The New Iraqi Air Force: F-16IQ Block 52 Fighters

Iraqi Air Force Evolution

Iraq’s purchase of armed scout helicopters was significant, because an Air Force that had once been one of the strongest in the region is currently reduced to few dozen planes and helicopters, with no front-line fighters, or attack helicopters with precision munitions. The ARH order would be a significant step forward in aerial combat power, though they will be employed in the internal anti-terrorist battle rather than acting to secure Iraq’s sovereignty against neighboring countries.

That level of security requires the ability to control the air over one’s own country, which is why the USAF has always planned to remain in Iraq for a number of years as a guarantor. The question that remains is how long they will be able to remain as a guarantor, and when Iraq will have an air force that can realistically assume even minimum-level air policing duties.

Iraq is slowly building its fighter force from the ground up. Cessna light planes serve as primary trainers, and some of the larger Cessna 208B Caravans have been modified to perform surveillance or even combat strike roles. T-6A Texan II turboprops serve for the next level of fighter training. After that, Iraq’s pilots have to go to the USA, to train on supersonic T-38 Talons. That will change when Iraq receives its own advanced jet trainers in 2015, and their selection of the L-159 ensures that these jet trainers will also end up serving a secondary combat role. “Iraq’s New Trainers: The Czech Is On The Way” has more coverage of Iraq’s choices.

In terms of its front-line fighters, its chosen F-16IQ Block 52s show a pattern of slight downgrades from the more advanced F-16C/D Block 52 base systems. The official export request’s determined avoidance of sophisticated air to ground weapons like GPS-guided JDAMs, or advanced air-to-air missiles, also seems designed to assuage regional fears. The net effect seems cleverly calibrated to give Iraq an air defense force that can handle aging threats from Syria or Iran relatively well, and perform strike missions within Iraq, without being a serious threat to more advanced air forces in the region. Regional memories among its Arab neighbors, as well as Israeli concerns, make that a smart starting point. Upgrades can always take place later, and the F-16IQs have at least some of the equipment required to handle more advanced weapons.

First flight took place in May 2014, and the 1st delivery of 2 planes is scheduled for September 2014, with at least 2 arriving every month thereafter. All 36 ordered fighters are expected to arrive by the end of 2015.

Even delivery of working fighter jets only represents a first step, rather than a solution. The 2010 formal DSCA request was just the beginning of a process that can take between 4 – 10 years from request to full operational capability, and Iraq is likely to fall somewhere in the middle. There’s much more involved than just flying a plane. For starters, Iraq will also need to implement and stand up radar surveillance and command and control capabilities, in order to tie its fighters into a working system. Then there’s the need for effective maintenance and support, something the Iraqis have had trouble executing with platforms that are much less complicated than an F-16. Not to mention training in an Iraqi environment so that everyone is on the same page, and effective parallel training of critical and difficult jobs like Forward Air Controller troops in the Army.

Local efforts should be possible some time in 2015, but realistically, Iraq won’t be able to enforce national air sovereignty before 2016 at the very earliest. A number of analysts have believed for some time that it will be years later than that, and effective close air support will take longer still. If it ever happens at all.

Contracts and Key Events

July 21/17: The US Air Force has awarded Textron Aviation Defense a $8.8 million contract to refurbish 15 T-6A Texan II training aircraft for the Iraqi Air Force. Work on the foreign military sale will be conducted at Inman Ali Air Base in Iraq, with a completion date scheduled for the second quarter of 2018 in order to meet Iraq’s demand for F-16 pilots in 2019. The light turboprop training aircraft serves as the main training platform for Iraqi pilots operating its main fleet of F-16IQ Block 52 fighters.

August 10/16: Iraq’s Defense Ministry has received delivery of its latest batch of four F-16 fighters. This brings to eight the number of fighters operational out of 36 promised by the US government. The sale goes toward bolstering the country’s growing air force fleet, replacing older Su-25s, in the government’s fight against the Islamic State.

March 2/15: Iraqi fighter pilots will continue to be trained in Tucson, Arizona after the Air Force gave a one year extension of Iraq pilot training. The $32 million deal will see Lockheed Martin continue the training of F-16 pilots until the end of February 2017. Baghdad has build up its fleet of F-16s in recent years, with 18 bought in 2011 and a further 18 purchased in 2014. The first pilots arrived in Tucson back in November 2014.

July 10/15: In response to recent reports in the Iraqi press, the US Embassy in Baghdad has stated that the country’s F-16IQ Block 52 fighters due for delivery will not be based in Jordan, as claimed by an Iraqi MP earlier this week. Embassy officials stated that the claims were “completely false”, with the F-16s set to operate out of Balad Air Force base, the location of recent intense fighting. The delivery of three Iraqi Air Force F-16s to the base was hampered by security concerns, with the aircraft instead delivered to Arizona for training.

Nov 10/14: Delivery. The situation around Balad remains unsettled enough (q.v. June 30/14) that the US government is going to deliver Iraq’s F-16s to Tucson, AZ instead. Pentagon spokesman Col. Steven Warren:

“We are going to deliver three F-16s to Tucson in December… then one per month after that through May for a total of eight F-16s. We expect the Iraqi pilots will begin flying their own aircraft for continuation training beginning in January…. All maintenance for the F-16s will be provided by [contracted] logistic support…. So they’re continuing their training, but instead of training using U.S. training aircraft they will now use their own aircraft in Tucson.”

The training will be better, but it does delay the existence of a serious air sovereignty force in Iraq. It also gives the USA some extra leverage over Iraq, via its decisions about delivery. Sources: Pentagon, “Iraqi Pilots to Train on Iraqi-purchased F-16s in Arizona”.

