cognition

Conference Paper · October 2016

Conference: 19th International Multiconference INFORMATION SOCIETY - IS 2016 / Cognitive science, At Ljubljana, Jozef Stefan Institute, Volume: B, page 8-11

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgpkn7A-p50&t=541s

Article:

http://library.ijs.si/Stacks/Proceedings/InformationSociety/2016/IS2016_Volume_B%20-%20Kognitivna.pdf

С позиции парадигмы метафоры «живого» знания и теории интерпретирующего познания обоснован субъектный принцип реализации и функционирования перевода. Предложена операциональная трактовка перевода (в трех процессуальных измерениях - акт, событие и практика) как интерпретирующей когнитивно-дискурсивной деятельности живого человека, т.е. активной и пристрастной личности, в единстве индивидуального и социального, ментального, телесного и аффективного, во взаимодействии со средой. Предлагаемая концепция выводит на новый уровень познания проблему «видимости» переводчика.

The article integrates the perspectives of the “living” knowledge paradigm and the theory of interpretive cognition to ground the subject principle of enacting and functioning of translation, that implies the mind of the living person (in its unity with the body) as the only ontological actuality of translation phenomenon in all its procedural dimensions (translation act, translation event, translation prac- tice). Thus, the concept of translation proposed in the article is an operational (procedural) and an anthropocentric (translator-centered, embodied) one. It casts new light on the classical problem of the translator's visibility, which is explained in cognitive terms. The article explores translation as an interpretive cognitive activity (evaluative sense-making) of an inevitably biased actor as both cognitive and social agent, whose “living” knowledge hypertext, enabling, mediating and shaping this activity, incorporates the results of individual and social, mental, perceptual and affective cognition in their dynamic unity and as such represents not some “objective” reality but the individual experience of interaction with the environment the person is embedded in. Thus, it is claimed that it is the translator's and never the author's or the text's intention that is at stake in translation act and that the target text relays (and never transfers) only the translator's “living” knowledge structures, described in the paper as innovative.

Creative Evolution: Mind, biosocial plasticity and material engagement
11 June 2016, Keble College, Oxford University

I will be discuss the structure and phenomenology of coupled action, making connections to Dynamic Systems Theory, Material Engagement Theory and the enactivist action-oriented theories of perception. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of how habits envelop objects that we engage with (e.g. the blind man’s cane), and how this produces a global—or, at least, non-discrete—reworking of our phenomenological field of significance. I will explain this coupling between bodies and artifacts in language of Dynamic Systems Theory, especially in terms of how emergent properties of a system can emerge out of the interactions among more basic parts, but is not reducible to these parts. I will then talk about how Merleau-Ponty’s description of the field of signification can be described in the language of affordances in order to make some connections to the concept of material agency in Material Engagement Theory. I by making some brief remarks about the phylogenetic preconditions that make this sort of material engagement a ubiquitous feature of our species-situation.

In viewing language as multi-scale coordination , a distributed view challenges central postulates of linguistics. It not only denies that language is essentially 'symbolic' but also that verbal patterns are represented inside minds or brains. Rather, language is, at once, collective, individual and constitutive of the feeling of thinking. It is distributed between us. Those pursuing this view have made two major advances. First, language is traced to, not a neural faculty, but a history of interactivity. Second, humans because humans constantly cope with lack of understanding, they have come to rely on time-ranging. I conclude that this offers a rich view of meaning to an inclusive ecolinguistic agenda. Much can be gained, I argue, if linguists strive to encourage bio-ecological awareness.

Einleitung:
Seitdem in der phänomenologischen Psychiatrie die intersubjektive Erfahrungsdimension intensiv beforscht wird, erweist sich insbesondere die von Wolfgang Blankenburg initiierte „Psychopathologie des common sense“ als eine vielversprechende Forschungsdomäne für ein sozial orientiertes Verständnis psychischer Erkrankungen.
Methode:
Nach einem kurzen philosophiehistorischen Überblick zum common sense wird unter dem inhaltlich angemesseneren Begriff des sensus communis eine phänomenologische Theorie entworfen, die verschiedene zeitgenössische Konzepte der anthropologisch-psychiatrischen Forschung integriert.
Ergebnisse:
Der Begriff des sensus communis erlaubt es nicht nur, Konzepte wie die der „Verkörperung“, der „Enaktivität“, sowie der „Zwischenleiblichkeit“ und der „Lebenswelt“ zu integrieren, sondern auch, die Verbindung zwischen Psychiatrie und Sozialwissenschaften zu vertiefen. Der sensus communis lässt sich dabei in einen Sinn zur intermodalen Umgebungs-Wahrnehmung, ein implizites Gespür für soziale Interaktionen sowie schließlich den „gesunden Menschenverstand“ für pragmatisches Handeln ausdifferenzieren. Diese drei Vermögen sind „an der Gemeinschaft für die Gemeinschaft herangebildet“ (Blankenburg) und können fruchtbar auf psychopathologische Fragen angewendet werden. Abschließend wird auf weiterführende, sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsaspekte sowie therapeutische Implikationen hingewiesen.

The paper seeks to shift ecolinguistic focus from discourse to the bidirectional coupling of the human and the living world. In so doing, it endorses Gregory Bateson's unity of mind and nature. Accordingly appeal is made to the bio-ecology, a domain affected by, not just languages, but also individual and collective agency. Indeed, humans change the world by linking social modes of control with individual skills based on life-history. On this eco-logic, humans are both collective agents and living subjects that act within the bio-ecology. To pursue the reciprocal relations of humans and the living is to clarify the limits of scientific knowing. Accordingly, ecolinguistics has the mission, first, of critiquing models that separate the human from the living and, second, of raising the bio-ecology's profile. It needs to build a bio-logic where life draws on energetics, values and how human (and other) collectives behave. Critical approaches to discourse can be complemented by work aimed at bio-ecologial awareness. Ecolinguists can join scientists and the many others who stress our responsibility for terrestrial life or, in the terms of ancient Chinese tradition, for harmony between heaven and earth.

Coherence substantiates a dynamic order between a
system’s components, thus representing an important
organisational principle in life and cognition. Coherent
activity of neuronal assemblies correlates with all basic
cognitive functions, including consciousness, and
coherence is also an important mechanism of
interneuronal signal processing, e.g., information en-
(de)coding, communication and synaptic plasticity.
However, according to enactive approach to cognitive
science that emphasises organisational autonomy, the
brain is not only an information processing machine, it
also interprets information from its environment
according to the system’s norms, and thus creates the
meaning. We specify the potential role of coherence as a
dynamic relation principle- within a cognitive system
and with its environment- that could mediate the
meaning.

We present a potential new view of solution focused brief therapy (SFBT), based on the development of descriptions in therapy conversations. This version of SFBT leaves out many accepted aspects of the model, so far, including: tasks, end of session compliments, exceptions to the problem and compliments.  We address the issue of theory in solution focused practice and make a distinction between theory as mechanism and explanation – a ‘scientific’ approach, and more philosophical theory which can act as a useful guide to attention for practitioners. We point to potential connections between this view of SF work and recent developments in the field of enactive cognition and post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind, including narrative philosophy.