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WikiLeaks
Press release About PlusD
 
Content
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). SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) Lawyer (and would-be Lebanese president) Chibli Mallat described to us a plan to remove President Lahoud from office according to the constitution. Rather than amending the constitution yet again -- to void the 2004 amendment that extended Lahoud's term in office -- Mallat called for Parliament simply to elect a new president, on the grounds that Lahoud's extension is null and void. The Sa'ad Hariri-led Parliamentary majority can constitute a quorum, and Speaker Berri cannot prevent them from meeting to vote. Mallat said he doubted that even Michel Aoun or Hizballah -- who have both been Lahoud's insurance policy for remaining in office -- would go all out to keep Lahoud in office in this case. "March 14 forces" leader Marwan Hamadeh separately told us he doubted Mallat's plan would work, but said that the "March 14 forces" would use it as a "weapon" against Lahoud. End summary. MALLAT TO ANNOUNCE "SHOCKING" PLAN ---------------------------------- 2. (C) The Ambassador, emboff and senior political FSN called on lawyer, Middle East scholar, and declared presidential candidate (albeit one with no election, so far, for which to run) Chibli Mallat at his Beirut law offices on February 16. Mallat informed us that he planned to hold a press conference that evening, in which he would announce what he gleefully described as a "shocking" plan for removing President Lahoud from office and electing a successor. PUTTING ARTICLE 74 TO USE ------------------------- 3. (C) Starting from the premise that any successful attempt to replace Lahoud must be "as simple as possible," Mallat said that the key lay in article 74 of the Lebanese constitution, which outlines the procedures for electing a new president of the republic in the event that the office becomes vacant as a result of the president's death or resignation or -- a key phrase, Mallat pointed out -- "for any other cause." WHY LAHOUD'S EXTENSION IS NULL AND VOID --------------------------------------- 4. (C) Mallat argued that the "other cause" in this case is the fact that President Lahoud's extension in office by three years -- resulting from an amendment to the Lebanese constitution made in September 2004 -- is null and void. Any "audit" of the amendment would show that it had been done in "a forced manner," through Syrian coercion of a large number of the members of Parliament who voted for it. The extension was therefore null in void on a number of levels, including those of the Lebanese constitution, international law (because it contradicted UNSCR 1559's call for presidential elections to be held according to the Lebanese constitution), and universal principles of democracy. 5. (C) It was not necessary to attempt to add yet another amendment to the constitution that would nullify the amendment that extended Lahoud's term, according to Mallat. This would, in any case, be virtually impossible, because the Sa'ad Hariri-led Parliamentary majority could not muster the votes to do so. The constitutional requirement for a two-thirds majority in this case would lead to "paralysis," and it was necessary to "avoid anything of a procedural nature." At the same time, it would be "useless" for Lahoud's opponents to try to force him out using mass demonstrations, he added. EVEN BERRI CAN'T STOP A NEW ELECTION ------------------------------------ 6. (C) Rather, Mallat said, the Parliament should simply follow, to the letter, article 74, which calls for it to "meet immediately and by virtue of the law elect a successor." It would not even be necessary for Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to cooperate for this process to succeed. The Hariri-led Parliamentary majority simply had to send him a message identifying the problem of a "void" in the BEIRUT 00000470 002.2 OF 003 presidency, and request that he convene Parliament to elect a new president. If Berri refused to do so, members of Parliament could meet nonetheless. There were enough in the majority to form a quorum and elect a president (out of two-thirds of the quorum on the first round or a simple majority in subsequent rounds). If Berri tried to lock them out of the Parliament building -- or if demonstrators tried to block the way -- they could meet somewhere else. "Don't give Berri a veto," Mallat warned -- "the moment you do," the initiative to replace Lahoud would be "dead." (Mallat added that he understood from MP Ghassan Tueni that Berri would not oppose this approach, however.) UN INVESTIGATION STRENGTHENS THE CASE ------------------------------------- 7. (C) Mallat noted that opponents of this plan might ask that, if Lahoud's extension in office has been null and void all along, why Lahoud's opponents are calling for redressing this problem only now. In fact, there was a valid reason, he said. The work of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission, formed to investigate the February 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, had focused on Hariri's meeting with Syrian President Asad in August 2005, in which Asad allegedly threatened Hariri, in order to clear the way for Lahoud's extension. Syrian intimidation, and the link between it and subsequent incidents in Lebanon, namely Hariri's assassination, made Lahoud's extension in office illegitimate from all angles -- those of criminal law, constitutional law, international law, and democratic practice. 8. (C) Consequently, Mallat said, "there's a legal void" where Lebanon's head of state should be. The fact that visiting foreign officials, high-ranking USG officials among them, have avoided calling on President Lahoud testified to this. It was an "extremely strong argument" that was pushing the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, among others, to favor ousting Lahoud, he said. TIME RUNNING OUT ---------------- 9. (C) While there may well be a stronger case for removing Lahoud on these grounds than there was earlier, Mallat warned that time was of the essence. Lahoud's remaining in office meant further "deadlock" at a time when the country could no longer afford it. The riots in Ashrafieh on February 5 were a warning of what might yet be to come. "Deadlock creates its own logic," he said. Without breaking the deadlock, increasing tensions -- with the government unable to handle security challenges -- would continue, "slowly turning us into another Iraq." DEALING WITH HIZBALLAH AND AOUN ------------------------------- 10. (C) Mallat agreed that there was "absolutely" a danger that the immediate aftermath of such a process might at least briefly see two sitting presidents of the republic: Lahoud, bunkered in the Ba'abda Palace, and whoever the Parliament chose as his legal successor. However, it "doesn't matter," he argued. Most of the country's political actors -- including Michel Aoun and Hizballah, who till now have served as Lahoud's insurance policy for staying in office -- have an interest in Lebanon remaining "a normal country." Even they would start to add pressure on Lahoud to respect the Parliament's decision. If Lahoud remained defiant, the government could order his arrest. 11. (C) Hizballah ultimately wants to keep a stake in the political process and "will not put its life on the line" for Lahoud, Mallat said. He recommended that the USG approach seek to "mellow" both Hizballah and Aoun's anxieties about their own futures in the event of Lahoud's removal. At the same time, Mallat said, the USG needed to leave no room for ambiguity about its position that Lahoud must step down. Otherwise, Lahoud would use this ambiguity against his opponents, claming that Washington in fact wanted to keep him in office. TELL OTHER CANDIDATES: BE LIKE CHIBLI -------------------------------------- 12. (C) Mallat took credit for convincing "March 14 forces" BEIRUT 00000470 003.2 OF 003 leaders Sa'ad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt about the necessity of making Lahoud's removal a priority now. In the event that his plan succeeded and Parliament held a presidential election, he urged that the USG and its European allies both be scrupulous in avoiding the appearance of backing one candidate or the other and, at the same time, be vocal in calling for the election to take place on an open, level playing field. Specifically, the USG and EU governments should tell other would-be Lebanese presidential contenders to "run your campaign like Mallat!" That is, he explained, Mallat's rivals should emulate his unprecedented (for Lebanon) efforts to run a genuinely public campaign -- with a platform, press releases, speaking engagements, and the like -- rather than resort to the old-fashioned -- if tried and true -- Lebanese approach of striking deals with Parliamentary backers behind closed doors. HAMADEH: IT WON'T WORK, BUT IT'S A "WEAPON" -------------------------------------------- 13. (C) In a subsequent meeting on February 16, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh told the Ambassador and emboff that the "March 14 forces" would meet that evening to launch a campaign to remove Lahoud. He smiled and nodded when the Ambassador mentioned Mallat's plan, saying he was familiar with it. Mallat's plan "won't work," Hamadeh said, "but it will be one of our weapons." FELTMAN

Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000470 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, PTER, SY, LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: CHIBLI MALLAT'S PLAN TO REMOVE LAHOUD BEIRUT 00000470 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) Lawyer (and would-be Lebanese president) Chibli Mallat described to us a plan to remove President Lahoud from office according to the constitution. Rather than amending the constitution yet again -- to void the 2004 amendment that extended Lahoud's term in office -- Mallat called for Parliament simply to elect a new president, on the grounds that Lahoud's extension is null and void. The Sa'ad Hariri-led Parliamentary majority can constitute a quorum, and Speaker Berri cannot prevent them from meeting to vote. Mallat said he doubted that even Michel Aoun or Hizballah -- who have both been Lahoud's insurance policy for remaining in office -- would go all out to keep Lahoud in office in this case. "March 14 forces" leader Marwan Hamadeh separately told us he doubted Mallat's plan would work, but said that the "March 14 forces" would use it as a "weapon" against Lahoud. End summary. MALLAT TO ANNOUNCE "SHOCKING" PLAN ---------------------------------- 2. (C) The Ambassador, emboff and senior political FSN called on lawyer, Middle East scholar, and declared presidential candidate (albeit one with no election, so far, for which to run) Chibli Mallat at his Beirut law offices on February 16. Mallat informed us that he planned to hold a press conference that evening, in which he would announce what he gleefully described as a "shocking" plan for removing President Lahoud from office and electing a successor. PUTTING ARTICLE 74 TO USE ------------------------- 3. (C) Starting from the premise that any successful attempt to replace Lahoud must be "as simple as possible," Mallat said that the key lay in article 74 of the Lebanese constitution, which outlines the procedures for electing a new president of the republic in the event that the office becomes vacant as a result of the president's death or resignation or -- a key phrase, Mallat pointed out -- "for any other cause." WHY LAHOUD'S EXTENSION IS NULL AND VOID --------------------------------------- 4. (C) Mallat argued that the "other cause" in this case is the fact that President Lahoud's extension in office by three years -- resulting from an amendment to the Lebanese constitution made in September 2004 -- is null and void. Any "audit" of the amendment would show that it had been done in "a forced manner," through Syrian coercion of a large number of the members of Parliament who voted for it. The extension was therefore null in void on a number of levels, including those of the Lebanese constitution, international law (because it contradicted UNSCR 1559's call for presidential elections to be held according to the Lebanese constitution), and universal principles of democracy. 5. (C) It was not necessary to attempt to add yet another amendment to the constitution that would nullify the amendment that extended Lahoud's term, according to Mallat. This would, in any case, be virtually impossible, because the Sa'ad Hariri-led Parliamentary majority could not muster the votes to do so. The constitutional requirement for a two-thirds majority in this case would lead to "paralysis," and it was necessary to "avoid anything of a procedural nature." At the same time, it would be "useless" for Lahoud's opponents to try to force him out using mass demonstrations, he added. EVEN BERRI CAN'T STOP A NEW ELECTION ------------------------------------ 6. (C) Rather, Mallat said, the Parliament should simply follow, to the letter, article 74, which calls for it to "meet immediately and by virtue of the law elect a successor." It would not even be necessary for Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to cooperate for this process to succeed. The Hariri-led Parliamentary majority simply had to send him a message identifying the problem of a "void" in the BEIRUT 00000470 002.2 OF 003 presidency, and request that he convene Parliament to elect a new president. If Berri refused to do so, members of Parliament could meet nonetheless. There were enough in the majority to form a quorum and elect a president (out of two-thirds of the quorum on the first round or a simple majority in subsequent rounds). If Berri tried to lock them out of the Parliament building -- or if demonstrators tried to block the way -- they could meet somewhere else. "Don't give Berri a veto," Mallat warned -- "the moment you do," the initiative to replace Lahoud would be "dead." (Mallat added that he understood from MP Ghassan Tueni that Berri would not oppose this approach, however.) UN INVESTIGATION STRENGTHENS THE CASE ------------------------------------- 7. (C) Mallat noted that opponents of this plan might ask that, if Lahoud's extension in office has been null and void all along, why Lahoud's opponents are calling for redressing this problem only now. In fact, there was a valid reason, he said. The work of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission, formed to investigate the February 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, had focused on Hariri's meeting with Syrian President Asad in August 2005, in which Asad allegedly threatened Hariri, in order to clear the way for Lahoud's extension. Syrian intimidation, and the link between it and subsequent incidents in Lebanon, namely Hariri's assassination, made Lahoud's extension in office illegitimate from all angles -- those of criminal law, constitutional law, international law, and democratic practice. 