July 4/14: Training. Delivery isn’t the only problem for Iraq. From Stars and Stripes, “Iraq lacks ability to fly F-16s it seeks, US trainer says”:

“Twelve of the 18 Iraqi pilots undergoing F-16 training are at an Air Force facility in Tucson. Two have advanced to the final stage and should be certified to fly as lead pilots in mid-August, according to Tom Fox, a civilian government employee who manages the F-16 training program.

Six others have qualified as wingmen who would accompany the lead pilot in separate planes, and four are in basic training, Fox said. The plan is to train a total of 54 pilots. Fox said Iraq was having trouble paying the agreed-upon price for the training, so the Air Force created a payment plan to make it more affordable and keep it on track.”

June 30/14: Civil war delay. As the Iraqi government’s authority collapses in the north, it has affected F-16 delivery. From the Pentagon, “U.S. Continues Military Aid to Iraqi Government”:

“While the department hasn’t placed any restrictions on the F-16 aircraft delivery process in Iraq, [US Defense Department spokesman Army Col. Steven] Warren said, the relocation of contractors from Balad will cause some impact. Advances by ISIL militants triggered the evacuation of contractors from the air base.

“I don’t have a specific timeline for how the relocation of contractors from Balad will affect the delivery of the F-16. It certainly will,” he said. “These contractors were part of the process; they’re no longer operating in Balad.”

May 1/14: On the ground… A Wall Street Journal report offers a poor review of the Iraqi military’s performance, citing desertion, poor logistics, and insufficient support. Prime Minister Maliki’s policies of ethnic division haven’t exactly helped, and the conflict next door in Syria ensures that many Sunnis are returning home with even more battle experience. Close air support is especially problematic:

“In January, Gen. Dulaimi says, he was passing through a dense urban area of Ramadi in a column of nearly 50 Humvees, tanks and armored cars. They were ambushed by what he describes as hundreds of militants carrying machine guns, grenade launchers and improvised explosives…. [but] he was told that there were no airplanes capable of operating at night…. After nearly five hours, Baghdad sent a Russian-made prop plane loaded with two missiles—its maximum capacity. One of the missiles landed a direct hit, scattering the antigovernment commandos.”

The prop plane was almost certainly a very American AC-208 Combat Caravan, but it illustrates the problem. The other bad news is that even the arrival of F-16s isn’t going to help in the near term. The difficulty of conducting close air support without killing your own troops or making even more local enemies goes up sharply at the F-16’s high subsonic speeds, and even fancy gadgets like Sniper ATP surveillance and targeting pods won’t replace trained Forward Air Controllers on the ground and long experience working together. Sources: WSJ, “Fledgling Iraqi Military Is Outmatched on Battlefield: On Eve of Elections, Demoralized Army Is Losing Fight Against Islamist Militants” | See also: Defense One, “Iraq’s Elections Setting Up ‘Worst Case Scenario’ “.

Oct 25/13: In an interview with Reuters, Deputy National Security Adviser Safa al-Sheikh Hussein continues to press for F-16s, and adds a newer request: drones. Apparently “al Qaeda insurgents… are making swift advances in the west of the Iraq,” though a more cynical observer might say that their growing problem is the logical outcome of a consistent “we win, you lose” anti-Sunni approach by Iraq’s government. At any rate, Hussein says:

“The first thing the Prime Minister will ask for is to accelerate the processes for the shipment of drones and F-16s…. The initial response from the U.S. was positive, but it depends on the delivery time. We want them immediately… [but] Iraq will not die if it doesn’t get American weapons. Many countries are offering military equipment”

This last assertion is true, to a point. If they want Medium Altitude, Long-Endurance drones, the field shrinks once you step beyond the USA and Israel. If you want armed UAVs, the field shrinks to almost nothing. Fortunately for Iraq, the last couple of years have seen major steps forward in the MALE UAV field. Neighboring Turkey’s new Anka is unproven, and just lost its engine when China’s AVIC bought Thielert. Nearby in the UAE, the unarmed Predator XP-1 joint venture is still American enough to create problems if the USA demurs; but ADCOM’s United 40 is available and intriguing, albeit unproven. Italy’s Selex ES can offer Falco drones, which serve with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UN, but offer just 8-14 hour endurance; Falco EVO reportedly boosts that to 18 hours, which is more acceptable. Piaggio-Selex can add the larger P.1HH Hammerhead UAV, based on a civil aircraft and offering both heavier payloads and high-speed coverage. Then there’s France’s Sagem. Their glider-derived Patroller-R model’s 20 – 30 hour endurance is extremely well suited to border patrol, and its low payload isn’t an issue in that application. Sources: Reuters, “Iraq to press U.S. on drones, F-16s to fight al Qaeda”.

Sept 16/13: Training. L-3 Link Simulation & Training announces a contract modification to build the Iraqi Air Force 2 F-16 Block 52 Weapon Tactics Trainers (WTTs), 2 brief/debrief systems and 1 mission observation center, which will accompany the 2 Full Mission Trainers (FMTs, q.v. Feb 28/13) they’re already under contract for.

F-16 Block 52 FMT #1 is expected to be operational at Balad Air Base, Iraq during Q1 2015, with the rest of the systems ready to go by Q4 2015. The WTTs are a full cockpit simulator, without the FMT’s full motion simulation and 360 degree view. Instead, they’re more like a realistic cockpit with a screen up front. You can network the 2 simulator types, however, which will allow the Iraqis to train cooperative missions of up to 4 pilots. Sources: L-3, Sept 16/13 release.

Aug 2/13: Training. The Royal Jordanian Air Academy in Amman, Jordan has been issued a $29.4 million task order to pay for English language and technical training to Iraqi Air Force students. Training will be at the Royal Jordanian Air Academy, and is expected to be complete by Aug 8/14.

The US Air Education and Training Command Contracting Squadron/LGCI (International Contracting Flight) at Randolph Air Force Base, TX acts as Iraq’s agent (FA3002-12-D-0006, #0006).

