Don't count on a Suharto
accounting By Bill
Guerin
JAKARTA - Indonesian President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had successfully
distanced himself from his past association with
former strongman Suharto's corrupt government.
Now, he faces a historic decision that could make
or break his administration's corruption-busting
credibility with the masses who voted him into
office on a reform platform.
Sections of
Jakarta's political and bureaucratic elite are
eagerly pressing to dissolve the corruption
charges leveled against former president Suharto,
84, who was forced from power after violent
popular protests in May 1998. Yudhoyono is under
mounting political pressure to draw a line through
the dark days of Suharto's 32-year tenure and
grant the medically ailing former leader he
once
served as a cabinet minister amnesty on
humanitarian grounds.
The end of Suharto's
so-called "New Order" regime in 1998 was marked by
massive rioting and the deaths of hundreds of
pro-democracy protesters. It also heralded the
beginning of Indonesia's tumultuous and fractious
democratic era. The doomsday scenarios of
disintegration, social chaos, civil war or even a
military coup predicted after Suharto's
unceremonious fall from grace have all notably
failed to materialize.
At the same time,
neither have the robust economic growth levels
hoped for from Indonesia's new, and in many other
ways flourishing, democracy. Corruption, collusion
and nepotism have all continued apace under
Suharto's successors; the verdict is still out on
Yudhoyono's young administration, and political
analysts say his decision on whether to grant
Suharto amnesty will send a strong signal about
his willingness to tackle endemic corruption
issues.
Suharto's legacy is steeped in
controversy. Under his leadership, Indonesia's
economy rose steadily, with as much as 60% of the
population lifted out of some of Asia's most
abject poverty. His authoritarian tenure was also
attended by boom times for his family, his cronies
and the conglomerates they ran, often under
special government privileges. Those now bidding
to rehabilitate his image have focused brightly on
Suharto's many economic accomplishments.
By the 1990s, Suharto's family members had
cornered various sectors of the local economy.
Only after Suharto's fall did the colossal wealth
of his family and close business associates come
to be known. Suharto has stood accused in court of
embezzling some US$600 million from state coffers.
That may be the tip of the iceberg: independent
watchdog groups estimate he and his cronies may
have spirited away billions of dollars. And there
are still many unanswered questions about the
dozens of lending institutions that went bankrupt
in the wake of the regional financial crisis, many
of which were owned by Suharto's associates.
A 1998 decree by the People's Consultative
Assembly, the highest legislative authority in the
country, commanded the government of president B J
Habibie to eradicate and investigate corruption by
"former state officials, their families or cronies
and private businesses as well as conglomerates,
including former president Suharto". Since 2000,
however, the ex-strongman has successfully evaded
prosecution over the course of three different
administrations for the reason that he was
medically unfit for trial. He recently underwent
colon surgery and has suffered from a series of
strokes.
Untried crimes The
pending $600 million embezzlement case is one of
many crimes for which the former president stands
formally and informally accused. For instance, the
Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of
Violence (Kontras) claims that Suharto should also
be held accountable for alleged crimes against
humanity.
Kontras accuses Suharto of
massive human-rights abuses that resulted in the
deaths of more than 500,000 people during the
communist purge in 1966 after the abortive coup
against former president Sukarno, and Kontras
coordinator Usman Hamid contends that those crimes
will never be solved if, somewhat ironically,
Suharto is pardoned on humanitarian grounds.
Suharto's political legitimacy relied
heavily on his regime's ability to provide
stability and economic development. Within months
of taking power, he started a sweeping program of
economic reforms to stabilize prices, boost the
agriculture sector, open up the economy and lure
in foreign investment. His New Order regime spent
vast sums on new primary schools, health clinics
and improving rural infrastructure.
Manufacturing accounted for less than 10%
of gross domestic product in 1966; by 1996, that
figure had exceeded 25%. The average annual GDP
growth rate was about 7% between 1966 and 1996 -
without doubt an amazing policy achievement. By
1996, poverty rates had dropped dramatically to
11% from more than 60% when he first took power,
while national life expectancy had increased by
some 20 years. The global spike in oil prices in
the 1970s helped more than treble per capita
income.
Conversely, the seven years of
democratic rule that began in 1999 have failed to
provide a significant economic boost. Instead, the
new reform era has been continually dogged by
rising unemployment. Lagging exports and
investment have been intensified by arbitrary
regulatory and compromised legal situations that
democratic politicians, for whatever reasons, have
largely failed to tackle.
