Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative
History and Cultural Evolution
UC Riverside
Peer Reviewed
Title:
A Trap At The Escape From The Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in
Modern Africa and West Asia
Journal Issue:
Cliodynamics, 2(2)
Author:
Korotayev, Andrey, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow
Zinkina, Julia, Russian Academy of Sciences Presidium’s Program “Complex System Analysis
and Mathematical Modeling of the World Dynamics”
Kobzeva, Svetlana, Russian Academy of Civil Service
Bozhevolnov, Justislav, Moscow State University
Khaltourina, Daria, Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow
Malkov, Artemy, Russian Academy of Sciences Presidium’s Program “Complex System Analysis
and Mathematical Modeling of the World Dynamics”
Malkov, Sergey, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences
Publication Date:
2011
Permalink:
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/79t737gt
Acknowledgements:
This research has been supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project #
10-06-00344)
Keywords:
Malthusian trap, Cliodynamics, Political instability, Modernization, Secular cycles, Demography
Local Identifier:
irows_cliodynamics_217
Abstract:
The escape from the “Malthusian trap” is shown to tend to generate in a rather systematic way
quite serious political upheavals. Some demographic structural mechanisms that generate such
upheavals have been analyzed, which has made it possible to develop a mathematical model of
the respective processes. The forecast of political instability in African and West Asian countries
in 2012–2050 produced on the basis of this model is presented.
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Cliodynamics: the Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History
A Trap At The Escape From The Trap?
Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability
in Modern Africa and West Asia
Andrey Korotayev, Julia Zinkina, Svetlana Kobzeva, Justislav
Bozhevolnov, Daria Khaltourina, Artemy Malkov, Sergey Malkov
Russian Academy of Sciences
The escape from the ‘Malthusian trap’ can generate serious political
upheavals. We analyze the demographic-structural mechanisms that
generate such upheavals and develop a mathematical model of the
respective processes. The model yields a forecast of political instability in
African and West Asian countries for 2012–2050.
Introduction
The ‘Malthusian trap’ is often used to describe the dynamics of pre-industrial
societies in which economic growth does not lead to an improvement of living
conditions, because populations tend to grow faster than economic output.
This ensures that the majority of population would remain close to the bare
survival level (Malthus 1978 [1798]; Artzrouni and Komlos 1985; Steinmann
and Komlos 1988; Komlos and Artzrouni 1990; Steinmannet al. 1998; Wood
1998; Kögel and Prskawetz 2001; Grinin et al. 2008, 2009).
In complex pre-industrial societies the Malthusian trap was one of the main
causes of state breakdown. Malthus himself considered warfare (including
internal warfare) as one of the most important consequences of overpopulation
(in addition to epidemics and famines). The Malthusian dynamic is an
important component in recent demographic-structural models describing
how population growth leads to sociopolitical instability (for example, Usher
1989; Chu and Lee 1994; Komlos and Nefedov 2002; Turchin 2003, 2005a,
2005b; Nefedov 2004; Turchin and Nefedov 2009; Turchin and Korotayev
2006; Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006; Korotayev et al. 2006b). The question
that we address in this article is whether Malthusian traps have any relevance
to understanding waves of political instability today.
The sociopolitical upheavals of the 2011 Arab Spring not only were totally
unexpected by both the external observers and the populations of respective
countries, they also appear not to have any Malthusian antecedents. Indeed, on
the verge of these events the economic conditions in the respective countries
Corresponding author’s e-mail: akorotayev@gmail.com
Citation: Korotayev, Andrey, Julia Zinkina, Svetlana Kobzeva, Justislav Bozhevolnov,
Daria Khaltourina, Artemy Malkov, Sergey Malkov. 2011. A Trap at the Escape
from the Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in Modern
Africa and West Asia. Cliodynamics 2: 276–303.
Korotayev et al.: Escaping the Trap. Cliodynamics (2011) Vol. 2, Iss. 2
were in no way catastrophic. For example, the levels of poverty and inequality
were relatively low by the Third World standards (see, Korotayev and Zinkina
2011a, 2011b). Furthermore, the quality of life for the majority of the
population, as measured by such demographic indices as life expectancy, has
been steadily improving over the last several decades. Thus, life expectancy at
birth in such Arab countries as Egypt, Libya, and Syria (which were all shaken
by popular uprisings in 2011) increased from 45–50 years in 1960 to 65–70
years in 1995 and then to 70–75 years by 2010.