Aug 5/13: The US DSCA announces Iraq’s official request to import an Integrated Air Defense System of surface-to-air missiles, ground radars, command and control, etc. Fulfillment of the $2.4 billion request is critical, if Iraq wants to give its small F-16 fleet any chance of enforcing its aerial sovereignty. Read “Iraq’s New Integrated Air Defense System” for full coverage.

June 10/13: Radars. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Linthicum Heights, MD receives a maximum $115 million firm-fixed-price contract to provide 38 AN/APG-68(V)9 radar systems: 16 for the Royal Thai Air Force and 22 for the Republic of Iraq. This foreign military sale also includes spares for F-16 operators Egypt, Morocco, and Pakistan.

The 22 radars would equip the 2nd ordered squadron, with 4 left over for spares.

This is a sole-source buy, as it must be, and $51.4 million is committed immediately. Work will be performed in Linthicum, MD, and is expected to be complete by Dec 20/17. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WWMK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, acts as the FMS agent for these orders (FA8615-13-C-6018).

April 2013: SIGIR report. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s quarterly report [PDF] discusses Iraq’s F-16 fleet. Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), had this to say:

“The two F-16 cases are designed to bring 18 aircraft each, with the first delivery of two planes scheduled for September 2014. Two will arrive every month thereafter, completing delivery by the end of 2015. Iraq would like them all today. They have given me a letter requesting acceleration, but they understand that we are accelerating as fast as we can. We were in the process of building the airbase infrastructure at al-Assad, and then they switched to Balad. That slowed things down. The F-16 cases, from a production standpoint, are on track. Pilot training is on track. We had some hiccups on pilot training – a couple of guys washed out – but we’re on track now.”

Feb 18/13: Training. Iraq becomes L-3 Link’s 11th export customer for F-16 training simulators, via an order for 2 full F-16 Block 52 simulators with HD World and Simusphere HD-9 technologies. Iraq’s simulators will also incorporate L-3’s simulated Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, which is worn by the pilot, and “a geo-specific visual system database of Iraq.” The US military has certainly visited often enough, so you’d expect them to have that part down pat.

The simulators will be built at L-3’s Arlington, TX facility. No delivery date was given, but the simulators’ importance for training Iraqi pilots makes that date information worth knowing. L-3 Communications.

Dec 17/12: Support. BAE Systems announces 2 contracts from Indonesia and Iraq valued at nearly $63 million. They’ll provide F-16 support equipment, test systems, and spares from their Fort Worth, Texas facility by early 2014.

BAE Systems has delivered more than 25,000 support equipment and test systems to more than 24 countries worldwide, and is working hard to carve out a niche in F-16 upgrades as well. Like their rival Lockheed Martin, BAE has a strong regional network, and they will work hard to develop their regional relationship with Iraq.

Nov 29/12: Sniper ATP. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Orlando, FL receives a $31.9 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, time and material contract to supply Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods for the Iraq Air Force. This is the 1st Iraqi order, and it may just be a sum to get production started, rather than the full amount. Combined, Iraq’s 2 DSCA requests would let them order up to 40 pods.

Work will be performed in Orlando, FL, and is expected to be complete by July 2015. It’s a Foreign Military Sale transaction, so the AFLCMC/WNKCB at Robins Air Force Base, GA manages the contract for their Iraqi client (FA8540-13-C-0008).

Oct 18/12: 18 more? Acting Defense Minister Sadoun al-Dulaimi tells Reuters that Iraq has signed a contract for another 18 F-16IQs, on the same terms as the initial 18-plane buy. He adds all of Iraq’s F-16s are expected to arrive before the end of 2018.” Confirmation has been sketchy so far, beyond Reuters.

Duliami reportedly added that Iraq was also talking with American officials about buying air defense systems and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. That’s an interesting comment, because Iraq just bought Russian counterparts to those systems. Reuters | Iran’s Press TV.

Aug 22/12: The Pentagon says Iraq’s F-16IQs will begin arriving in 2014. Defense News | DoD Buzz.

July 24/12: F-16s, Batch 1. Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, TX receives a $199.3 million firm-fixed-price, time-and-material, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to finish providing the government of Iraq with 18 F-16IQ fighters, plus support equipment, technical orders, integrated logistics support, and contractor logistics support. Lockheed Martin confirms that this figure is added to the $835 million Dec 5/11 contract, and not the beginning of a 2nd F-16 order.

Note that even those 2 contracts’ combined $1.03 billion (about $57.5 million per fighter) leaves out important items like $45 million for radars (vid. March 14/12), and other “government furnished equipment” add-ons. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and will run to May 30/18. The ASC/WWMK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8615-12-C-6012).

July 13/12: DB-110. Goodrich Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems in Westford, MA received a $71.5 million firm-fixed-price, time and materials, and cost-reimbursable, unfinalized contract action/letter contract for 4 DB-110 reconnaissance pod systems, for use on Iraq’s F-16IQ fighters. The amount involved suggests a substantial training, infrastructure, and service component, in addition to the pods; Oman’s cost for its same-day 4-pod contract was just $34.3 million.

Goodrich’s exportable derivative of the U-2 spy plane’s SYERS cameras offer 3 separate optical fields of view, and the pod has been ordered by 12 customers: Britain (Tornado), Egypt (F-16 C/D), Iraq (F-16C/D), Japan (P-3), Morocco (F-16C/D), Poland (F-16 C/D), Oman (F-16C/D), Pakistan (F-16C/D), Saudi Arabia (F-15S), the UAE (F-16E/F), and the USA. The DB-110 can be operated autonomously on F-16s, controlled by the pod’s reconnaissance management system, while imagery is viewed on the cockpit video display. Iraq’s Dec 15/10 and Nov 14/11 DSCA requests each specified up to 4 pods, as a competition between BAE’s AARS and Goodrich’s DB-110. The DB-110 appears to have won, and it’s a fairly high-end system to export to any country that’s a security concern. Then again, Pakistan and Egypt already operate them.

