C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002922 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2025 TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, IZ, Elections SUBJECT: ANBARI BUSINESS AND TRIBAL LEADER CHARTS A POLITICAL COURSE Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 1. (C) SUMMARY. Abdullah Kharbit, a prominent businessman from an influential Anbar tribal family, described the Sunni Arabs as leaderless and unorganized as compared to the Shia and Kurds. He noted a few leaders have begun creating a Sunni political movement to prepare for the elections in December. Abdullah said some of these men have received permission from insurgents to enter the political process. While tribal leaders will command limited support at the polls, the popular new Governor and leader of the Anbar Iraqi Islamic Party will poll well with more educated voters, he opined. Kharbit emphasized that the real power in the province belongs to insurgents rather than tribes or political leaders. Abdullah believes some insurgents may help facilitate Sunni political participation, but the extremists will go to great lengths to prevent it. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) On July 7, Ramadi PolOff and 2MarDiv FAO met with Abdullah al-Kharbit, a contractor from a prominent Al-Anbar family who serves as the clan's informal liaison to the Coalition. Abdullah characterized the Sunnis as leaderless. The last Sunni leader was Saddam Hussein, and Hussein had effectively eliminated all competition. Abdullah contrasted this with Shia and Kurds, who have established leaders, and a far more organized body politic. 3. (C) Abdullah identified two main players in the drive to create a Sunni political movement: Khalaf Al-Ayan and Salah Mutlak. Abdullah claimed that the insurgency has approved these two men's participation in the political process, and they had recently organized a political conference in Ramadi. Ironically, the conference was cancelled at the last minute when rival insurgents threatened attendees, to which Abdullah attributed to tribal rivalries. He described the aborted conference as "an Albu Fahad tribal show", given key organizers, Sheikh Nasser and Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, are from the tribe. (Comment: Talal al Gaoud, an Amman-based Sunni political organizer from the Albu Nimr tribe told SET officer in late June in Amman that a more diverse conference was planned for the week of July 11, but it appears to have been cancelled as well. Mutlak has been an active Sunni negotiator all spring, with multiple and evolving affiliations, most recently as spokesman for the National Dialogue Council. Khalaf Alayan, also from the National Dialogue Council, is a former senior military officer with alleged strong connections to the insurgency. End Comment.) 4. (C) Abdullah claimed his cousin, Hamad al-Kharbit, is influential behind the scenes. He said Hamad remains well connected to the events of Al-Anbar, although he is based in Amman. (Note: In the January elections, Hamad won a seat on the Provincial Council but told SET officer he would not participate. He said he only registered as a candidate to please the Coalition. Hamad's slate received a sufficient number of votes for seven or eight seats, but there were only three candidates on his provincial list. End Note.) Abdullah, meanwhile, was a candidate for the National Assembly, in January, but in the skimpy Anbar voter turnout failed to secure a seat. Undaunted, he plans to runs again and desires nothing less than a Ministership. He said he considered forming a political alliance with Minister of State for Provincial Affairs, Sa'ad Naif al- Hardan, but he now believes Hardan will have too much baggage from his participation in the ITG. Abdullah also debated an alliance with Minister of Defense Sadoun al- Dulaymi but regards Dulaymi as "too cozy" with Prime Minister Jafari. 5. (C) In general, Abdullah expects the tribes to do well at the polls. He observed, the "simple people" will vote along tribal lines. However, he believes the intelligentsia vote will probably go to the Iraqi Islamic Party. In fact, Abdullah views Anbar Governor Mamoon Sami Raseed (the local IIP leader) as a rising star. "He is astonishingly honest and simply unbuyable and believe me, I know." Mamoon is proving to be a popular and effective manager, said Abdullah. Mamoon does more work with less money but he still spreads the projects around so everyone feels they are getting something. "For the next election, bet on Mamoon. He will be the winning horse." Abdullah observed Mamoon has survived in Anbar's deadly (literally) politics because he is regarded as an able administrator. Insurgents want water and power, too, Abdullah quipped. He postulated that the insurgents think the Coalition hates the IIP, so Mamoon automatically gets some street credit. In Abdullah's view, the only other non-tribal Sunni candidates who would do well in an election are Abd Al- Latif Humayem, Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, and Muslim Ulema Council leader Harith Al-Dari. 6. (C) On security matters, Abdullah believes that the real power in the province rests with the insurgency. He identified the following people as key insurgent leaders: Mohammad Daham in Ramadi (who is currently in Coalition detention); Sheikh Nou'fel of Khaldiyah; Mohammed Mahmoud Latif who operates in the region between Ramadi and Khaldiyah; Sheikh Saqr of Abu Ghraeb; and Abu Mu'ath (possibly an alias for Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri) in Al Qaim. Abdullah confessed that the tribes have very little control over these figures. He also dismissed the notion that the tribes have begun to fight foreign and extremist elements. For example, over the past six weeks there has been sporadic fighting in the town of Al Qaim (near the Iraqi border with Syria) between the Albu Mahal tribe and members of Abu Musab al Zarqawi's Tanzim Qa'idat al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn (QJBR). However, Abdullah contends this is just the most recent chapter in a traditional tribal feud between Albu Mahal and the Al-Karabouli - many of whom have aligned themselves with QJBR. (Note: The fighting is likely an effort to control the border and the lucrative smuggling opportunities there. End Note.) 7. (C) Although Abdullah downplayed the tribe vs. extremist dynamic, he identified a potential fault line between the local insurgency and the foreign fighters. In order to prevent a repeat of the dismal voter turn-out in Anbar on January 30, Abdullah believes some insurgent leaders will encourage active participation in the upcoming political process and may participate themselves. He predicts some insurgent leaders will be divided: some will shelter the political process from the extremists while others will discourage the Sunnis from voting. He said the insurQnts seek to establish a "legitimate" militia and see themselves performing the role that Pesh Merga and Badr Corps serve in their respective communities. 8. (C) Abdullah explained that Zarqawi has announced the creation of a new organization called the Omar Corps to counterbalance the alleged persecution of Sunnis by the Badr Corps. (Note: Omar was the third Islamic Caliph after the death of the Prophet Mohammed and let the great expansion of the Islamic Empire. End Note.) Abdullah fears such a move will resonate with all sectors of the Sunni community who fear Shia control of the government and the instruments of state power. For example, Abdullah says his biggest fear -- as a Sunni -- is the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. "It might as well be the Iranian MOI," he exclaimed. He told stories of Sunnis being abused at the hands of MOI personnel. (Note: Many Sunni contacts from Anbar now make such allegations. End Note.) If the concept of armed revenge finds resonance with the Anbar electorate, Abdullah observed the Sunnis' problems will be compounded. 9. (C) Comment: Abdullah is an excellent conversationalist who speaks fluent English and approaches many issues from a Western mind-set which gives him access to many Coalition actors. His pedigree and his family's connections to the previous regime also give his access to insurgent circles. However, it is not clear if he has entree to the insurgent inner clique, and he is not above telling fiction if it serves his personal interest. Nevertheless, he is usually pretty good at taking the pulse of the street, he supports the legitimate political process, and his business interests put him on the side of Iraqi stability and progress. 10. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, minimize considered. Satterfield

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.