This observation, that a wave of sociopolitical destabilization can occur
against such relatively benign demographic background, appears to contradict
the Malthusian logic. In this article, nevertheless, we shall show that Malthus
continues to be relevant today, although in a somewhat unexpected way. We
will argue that the wave of sociopolitical destabilization during the Arab Spring
was a result of the Arab countries’ escape from the Malthusian trap. Although
this escape by definition implies the improvement of the standards of life for
the majority of the population, it also tends to generate serious sociopolitical
upheavals.
Two Examples of the Classical Malthusian Trap in
Action: Qing China and Modern Ethiopia
In 1700–1850 China managed to achieve a highly impressive rate of economic
growth, in large part due to the introduction of New World crops, such as
maize and sweet potatoes and the development of new varieties of previously
known cultivated plants, and to agricultural labor intensification and land
reclamation (Ho 1955; 1959: 173–189; Lee 1982; Bray 1984: 452, 601; Perkins
1969: 39–40; Fairbank 1992: 169; Lavely and Wong 1998: 725–726; Lee and
Wang 1999: 37–40; Mote 1999: 750, 942; Myers and Wang 2002: 599, 634–
636; Rowe 2002: 479; Zelin 2002: 216–218). As a result of these innovations
the carrying capacity of land during this ‘secular cycle’ (Turchin and Nefedov
2009) was raised to a radically new level, which made possible significant
growth of the Chinese GDP. Thus, according to Maddison’s (2001, 2010)
estimations, between 1700 and 1850 the GDP of China grew almost threefold.
However, the Chinese population grew during the same period of time more
than fourfold. As a result, by 1850 we observe a considerable decline of per
capita GDP (Figure 1).
The decline in the level of life of the majority of Chinese can be traced on
the basis of a number of independent data series. For example, the average real
daily wages dropped to the level of bare physiological survival by the end of the
period in question.
Data of chia-p'u (several hundred thousand Chinese genealogies of ‘middleclass’) show that the average age at death dropped from 55–60 years in early
Qing cycle to 45 years by the end of the period.
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Figure 1. Relative dynamics of GDP, population, and per capita GDP in Qing
China (100 = 1700 level) and daily wages (measured in liters of rice), 1700–
1850 (data sources Maddison 2010, Chao 1986).
The data on dynamics of female infanticide (Lee et al. 1992: 164, Fig. 5.5).
indicate that about five new-born girls were registered per ten new-born boys.
However, by the late 1840s the situation became simply catastrophic—this
ratio declined to only 1–2 new-born girls per 10 new-born boys. This trend was
due to increasing economic hardship: in the Qing China prices of basic food
commodities were closely correlated with the levels of female infanticide (Lee
et al. 1992: 158–175).
The dramatic decline of the living standards of the majority of the Chinese
population naturally led to the increasing dissatisfaction with the government,
and eventually, in 1850–1870, a series of rebellions. The Taiping Rebellion was
the largest among them (Perkins 1969; Kuhn 1978; Liu 1978) and probably the
bloodiest internal political collapse in the history of the humankind. The total
number of dead has been estimated as high as 118 million people (Huang
2002: 528). The majority died not as a result of direct violence, but because of
diseases, famine, and floods that were a direct consequence of overpopulation.
The most destructive effects were produced by the break of the Yellow River
dams in 1853, when this great Chinese river changed its course, and a large
part of densely populated Northern China was literally washed down (see
Kuhn 1978 for details).
The catastrophic change of the Yellow River course had evident Malthusian
causes, as the growing overpopulation of its valley led to the increasing
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cultivation of the marginal lands upstream, soil erosion and increasing silting
of the Yellow River bottom. These developments enhanced the threat of floods,
and required increasing the height of counter-flood dams. After the Taiping
rebels captured the Chinese ‘breadbasket’ in the Lower Yangtze region, the
revenues of the Qing budget shrank, while military expenses continued to
increase. As a result, the Qing government failed to secure the necessary funds
for the maintenance of the extremely complex counter-flood system, and the
break of the dams by the Yellow River became inevitable (see Korotayev et al.
2006b: Chapter 2 for details).
Demographic transition and the increase in agricultural productivity due to
major technological advances in recent centuries allowed most states to escape
the Malthusian trap. However, these modernization processes started later in
Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world. Thus, even in the recent
decades the Malthusian trap continued to produce state breakdowns in this
region.
Consider the example of Ethiopia. In the period preceding the fall of
Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime (from 1981 to 1991) Ethiopia’s GDP grew by
12.5 percent, while the population grew by 40 percent. As a result, GDP per
capita fell from very low $608 to catastrophic $500. Another dramatic fall
occurred in per capita calorie intake. 1831 kcal/day in 1981 was already very
low, but 1657 kcal/day in 1991 was below physiological minimum (Figure 2).