Work is to be complete by Sept 30/18. The ASC/WINK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract on behalf of its Foreign Military Sale client.

March 14/12: Radars. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Linthicum Heights, MD receives an $87.8 million dollar firm-fixed-price Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program contract, to provide 43 AN/APG-68v9 radar systems to the Republic of Iraq (22), the Royal Air Force of Oman (15), and the Royal Thai Air Force (6). Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, MD, and is expected to be complete by March 3/15. The ASC/WWMK at Wright Patterson AFB, OH manages this contract (FA8615-12-C-6047).

The AN/APG-68v9 is the standard radar for new F-16C/D aircraft. Northrop Grumman cites a 33% increase in air-to-air detection range over earlier versions, plus ground-looking synthetic aperture radar with mapping and 2-foot point target response. They also claim that the radar’s reduced weight, power, and cooling help contribute to 25%-45% lower support costs, though their baseline comparison for those costs isn’t clear.

Jan 20/12: Training begins. Gannett’s Military Times reports that:

“The first of the Iraqi pilots that will learn how to fly F-16s recently arrived in Tucson with the 162nd Fighter Wing, an Air National Guard unit that specializes in training foreign pilots to fly F-16s, said wing spokesman Maj. Gabe Johnson. The Iraqi pilot is slated to start the academic part of his training on Jan. 23 followed by hands-on flying from February through September, Johnson said.”

Dec 5/11: Well, those mystery aircraft are still a mystery. But the initial funding for the F-16 sale isn’t. Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, TX receives an $835 million firm-fixed-price, time-and-material and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for 12 F-16C and 6 F-16D Block 52 base aircraft, plus support equipment, technical orders, integrated logistics support, and contractor logistics support.

There are still other expensive parts like Pratt & Whitney engines (tipped by the “Block 52” designation), Northrop Grumman radars, etc., still to be bought, and modifications to be made to bring the planes to F-16IQ Block 52 status – unless those are covered by the “technical orders”. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and the contract runs to May 30/18. The ASC/WWMK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages this contract, as an agent for the government of Iraq (FA8615-12-C-6012).

Nov 4/11: Two separate Arabic reports by the Al-Baghdadeya satellite channel shed more light on Iraq’s timelines and plans. One quotes Iraq’s parliamentary Commission on Security and Defence, saying that Prime Minister Maliki will be pressing the USA for accelerated F-16 delivery by 2013, and denying any existing deals to lease further aircraft from the USA or elsewhere.

The other report quotes the same committee, which says that Iraq will need at least 6 fighter squadrons in order to exert full control of its airspace. That works out to about 78-96 aircraft, depending on how they choose to define squadrons. Absent foreign help, that will take some time.

Nov 14/11: Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee Chair Hassan Sinead had an interesting teaser for us all. Translated from URA Agency’s report [in Arabic]:

“The next week will see the flight of military aircraft to Iraq since 2003, as part of our national armament efforts for the protection of Iraqi airspace.” Sinead did not mention any other details about the quality of the aircraft, saying only: “you will see next week.”

DJ Elliott, who compiles the Iraqi Order of Battle, had these thoughts regarding the possibilities:

1. Mirage F1s in storage in France.
2. Obsolete MiGs in Serbia [I hope not]
3. Iran returning some Fighters [unlikely]
4. Salvage [unlikely]
5. Loaned from US
6. Not a “Fighter” but instead just a Jet [E.G. the Czech L159s? This is my bet.]

DID agreed with his top-odds pick, and that eventually came true. The deal had been in the works for some time, and L-159s were just the next step up from Iraq’s fielded T-6 trainers, but they can carry a wide array of aerial and ground attack weapons. We saw stored Mirage F1s as the 2nd most likely option, since there may be Iraqi pilots who have flown them before, a critical requirement for a true stopgap. Loaned F-16s from the USA are certainly possible, with the proviso that pilot training requirements mean they won’t be effective for a year or so. The one “instant delivery” option we might add is a loan from Gulf Cooperation Council countries: a handful of Mirage 2000-9s from UAE (same issues as F-16), or retiring Tornado F3 Air Defense Variant fighters from Saudi Arabia. The latter could even come with Saudi pilots in one of the fighter’s 2 seats; it wouldn’t be the first time foreign pilots have flown for a Mideast air force.

Sept 14/11: The USAF doesn’t quite confirm a deal, but they do give the strongest indication to date that one is close. Maj. Gen. Russell J. Handy, the commander of the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Iraq and director of Air Component Coordination Element-Iraq:

“I do not have any word yet that a letter of offer and acceptance is signed, but as you probably know, we did have a senior member of the Iraqi government visit Washington… Everyone that I talk to at every level of government in Iraq is convinced that that is the right approach for them. And so we’re very encouraged by those words, and we feel that we’re very close to them signing that letter of offer and acceptance… They are seeking to buy a larger number of F-16s than they had originally — up to 36… This first letter of offer and acceptance is for 18 of them … we hope to hear very soon that’s signed, but no final word yet on that.”

July 30/11: Aswat-al-Iraq:

“Iraqi premier Nouri al-Maliki announced today the 36 fighters deal with USA. In a press conference, following the parliamentary meeting of today, he declared that he signed a contract to develop Iraqi Air Force by buying 36 F16 fighters. This announcement denotes that Iraq has doubled the fighters deal from 18 to 36 planes, which shall be financed from the increasing oil revenues.”

Accounts differ slightly, with other reports mentioning only documents that revived negotiations, rather than a signed contract. There is no clarity at press time, though it’s worth noting that Lockheed Martin has not made any announcement. Defense News | Reuters.

July 11-12/11: After the Wall Street Journal reports that negotiations have started up again for F-16 fighters and air defense systems, Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh denies it. He reiterates that the F-16 plan is postponed, not canceled, due to budget issues. WSJ | Bloomberg.

Feb 16/11: Iraq is shifting the $900 million down payment on F-16s into food aid support, as global currency devaluation, a long global cycle of under-investment in farming, and some event-related shocks conspire to create significant inflation in global food prices. That has already led to significant unrest in many middle eastern countries. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has said that 6 million Iraqis out of a population of around 31 – 32 million possessed food ration permits, and pledged to increase spending on that program from $3 billion to $4 billion.

Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh has now stated that the F-16 money has been diverted toward improving food ration subsidies, and finance committee member Mohammed Khalil has confirmed it, adding that Iraq’s projected budget deficit of $13.3 billion ($68.56 billion revenues – $81.86 billion spending) also played a role in the decision.

That deficit’s size suggests that the F-16s won’t be replaced by a cheaper option like Mirage F1s, either, which creates some large long-term questions regarding Iraq’s defenses and foreign military presences. One option might be to station Gulf Co-operation Council country fighters at Iraqi bases, which would surely represent a seismic reversal from the Saddam years. Another option might be to have NATO assume air policing duties, as a fig leaf that could keep a substantial US presence. Middle East Online | Agence France Presse.

Jan 27/11: The French Ambassador to Iraq, Boris Boillon, confirms that France is proposing a deal for 18 Mirage fighters. The planes are not Mirage 2000s, however, but retrofitted Mirage F1s. Iraq operated that type before the US invasion, and had 18 ordered aircraft impounded by France as part of the international sanctions regime. Morocco operates an upgraded variant, the Mirage F1 MF2000, which may provide some guidance regarding potential retrofits. The planes are reportedly being offered for EUR 733 million ($997 million), or about 1/4 the price of 18 new F-16IQs.

Ambassador Boillon cited that price when he presented the French deal as a complementary option, rather than a competing choice. Tactical Report, on the other hand, contends that Iraqi Air Force Lt-Gen. Anwar Ameen prefers the Mirage 2000v9. The UAE is the only operator of that type, and wants France to buy back its fleet in return for a deal covering new Rafale fighters. Expatica France | Tactical Report | UPI.

Jan 26/11: Iraqi Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh tells a press conference that the Council of Ministers has approved the purchase of 18 F-16s, and budgeted an unspecified sum, thought to be a $900 million down payment. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is also the acting Defense Minister, would negotiate the deal’s final parameters. There has been talk of a $13 billion weapons buy, which would include the existing DSCA request for F-16IQs, but no confirmation as yet. The USA will reportedly deliver the F-16s to Iraq within 2-3 years, but in the meantime, and even for some time thereafter, Iraq will not be able to police its own airspace effectively. Iraq Order of Battle author DJ Elliott believes that 2018 would be the earliest date.

The F-16 is not Iraq’s only option. France is offering Mirage F1s, and DJ Elliott reports that the Iraqis may also be looking at a 3rd option: China & Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder. The JF-17 fills the same lower cost, non-interfering seller requirement as the Mirages, but offers a more modern aircraft than the Mirage F1, from an Islamic vendor. Al-Sumaria News [in Arabic] | Iraq-Business News | Saudi Arab News re: Iraqi readiness | DJ Elliott re: Iraqi readiness.

Dec 14/10: Aswat al-Iraq reports that Iraq’s Council of Ministers authorized the government to negotiate with the USA to buy 6 F-16s, and also authorized the minister also to continue negotiations with the French side to buy 18 Mirage 2000 jets as of 2012. Nearby, the UAE also flies this mix, and both aircraft are popular with countries in the Gulf region.

The composition of this set appears to indicate an interim buy, and there is some question regarding the accuracy of the Mirage designation. Continued negotiations could also involve the 18 Mirage F1s that Iraq ordered under Saddam, but France never delivered. France has sold used Mirage 2000s to other countries as well, vid. Brazil, and it may be in their interest to offer the Iraqis an aircraft that could become the foundation for a longer term force split. The UAE is looking to replace its Mirage 2000v9 fleet, which is very advanced by most standards, but they have asked Dassault to buy back their Mirage fleet in exchange for a Rafale sale. An Iraqi Air Force that’s already flying Mirage 2000s, and looking for a good price, would offer a natural option for some kind of 3-way deal. Time will tell.

Aug 2/10: The Government of Iraq has signed an agreement with the U.S. for 10 Iraqi Air Force pilots to begin prerequisite F-16 training. “This agreement follows the request submitted by the GoI to purchase 18 new Block 52 F-16 airplanes.”

The pilots are projected to begin training in the U.S. this fall, and upon graduation, these pilots will have completed all prerequisite flight training necessary to move immediately into F-16 training. The 12-17 month program will include all necessary components of T-6A Texan II and T-38 Talon training, including a course called Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals. The intensive flight training will be complemented with specialized English language training for aviation. Pentagon DVIDS.

April 9/10: AHN quotes General Nasier A. Abadi, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces:

“On the building of the Iraqi military forces, the general said the need of today is to build “Airforce” strength as till now most of the budget went to building army which has now “14 divisions.” From now on, “70% of the budget will go to Airforce,” he noted.

Although the Iraqi government will need at least “three sources (quotations),” for Airforce procurements, the general explained that there is a “special deal with the U.S. over the supply of F-16 fighter jets,” with a plan to partner with F-16 squadrons based in Iraq to “train” Iraqi pilots.”

April 6/10: DJ Elliott, who pens the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle, reports a tip that:

“Iraq has finally and formally requested 24 F-16s from the US. At this time they are not at the ‘order’ stage but as I noted in my commentary to you in November 2008 the possibility of an Iraqi LOA by the end of this year – if President Obama agrees – is feasible. Delivery could start as early as next year but likely in 2012/13 time frame.”

That tip came without confirmation or sourcing, but DJ later received a verbal confirmation from Scramble magazine, and adds:

“Boss of the IqAF thought that he would need 96 F16s minimum. 24 indicates the start of the first of at least 4 orders. Looks like the planned target is still 2020.”

The next step for Iraq is formal DSCA publication of their request, once it gets through the US State Department’s bureaucracy and political approvals. Congress would then have 30 days to block the sale. Failing that, a contract/ Letter of Acceptance could be signed.

March 5/10: DJ Elliott, who pens the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle, offers his assessment of both the Iraqi Air Force by 2012, and the most probable USAF force required to secure the country:

“In 2012, the Iraqi Air Force will not have any fighters unless they are provided with used aircraft. Even in that case, they will be 3 years at minimum training personnel to make those aircraft a functional and effective air defense force. Helicopter support forces will be further in development but, still under strength and in training. Fixed-wing transports will still be in delivery. Only the reconnaissance and training wings will be [fully] operational in 2012.”

…US Air Force in Iraq – Will probably base 6 Fighter Squadrons at Tallil, Balad, and Al Asad. Their duties will include training the Iraqi Air force in air combat maneuvering and providing air defense until they are operational. This will probably be needed until 2018-2020, however, delays in delivery and training could extend this requirement.

US Air Force in theater support – Transport aviation would probably be based in Kuwait to provide the majority of the supply needed by air. Additional aviation could be rapidly deployed to reinforce from Europe and the US if needed.”

Nov 22/09: Al-Sabah reports [in Arabic] that Iraqi Prime Minister Talabani’s visit to France:

“…resulted in the signing defense agreements to train the Iraqi army and updated on 18 aircraft (Mirage F-1) and helicopters, and provide 300 scholarships,…”

Thanks to DJ Elliott for assistance with translation. The Mirage F1s were left in France for servicing during the 1990s, and apparently remained there due to arms embargoes imposed after Operation Desert Storm. The report offers no delivery date, but fielding Mirage F1s would offer Iraq a near-term option that would be difficult to fulfill with new-build aircraft.

Oct 20/09: Lockheed Martin CFO Bruce Tanner, discussing Q3 2009 earnings, reveals that Morocco and Iraq will be delaying their planned F-16 purchases “beyond 2011”. Q3 Podcast [MP3] | Q3 Earnings slides [PDF] | Flight International.

Sept 9/09: U.S. Air Forces Central have sent a team to assess how Iraq will maintain sovereignty of their airspace after U.S. Forces withdraw from Iraq on Dec 31/11. From Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq:

“During their visit to Iraq in early September, the Air Sovereignty Assessment Team met with the Iraqi minister of defense, the deputy commander of the Iraqi air force, the Iraqi air force staff, and U.S. advisors attached to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission- Air Force.

“The goal is to make sure Iraq maintains sovereignty by bridging the gap after we leave,” said Lt. Col. Daniel E. Rauch, deputy advisor from ITAM-Air Force to the Iraqi air staff for planning. “The accelerated schedule of the Security Agreement creates a period of time when Iraq does not possess the foundational capability to ensure air sovereignty or defend against the perceived threat.”

July 28/09: Looks like the timeline is indeed serious. An American Forces Press Service article says the US Air Force is sending an assessment team to Iraq to look at how the Iraqi military can field an air defense once American forces leave in 2011.

“The Iraqis probably will not be able to field advanced air-to-air manned interceptors by the time U.S. forces leave the country at the end of 2011, [Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, commander of Multinational Force Iraq] said. The U.S. team will work with Iraqi officials to look for creative solutions to the problem, the general said… “We’re going to bring this team over here to try and get them some creative solutions that might allow them to have some capacity by 2011,” Odierno said, citing use of retired U.S. F-16 fighters or the purchase of aircraft from other countries as possible steps in the process.”

March 31/09: Reuters quotes IqAF head Lt. Gen. Anwar Ahmed as saying that Iraq wants to buy an initial squadron of F-16s in 2009, to help guard against perceived threats from Iran and Syria.

“[Ahmed] said he hoped to sign a contract for 18 advanced F-16s… “This is very important to us… It is a priority.” Provided funds are made available by Iraq’s Parliament, he said his goal was to acquire up to 96 F-16s through 2020. He cited the F-16C/D Block 50/52 models now being produced for Poland, Israel, Greece and Pakistan…

If the funds are freed and a deal is wrapped up this year, the first two Iraqi-piloted F-16s would be patrolling Iraqi skies by 2012, he said… Ahmed, 54, said he had met a U.S. Air Force team in Baghdad on March 18 to discuss F-16 purchases and held follow-up talks with Pentagon officials on Tuesday. So far, he said, U.S. officials supported Iraq’s push to acquire the F-16.”

Sept 5/08: The Wall Street Journal reports that Iraq is seeking 36 “advanced model” F-16s.

Appendix A: Technology Options

So, far, Iraq has picked 18 modified F-16C/D Block 52 fighters as its initial core. That’s a start, but its parliamentary Commission on Security and Defence has indicated that 6 squadrons of fighter jets (about 96-100) is the minimum required for control of Iraqi airspace.

Iraq can choose to meet that need by buying more F-16s, or it can look to a mixed fleet, and try to make training rather than manufacturing the gating item for readiness. Technology options for Iraq’s front-line fighters separated into 2 tiers: F-16 options, and supplementary aircraft.