8. (C) Consequently, Mallat said, "there's a legal void" where Lebanon's head of state should be. The fact that visiting foreign officials, high-ranking USG officials among them, have avoided calling on President Lahoud testified to this. It was an "extremely strong argument" that was pushing the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, among others, to favor ousting Lahoud, he said. TIME RUNNING OUT ---------------- 9. (C) While there may well be a stronger case for removing Lahoud on these grounds than there was earlier, Mallat warned that time was of the essence. Lahoud's remaining in office meant further "deadlock" at a time when the country could no longer afford it. The riots in Ashrafieh on February 5 were a warning of what might yet be to come. "Deadlock creates its own logic," he said. Without breaking the deadlock, increasing tensions -- with the government unable to handle security challenges -- would continue, "slowly turning us into another Iraq." DEALING WITH HIZBALLAH AND AOUN ------------------------------- 10. (C) Mallat agreed that there was "absolutely" a danger that the immediate aftermath of such a process might at least briefly see two sitting presidents of the republic: Lahoud, bunkered in the Ba'abda Palace, and whoever the Parliament chose as his legal successor. However, it "doesn't matter," he argued. Most of the country's political actors -- including Michel Aoun and Hizballah, who till now have served as Lahoud's insurance policy for staying in office -- have an interest in Lebanon remaining "a normal country." Even they would start to add pressure on Lahoud to respect the Parliament's decision. If Lahoud remained defiant, the government could order his arrest. 11. (C) Hizballah ultimately wants to keep a stake in the political process and "will not put its life on the line" for Lahoud, Mallat said. He recommended that the USG approach seek to "mellow" both Hizballah and Aoun's anxieties about their own futures in the event of Lahoud's removal. At the same time, Mallat said, the USG needed to leave no room for ambiguity about its position that Lahoud must step down. Otherwise, Lahoud would use this ambiguity against his opponents, claming that Washington in fact wanted to keep him in office. TELL OTHER CANDIDATES: BE LIKE CHIBLI -------------------------------------- 12. (C) Mallat took credit for convincing "March 14 forces" BEIRUT 00000470 003.2 OF 003 leaders Sa'ad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt about the necessity of making Lahoud's removal a priority now. In the event that his plan succeeded and Parliament held a presidential election, he urged that the USG and its European allies both be scrupulous in avoiding the appearance of backing one candidate or the other and, at the same time, be vocal in calling for the election to take place on an open, level playing field. Specifically, the USG and EU governments should tell other would-be Lebanese presidential contenders to "run your campaign like Mallat!" That is, he explained, Mallat's rivals should emulate his unprecedented (for Lebanon) efforts to run a genuinely public campaign -- with a platform, press releases, speaking engagements, and the like -- rather than resort to the old-fashioned -- if tried and true -- Lebanese approach of striking deals with Parliamentary backers behind closed doors. HAMADEH: IT WON'T WORK, BUT IT'S A "WEAPON" -------------------------------------------- 13. (C) In a subsequent meeting on February 16, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh told the Ambassador and emboff that the "March 14 forces" would meet that evening to launch a campaign to remove Lahoud. He smiled and nodded when the Ambassador mentioned Mallat's plan, saying he was familiar with it. Mallat's plan "won't work," Hamadeh said, "but it will be one of our weapons." FELTMAN
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VZCZCXRO9911 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHLB #0470/01 0471701 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 161701Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2051 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0455 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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