The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam

The period 1963–65 was one of the most tumultuous times for the United States in all its history, for these years saw American military power committed to a war in Indochina which was to divide Americans to a degree unprecedented since the Civil War a hundred years before. Two presidents served during these years—John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

In examining this critical period, this chapter will focus on the role of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. To place their role in the proper context it is important to understand the nature and organization of the...

After the fateful decisions of 1965, American forces were deployed to Vietnam in a steady stream as fast as units could be brought to a state of combat readiness; and by mid-1967 American combat troops were heavily engaged in much of South Vietnam. In April 1965 I had been ordered from the Washington scene to the Dominican Republic to command the U.S. forces operating there during the period 1965–66.¹ My Dominican adventure was followed by a year (1966–67) commanding the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where we were very much concerned with readying units of...

At headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam, I replaced a very fine soldier, Lieutenant General Jean Engler, perhaps the most respected logistician in the U.S. Army at the time. When I arrived on the scene many horrendous logistic problems had already been largely solved. It is easy to point out deficiencies in hindsight, so the remarks that follow are offered in a constructive spirit and are not intended to detract from the thousands of talented, hard-working, dedicated support people who made large-scale U.S. operations in Vietnam possible.

HQ USARV had a strong staff. Brigadier General Robert Taber was my chief of staff...

It turned out to be my lot to serve out the final years of direct American involvement in the Vietnam War as the Army vice chief of staff in Washington. In this capacity, I could view those years from the perspective both of the JCS and of the highest command level of the Army, not to mention the civilian stewardship of the Army and the Department of Defense.

While in Vietnam I had not fully appreciated the seriousness of dissent back home, in particular the magnitude of the riots in the United States in the spring of 1968 following the...

Although the Vietnamization process and the disengagement of U.S. troops from the war began in earnest in the latter part of 1969, few people realized how soon or where the mettle of South Vietnamese forces would be put to the test. The new strategy of Vietnamizing the war, while at the same time bringing greater military pressure to bear on Hanoi and steadily withdrawing U.S. forces, turned on the ability of the South Vietnamese to carry on the war on their own. In this sense the new strategy was a gamble, betting that the South could hold its own with...

As the crucial year of 1972 approached, MACV and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff worked overtime to get the nation’s defenses in a better state of readiness to meet the next NVA invasion. It was expected to come in January or February 1972 and to hit hardest in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

An important element of the Vietnamization program entailed a large expansion of the regular South Vietnamese forces, which increased by almost one-third (from about 825,000 to over a million), while Saigon’s paramilitary forces almost tripled in size (from 1.3 million to 4 million). (Most of the...

Under the terms of the January 1973 cease-fire agreement, the United States and all other third countries agreed to remove their remaining forces from South Vietnam within sixty days. In addition, the United States agreed that it “would stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” that is, North Vietnam. Hanoi, on the other hand, was allowed to keep its forces in the South, supported from safe bases in the North and in Laos, while South Vietnamese military bases were vulnerable to attack. Neither North nor South Vietnam was allowed to accept the introduction...

So far, this examination has dwelt somewhat more on the negative aspects of U.S. involvement in Vietnam than on the positive side—things the United States did well. This is a natural outcome because the analysis to this point has been largely problem and issue oriented. This chapter will bring out some of the strengths, as well as the weaknesses, of American performance. U.S. Army activities will be the focus.

American direction and conduct of the war and the operational performance of our armed forces, particularly during the 1962–69 period, generally were professional and commendable. Performance continued to be...

The hard lessons learned, the questions raised, and the lingering issues will be part of the legacy of Vietnam. No doubt our experiences there will have a lasting impact on our foreign policy and related defense policy. The Vietnam tragedy will probably be an inhibiting factor in our external relations and domestic policies for at least a generation. On the other hand, a sudden shock like Pearl Harbor or a domestic disaster on the order of the Great Depression of the 1930s could well tum American attitudes around very quickly. In fact, in the early 1980s definite signs of a...

Let us now turn to what we as American citizens and military professionals should have learned from Vietnam. We are probably too close to this long, difficult period to grasp fully all its implications and ramifications. Many years will go by before the American people will begin to understand the war, and even more years before history makes a judgment. Nonetheless, we can examine what appear at this time to be the larger lessons, particularly those that in potential future conflicts could have far more serious consequences for the United States than was the case with Vietnam. This chapter will...