In September 2008, the Wall Street Journal’s use of the term “advanced F-16s” was generally interpreted to mean the standard F-16 C/D Block 50/52+ models requested or bought by recent customers like Chile, Greece, Morocco, Poland, Pakistan, Romania, Turkey et. al. Even Iraq’s DSCA request could not come to pass without technology export approvals, and clearance for various F-16 types, and for equipment and weapons sold in conjunction with the aircraft, are a political issue in the region. Fortunately for Iraq, the F-16 is already flown by a number of countries in the region, including Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. These aircraft include a number of early F-16A/B models, plus a larger set of upgraded early models and F-16C/Ds. Which is more or less what Iraq ended up ordering in its downgraded F-16IQ Block 52s.

The question is what comes next.

Advanced F-16 variants beyond even the Block 50 models also exist in the region. Israel flies all F-16 models including its own F-16I, which modifies the F-16D Block 52+ and adds a lot of Israeli electronics, equipment, and weapons. The UAE is a another exception, flying the world’s most advanced F-16s: the F-16 E/F Block 60 Desert Falcon with built-in infrared surveillance and targeting, the AN/APG-80 AESA radar, and an engine upgrade, among other improvements.

Both of these options are future non-starters, given the impossibility of an Israeli sale, and the ground reality that some of Iraq’s political parties have close ties to Iran.

Iraq could choose to keep ordering similar F-16s. The formal US DSCA request did match DID’s earlier estimate of $4-6 billion for an initial new-build fighter fleet of 18, plus its associated spares, weapons, etc. Subsequent deals can be expected to be cheaper, and what Iraq actually spends will be set by negotiations, but ramping up to a full fleet of 96 new planes won’t be cheap, or fast.

One way to reduce the additive total for subsequent jet purchases is if Iraq chose to buy some used F-16s, like the AIM-7 Sparrow missile capable American “F-16 A/B ADF” models bought by Jordan and Portugal. Former US Air National Guard flies F-16C/D Block 25 aircraft have been offered to Romania, for example, and a similar possibility still exists for Iraq as a stopgap measure. American F-16 C/D Block 30-42 aircraft may also be available.

The ultimate question is not one of money, however, or even of model, but of time. The 2010 formal DSCA request is just the beginning of the process. Actual signed contracts can take anywhere between 30 days to 4+ years after the official request, and in this case, they took a year. Fighter aircraft delivery times add another 1-3 years. Full training and proficiency adds another 2-3 years.

An Iraqi state that will need serious national fighter options as of 2012, was always certain to be disappointed by even the best timelines. Buying used aircraft for immediate delivery can help, which is why a future buy of used F-16s cannot be entirely ruled out.

Another way around the problem is to induct more than 1 type of fighter, raising numbers quickly through parallel purchases.

The most prominent option may already be flying nearby. The United Arab Emirates currently operates a fleet of just over 60 Mirage 2000-9s, an advanced variant that’s comparable to any F-16C/D now flying. Their Thales RDY-2 radars are upgraded for full ground strike capability, including SAR/GMTI (synthetic aperture radar with ground moving target indicator). That’s complemented by the Shehab laser targeting pod (a variant of Thales’ Damocles), the Nahar navigation pod, and a datalink to improve integration with MBDA’s MICA-ER radar guided missiles. This information feeds into upgraded cockpit color displays, and the optional TopSight helmet mounted display. Defensive systems and internal navigation also feature strong improvements over earlier Mirage 2000 models.

The Emirates are considering a replacement purchase of Dassault Rafale fighters, which would be even more advanced than their F-16 E/F Desert Falcons. As part of that deal, however, they’re pushing for France to buy back their Mirage fleet. France isn’t likely to do do that without a ready buyer, and the new Iraqi Air Force would be the best option by far for all concerned. France would cement its position with a new-old customer, the UAE could assist Iraq with training and transition, and both countries wold also have financial and geo-political interests served by the transaction.

It remains to be seen whether that deal can be done. There is reported interest within Iraq’s air force, but there are also budgetary limitations, given the apparent commitment to F-16s. A Mirage 2000-9 buy would offer Iraq a diversified supplier base, but it would also carry a completely different maintenance and weapons base, driving up the air force’s operating costs and reducing its flexibility. On the plus side, a 3-way deal with the UAE would offer very rapid delivery, and local support.

In the mean time, France is offering Iraq a low-cost supplement: upgraded Mirage F1s. Iraq operated this type for a number of years, but France impounded 24 of the 126 ordered F1EQ planes as part of the sanctions effort against Saddam Hussein. The products of a September 1985 order wouldn’t be very helpful in 2010, but the type’s own state of the art has advanced since then. Dassault and Thales have been working with Morocco on a “Mirage F1 MF2000” upgrade, which would bring the type to near-parity with many of the systems and weapons used on the Mirage 2000.

A similar set of upgraded Mirage F1s would offer Iraq a fast near-term solution. One that’s available by 2012 and familiar to some of its old pilots, while forming a natural bridge to future sales of Mirage 2000 or Rafale aircraft, at only 25-33% of the cost of a new F-16 buy. Iraq has been looking to recover EUR 651 million for that failed delivery, which could factor into negotiations. On the other hand, France forgave 80% of Iraq’s EUR 4.8 billion debts, and could easily argue that any damages have already been redressed as part of that EUR 3.84 billion forgiveness package.

There are also rumors of a wild card option: Pakistan and China’s JF-17 Thunder, which entered operational service with Pakistan in 2010. The type uses a Russian RD-93 engine, derived from the RD-33 engines that used to equip Iraqi MiG-29s, but the weapons and avionics are Chinese. Reliability would be lower than F-16s or Mirages, but performance would be similar to mid-range F-16 models or upgraded Mirage F1 MF2000s. The initial cost would be cheap compared to other new aircraft choices, but the planes would require their own maintenance, supply and weapons chains, driving up long term operating costs.