Such a low level of per capita food consumption means that a large part of
the population was on the verge of starvation. As a result, many chose joining
rebels (or bandits; it is well known that rebels can be easily transformed into
bandits, and vice versa). This was a rational strategy, given the alternative of
starving to death, and was a major contributor to the fall of Mengistu Haile
Mariam’s regime (see Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006).
Political-Demographic Dynamics in Modernizing
Systems
Against this background consider the following cases of major political
upheavals in recent decades.
• ‘Bread riots’ in Egypt (1977), the largest political unrest in Egypt after
1952. The participants were chanting “Hero of the Crossing, where is
our breakfast?” (addressing President Sadat). The riots took place in
all large Egyptian cities, several hundred thousand people participated
in them, and there were no fewer than 800 victims (Hirst 1977).
• Iranian Revolution (1979), when millions of Iranians demonstrated
against the Shah’s regime which was finally overthrown; highest death
toll estimates claim 60,000 (see, e.g., Abrahamian 2008).
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Figure 2. Population, GDP, and food consumption, Ethiopia (1981–1991).
•
•
•
•
•
•
Civil war in El Salvador (1980–1992), which led to the death of 75
thousand inhabitants of this country—a colossal number for a country
with total population of about 4.5 million (Montgomery 1995).
Kwangju uprising in South Korea (1980), the largest popular uprising
after the end of the Korean War, with 300 thousand participants,
about 2,000 dead, and five divisions of regular army taking part in the
suppression of the rebellion. This uprising was accompanied by a
series of popular riots in neighboring cities (Lewis 2002).
Hama rebellion in Syria (1982), which was the largest popular
rebellion in this country after the end of the Second World War. The
rebellion was suppressed with regular army units, aviation, artillery,
and tanks. According to some estimates, the number of dead reached
40 thousand, including 1000 soldiers of regular army (Fisk 1990;
Friedman 1998; Wiedl 2006).
Liberian civil war (1989–2003), in which about 200–300 thousand
Liberians were killed out of the total population slightly more than 2
million at the war start (Huband 1998; Williams 2006).
Algerian civil war (1990–1998), which started with recurrent strikes
and riots by mobs of impoverished Algerian youths and turned into a
full-scale armed conflict between the Algerian government and various
Islamist rebel groups. Death toll is estimated at 150–200 thousand
(Kepel 2006).
The ‘Lottery uprising’ in Albania (1997), started by a wave of violent
riots caused by the collapse of financial pyramids, as a result of which
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hundreds of thousands Albanians lost all their savings. As is well
known, many postsocialist European countries confronted this sort of
problem, but nowhere did this lead to a sociopolitical collapse
comparable with the Albanian one, with over 2000 killed, one million
weapons looted from armories, evacuation of foreign nationals, mass
emigration of Albanians to Italy, government resignation, and control
over large parts of the country restored only after the deployment of
foreign (primarily Italian) troops (Jarvis 1999: 17).
All these events were very large, encompassing a significant part (or even the
whole) of the respective country’s population and leading to wide-scale
political destabilization, huge death tolls, and long-term destructive
consequences. Did the Malthusian component play a role in these described
events? Indeed, in all these countries, with the exception of Albania and South
Korea, fertility rates in the year preceding the upheaval were extremely high
(ranging between 4.5 and 7.5 children per woman) compared with the
European countries (less than 2 children per woman). However, South Korea
went through fertility rate decline only in the few years preceding the
upheaval. Albanian birth rates were also low compared with other countries
affected by upheavals (although Albania was also the poorest European
country with the highest fertility rate in Europe).
What was the effect of such high rates of population increase on per capita
food consumption? Contrary to the Malthusian scenario, all countries under
investigation were struck by upheavals during periods of rapid increase of per
capita food consumption (Figures 3 and 4). Thus, El Salvador, Iran, and
Algeria, whose populations in the early 1960s were at the level of
undernourishment, or even famine, all managed to achieve a very significant
progress in the decades before instability struck. El Salvador increased its per
capita food consumption by 700 kcal/day and by 1980— the year when civil
war broke out —almost reached the WHO recommended norm of 2300
kcal/capita/day (Naiken 2002). Iran also increased its per capita food
consumption by 700 kcal/day (from 1800 in 1960 to more than 2500 in 1979)
at the point when the country was swept by the Islamic Revolution. Algeria
achieved even better progress, going over the WHO norm in 1977 with
continuing growth thereafter. The civil war broke out in 1992 when per capita
food consumption reached more than 2900 kcal/day, or nowhere near the
undernourishment level (and approaching that of overeating).
In Albania, Egypt, