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More soldiers but weaker Army

Thursday, 09 April 2015 | Pravin Sawhney | in Oped
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The raising of Army's 17 Mountain Strike Corps, ostensibly to better protect India’s Line of Actual Control vis-à-vis China, is unaffordable and unnecessary. It will retard modernisation of the Armed Forces and weaken fighting capabilities

Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar should urgently consider discontinuing raising of the Army’s 17 Mountain Strike Corps (90,000 troops) which is unaffordable, unnecessary, will retard modernisation, and further weaken war fighting capabilities. The raising demonstrated the panic that gripped the Manmohan Singh Government after the Chinese forces’ three-week long April 2013 intrusion in Ladakh. It also showed the hands-off approach of India’s longest serving Defence Minister AK Antony towards his work, the little understanding of military matters by the political leadership, and the opportunism of the Army.

Cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security on July 17  2013, the corps, whose raising started on January 1, 2014, will cost the exchequer Rs1,10,000 crore at 2013 prices (not catering for cost and time overruns) over a 10-year period (2014-2022). This is in addition to two divisions (30,000 troops) — 71 and 56 mountain divisions — which were raised expeditiously between December 2009 and March 2010, also to ward-off the Chinese threat.

The quick raisings are having two deleterious effects on war preparedness. For the first time ever, the capital outlay of the Army’s annual defence allocation (highest of the three defence services), meant for acquisitions and modernisation, is being transferred each year to cater for increased pay and allowances. Moreover, the Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Philip Campose, has confirmed to the Parliament’s Defence Consultative Committee that the raisings (including the earlier two divisions) have been done using War Wastage Reserves.

WWRs are critical holdings of equipment, stores and ammunition at the Army Headquarters to fight a war. At present, the war preparedness situation is more precarious than in March 2012 when the Army Chief, General VK Singh’s letter to then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stating that the Army was not fit for war, got leaked to the media. The above setbacks are because raising of 17 Corps was not part of Defence Minister’s classified operations directive issued every five-year (2009 to 2014) to the defence services; it was not listed in the 15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan prepared by the Integrated Defence Headquarters (2012 to 2027); and was not financially catered for by the Defence Ministry.

A brainchild of General VK Singh, the file for the 17 Corps did not go far as his relations with the Defence Ministry soured over his age row. His successor, General Bikram Singh, also did not have much luck; after the raisings of the 71 and 57 Divisions, he was advised by Defence Ministry officials to focus on modernisation rather than accretion of forces. This, however, altered dramatically with the Chinese intrusion. Once the Army Headquarters re-named the sought forces as a strike or offensive corps against China, Mr Antony cleared the file even without consulting the chiefs of staff committee or the Integrated Defence Headquarters. The Finance Ministry and then National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon, instead, sought the advice of both to get a consensual opinion and Indian Air Force’s requirements.

Ironically, it was the NSA’s office, rather than the Defence Ministry, that questioned the logic of offensive land forces without air cover. None (including the inquisitive media) wondered about the viability of an offensive corps in high altitude areas ranging, from 10,000 feet to 18,000 feet along the Line of Actual Control, where survival of troops (especially without roads and even tracks), is in itself a Herculean task. In a presentation made on the request of the NSA in June 2013, which was attended by Mr Antony and Integrated Defence Headquarters, the Army Headquarters conceded that the 17 Corps was accretion forces meant for three tasks: To fill large unattended gaps in Arunachal Pradesh against Chinese increased intrusions; to provide rest and relief to forces on the LAC; and to be reserves for the Jammu & Kashmir theatre.

By ignoring the already 80,000 strong Rashtriya Rifles (RR is Army by another name) in Jammu & Kashmir, which could well be used as accretion forces, the Army played smart and succeeded in increasing its authorised strength. The RR (the largest counter-insurgency force in the world) is a temporary force meant to be disbanded once the Army is no longer required for internal stability operations within Jammu & Kashmir.

The 17 Corps comprises two parts. There are 30,000 accretion forces meant to strengthen defences especially in Ladakh and the middle sector. The remaining 60,000 troops, being called Army Headquarters reserves, will be raised and located in faraway central India. Most of these troops will be used for rotation of troops on the LAC. Let alone being strike or offensive, the bulk of 17 Corps will be nowhere near the LAC as bilateral treaties with China (1993, 1996 and 2013) disallow accretion of forces close to the border by either side without mutual consent.

Unfortunately, the September 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement has downgraded the Army’s border guarding task and strengthened the policing task done by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police on the LAC. To prevent violence, the BDCA disallows following or chasing patrols which manage to evade and intrude across the LAC. Hence, the only way to stop intrusions would be by physical presence and persuasion at the LAC through what is called ‘banner drill’; display of placards reading ‘Go Back.’

In an irony of sorts, the BDCA has put to rest the long-time bickering between the Army and the ITBP on the issue of ‘single point control.’ The Army had argued that regular border transgression by Chinese forces have blurred the distinction between war and peacetime on the LAC; according to Government ruling, the ITBP, under the Union Ministry for Home Affairs, will be placed under the Army’s control only during wartime. The BDCA, by its focus on policing, has strengthened the ITBP’s mandate. This explains the announcement of 49 new ITBP battalions by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh in January this year. From its present strength of 20 battalions on the LAC (four each in the western and eastern sectors and two in the middle sector), the ITBP will now have a total of 69 battalions (each with 1,200 troops) on the LAC for a task which is essentially theirs.

The Army’s 17 Corps will be reduced to doing policing duties on the LAC, just what the Army does on the Line of Control against Pakistan. Much against any military thinking the world over, the bulk of the Army has adopted an extremely defensive posture — a reminder of World War I trench warfare — on the LoC. All units deployed along the LoC from Jammu to Kashmir have a two or three-tier perimeter fence; then there is a three-tier anti-infiltration grid behind the fence on the LoC. Is it a surprise that terrorists attack Army units with complete knowledge of their targets? If the Army is to move towards professionalism, the suspension of 17 Corps raisings, which will add numbers to policing job, should be the immediate corrective measure. The Army has enough existing manpower for rest and relief at the two military lines.

(The writer, who is editor, FORCE newsmagazine, can be reached at pravin@forceindia.net)

 
 
 
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