Unless negotiations with Lockheed Martin go seriously sideways, the JF-17s would appear to be dueling with Dassault’s Mirages for the role of “possible F-16 supplement” in the new Iraqi air force. Unlike France, China doesn’t have a deep relationship history with Iraq’s military, or a strong presence in the region. What it does have is state-linked firms that have bought into significant Iraqi oil leases, and growing international credibility as a “no strings” supplier and political backer. Pakistan’s role in the JF-17’s design would even give it a unique positioning as an “Islamic alternative.”

Beyond the operational questions, lies a political issue. An Iraqi buy of Chinese fighters would send shockwaves throughout the Middle East. It would be seen as the dawn of a Chinese role as a serious player in the region, beyond its current relationships with rogue nations like Iran and Sudan. That regional impact has both attractions and downsides for the Iraqi government.

Appendix B: Political Background

While events can always overtake even the best of plans, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has told reporters that he wants all American forces to be able to leave Iraq by 2011. The insertion of language by hostile Iraqi parties that would have made US soldiers subject to prosecution under Iraqi laws, and a surprising lack of focus by the USA on negotiating an extended Status of Forces agreement, will effectively end the US presence by 2012.

An Iraqi request for F-16s would have fit well with that strategy – if it had been made in early 2006.

No country can remain sovereign if it cannot control its own air space, and having its own fighter aircraft available for missions would give Iraqis far more leeway to make independent decisions about the future direction, training, and use of their military. The problem is that procurement, plus training, plus qualification of that air force for serious combat, takes years. With no formal request published as of early April 2010, and a contract that only begins at the end of 2011, Iraq has no realistic internal options.

That 2011 timetable was always a tall order; in fact, it was probably impossible from the outset. Even as the war in Iraq calmed down, and the insurgency was defeated, the USAF operated about 300 aircraft of all types in Iraq, supplemented by US Navy fighters. That force will not be replaced by 18 F-16s – nor would such a force provide sovereignty insurance against Iraq’s neighbors. Indeed, the new Iraqi Air Force is unlikely to have any operational F-16s before 2015 at the very earliest.

If Iraq wishes to go beyond air-air roles for its F-16s and perform close air support as well, its air force will find that this is a demanding task all its own, requiring pilot practice, followed by combined-arms training with properly equipped ground forces, in order to be effective. The USAF has deliberately slowed Iraq’s progress in this area for various operational and political reasons, and so there is no current base of expertise or equipment for the IqAF to build upon. If the IqAF wishes to be able to replicate the crucial role performed by American and British fighter jets in the Iraqi Army’s March 2008 Battle for Basra, therefore, or to support Iraqi troops in the event of hostile incursions from its neighbors, it will need to allocate even more lead time before it can be effective.

In the end, all of the relevant decisions have been political, rather than military, choices. That includes the question of whether the USAF remained in Iraq after 2011, in order to guarantee defense of the country’s air space.

At present, the odds are that Iraq will fly F-16 C/D class aircraft beginning in late 2013, with full effectiveness coming around 2016-2018. Our general assumption has involved a reduced but still present USAF, which would remain in Iraq beyond 2011. A combination of Iraqi demands and Obama administration fecklessness appears to have ended that.

Which still leaves the question of how to guarantee Iraqi air space.

One option might be to station Gulf Co-operation Council country fighters at Iraqi bases, while flying AWACS patrols using Saudi E-3s. That would surely be a seismic reversal from the Saddam years, and could be presented as a regional peace and healing initiative, but Arab rivalries and Iranian influence make that option more politically complex than it may appear.

Another option might be to have NATO assume air policing duties, as a fig leaf that could keep a substantial US presence. The dual challenge there would be (a) convincing budget squeezed NATO allies to join; and (b) managing the quasi-Ottomanist Turkish AKP government’s double-edged interest in being a significant part of (a).

Additional Readings

Background: Combat Aircraft Options

• F-16.NET – F-16 Versions.

• Dassault Aviation – Mirage 2000-9.

• DID – Pakistan & China’s JF-17 Fighter Program.

Background: Related Iraqi Purchases

• DID – Iraq’s New Integrated Air Defense System. Without it, the IqAF’s F-16s can’t be effective.

• DID – Iraq Orders a Long-Range Radar.

• DID – Iraq’s New Trainer-Fighters: FA-50 Bounces the Czech Iraq initially picked Czech L-159s, but shifted to South Korea’s supersonic FA-50 light fighter/trainers.

• DID – The Penny Drops: Iraq Chooses its COIN Aircraft. The T-6A trainers are the IqAF’s intermediate training fleet. A parallel request for their armed AT-6B version would have given give the IqAF its first fixed-wing close support capabilities, but Iraq only ordered the trainers.

• DID – Bird Dogs for the Iraqi Air Force. Cessna 172 and 208Bs – some of which have become RC-208Bs and AC-208Bs.

News & Views

• DID (July 18/13) – Iraq: Weapons – and Challenges – In the Pipeline. The US Special Inspector General’s Report shows some significant challenges.

• DID (July 12/11) – The Missing Links: A Realistic Appraisal of the Iraqi Military. Events bear it out.

• DJ Elliott’s Montrose Toast (Dec 26/10) – Iraqi Aviation Update December 2010.

• DJ Elliott’s Montrose Toast (March 5/10) – US Forces-Iraq after 2012? “The Iraqi Security Forces are not going to be ready for self-defense in 2012. They were never planned to be ready in 2012…”

• Reuters (March 31/09) – Iraq starts policing borders with unmanned planes. Type undisclosed, though Iraq’s Navy is known to be using ScanEagle UAVs in the south, around its oil terminals. “Interior Ministry spokesman Major-General Abdul Karim Khalaf said the drones would police all Iraq’s borders and their first mission took place two weeks ago.”

Tags: f-16iqaf, iraqf-16