In the
post-Suharto vacuum, party politics reigned
supreme, where loyalty among politicians was not
with the voters, nor the president, but rather in
assuring the survival of the wealthy and powerful
elite. The direct presidential polls in 2004 saw
Yudhoyono's landslide win over these more
established and gradually discredited political
parties, including Suharto's former party,
military-backed Golkar.
Significantly, a
June 2004 survey by the International Foundation
for Election Systems found that in choosing
candidates, voters were concerned about keeping
prices low (31%), controlling corruption (29%) and
creating jobs (19%). Since taking office,
Yudhoyono has tried to answer those voter concerns
by focusing on improving the economy and
administrative and regulatory reform - albeit to
varying degrees of success.
Moreover,
Yudhoyono moved to distance himself from the New
Order regime, which he served for decades both as
a senior military official and as a politician. He
has rarely commented on the previous government's
transgressions or the Suharto corruption trial -
even though such groups as Transparency
International have ranked the former president as
one of the most corrupt politicians on the planet.
Under parliamentary pressure, indications
are that Yudhoyono is now poised to allow
Suharto's bygones to be bygones. His attorney
general has in recent months stopped his previous
periodic sparring matches with Suharto's lawyers.
Some question now whether those argumentative
bouts were mere political showmanship.
Vice President Jusuf Kalla said last week
that the government "understands" Suharto's
situation. "I think we should no longer speak so
much about [the corruption trial]. We should
respect him." For that to transpire, Yudhoyono and
parliament would need to issue a formal decree
abolishing the legal process now in motion against
Suharto - potentially a politically explosive
move.
If that happens, some political
analysts believe there could be renewed bouts of
social unrest, only this time targeting
Yudhoyono's government for participating in a
perceived whitewash of Suharto's alleged economic
crimes.
Peeved public
perceptions It's still unclear exactly how
a formal pardon by Yudhoyono would go down with
the broad population. The politically charged
issue notably arises at a time the economy is
stuttering. and Yudhoyono's popularity is clearly
on the wane.
A poll published last week by
the usually reliable Indonesian Survey Institute
showed that Yudhoyono's approval rating is now at
an all-time low, mainly due to concerns about his
administration's handling of the economy. Of 700
people surveyed in nationwide face-to-face
interviews late last month, only 37.9% were
satisfied with the government's performance,
compared with 64.7% a year ago. More than 72% of
those polled said they were unsatisfied with
Yudhoyono's overall economic performance.
The Suharto case deepens his dilemma.
Yudhoyono's early success and credibility in
fighting corruption would be dealt a severe blow
by declaring an amnesty that failed to require
that Suharto's family return their allegedly huge
ill-gotten gains to state coffers. Amid continued
frustrations with the slow pace of reforms, such a
move could mobilize the many well-organized social
movements and also turn the newly emboldened local
press, which to date has been mainly generous in
its news coverage, against Yudhoyono's government.
After Suharto underwent extensive colon
surgery on May 10, the attorney general in effect
announced that Suharto was a free man and that
charges would be dropped because of his
deteriorating health. The next day, when it was
clear Suharto would survive the procedure,
Yudhoyono opted to move the issue to the back
burner. He cited waves of opposing and supporting
voices that "are getting higher and that could
lead to conflict" and said he would not make a
decision on the issue "until the right time".
So long as Suharto remains alive and under
threat of prosecution, those who grew rich with
his help and who today remain entrenched in
government, big business and high society know
that their interests are still vulnerable.
Indonesia's vast wealth was pillaged during the
Suharto years, a fact that many reform advocates
are not willing to forget.
Suharto, once
popularly known as Indonesia's "father of
development", was able politically to justify his
family's growing riches by his government's
ability to deliver rising living standards and
relatively broad-based economic growth. Still
smarting from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis,
the gap between Indonesia's politically connected
rich and unemployed poor is now very much widening
again.
A political compromise that allows
Suharto, his family and former cronies to keep the
estimated billions of dollars they pilfered during
his reign is clearly unacceptable among the small,
but vocal, politically active sections of the
population. Yudhoyono faces a decision that will
clearly make or break his government's credibility
among the masses who just two years ago so
enthusiastically voted him into office in the name
of reform.
Bill Guerin, a
Jakarta correspondent for Asia Times Online since
2000, has worked in Indonesia for 20 years, mostly
in journalism and editorial positions. He has been
published by the BBC on East Timor and specializes
in business/economic and political analysis
related to Indonesia. He can be reached at
softsell@prima.net.id.
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