Social Cognition

Two experiments (Experiment 1 N = 350; Experiment 2 N = 153), used relatively simple (Experiment 1) and complex (Experiment 2) vignettes to investigate whether two ostensibly distinct mental states that underlie intentionality judgments influence each other, related mental states, and agent morality, and also whether they affect blame through different routes. Knowledge (that a particular action can lead to a particular outcome) affected perceptions of an agent's desire by first increasing blame, which increased perceptions that the agent was aware of acting, while acting. Desire (for a particular outcome) affected blame and perceptions of agent knowledge by increasing perceptions that the agents were immoral (measured after knowledge and desire were described, but before the agents' action and the harmful outcomes were described), which influenced perceptions of the agents' awareness. The importance of these findings for mental state perception research, including the relationship of mental states to blame, is discussed.

The vagus nerve is a major constituent in the bidirectional relationship between the heart and the prefrontal cortex. This study investigated the role of the vagus in social cognition using the cold face test (facial cooling) to stimulate the vagus nerve and increase prefrontal inhibitory control. Heart Rate Variability (HRV) was measured to index parasympathetic outflow while social cognition ability was tested using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). Healthy males (n=25) completed the RMET under two conditions: with and without facial cooling. Results indicated that although facial cooling increased HRV at rest, there was no improvement on the RMET during the facial cooling condition. Interestingly, completing the RMET with facial cooling abolished this increase in HRV, suggesting interference along the vagal reflex arc. These results are consistent with the involvement of a common cortico-subcortical circuit in autonomic and cognitive processes, important for emotion recognition.

The nature and underpinnings of infants’ seemingly complex, third-party, social evaluations remain highly contentious. Theoretical perspectives oscillate between rich and lean interpretations of the same expressed preferences. Although some argue that infants and toddlers possess a “moral sense” based on core knowledge of the social world, others suggest that social evaluations are hierarchical in nature and the product of an integration of rudimentary general processes such as attention allocation and approach and avoidance. Moreover, these biologically prepared minds interact in social environments
that include significant variation, which are likely to impact
early social evaluations and behavior. The present study examined the neural underpinnings of and precursors to moral sensitivity in infants and toddlers (n = 73, ages 12–24 mo) through a series of interwoven measures, combining multiple levels of analysis including electrophysiological, eye-tracking, behavioral, and socioenvironmental. Continuous EEG and time-locked event-related potentials (ERPs) and gaze fixation were recorded while children watched characters engaging in prosocial and antisocial actions in two different tasks. All children demonstrated a neural differentiation in both spectral EEG power density modulations and time-locked ERPs when perceiving prosocial or antisocial agents. Time-locked neural differences predicted children’s preference for prosocial characters and were influenced by parental values regarding justice and fairness. Overall, this investigation casts light on the fundamental nature of moral cognition, including its underpinnings in general processes such as attention and approach–withdrawal, providing plausible mechanisms of early change and a foundation for forward
movement in the field of developmental social neuroscience.

Stanfield, C. T., Ginsburg, H. J., & Tooley, K. (May 2015).
The self-consistency effect represents human motivation to protect the self-concept from alterations. Such an error occurs when properties of mind are ascribed to non-sentient representations of humans (e.g. avatars). Mentalizing attempts to explain this phenomenon, suggesting the effect is due to social cognitive processing. If influenced by social mechanisms, then only agentive stimuli would activate the self-consistency effect, indicating a one-system domain-specific process. However, numerous studies find this effect is also activated by non-agentive directional stimuli, such as arrows, suggesting a two-system domain-general process occurs. We tested the two theories by inducing the self-consistency effect. Additionally, as little research had been conducted on context, reaction times were measured when the context of the avatar’s sightedness (sighted versus blind) was manipulated. Participants (N = 23) were asked to make quick judgments during a dot perspective task based on perspective cues, either
Self (participant) or other (avatar). Some trials were consistent (all dots in front of avatar) while others were inconsistent (dots in front of and behind avatar). As predicted, an interaction (slower reaction times) occurred during other-inconsistent trials. A contextual effect was predicted to occur in relation to visual perspective cue manipulation, resulting in slower reaction times during the sighted avatar trials when compared to the blind avatar trials. Though non-significant, a trend was observed as slower reaction times during these trials occurred. Thus, a larger sample size may yield results indicating an impact of the stimuli’s context on cognitive processing.

It is clear that harmful agents are targets of severe condemnation, but it is much less clear how perceivers conceptualize the agency of harmful agents. The current studies tested two competing predictions made by moral typecasting theory and the dehumanization literature. Across six studies, harmful agents were perceived to possess less agency than neutral (non-offending) and benevolent agents, consistent with a dehumanization perspective but inconsistent with the assumptions of moral typecasting theory. This was observed for human targets (Studies 1-2b, and 4-5) and corporations (Study 3), and across various gradations of harmfulness (Studies 3-4). Importantly, denial of agency to harmful agents occurred even when controlling for perceptions of the agent’s likeability (Studies 2a and 2b) and while using two different operationalizations of agency (Study 2a). Study 5 showed that harmful agents are denied agency primarily through an inferential process, and less through motivations to see the agent punished. Across all six studies, harmful agents were deemed less worthy of moral standing as a consequence of their harmful conduct and this reduction in moral standing was mediated through reductions in agency. Our findings clarify a current tension in the moral cognition literature, which have direct implications for the moral typecasting framework.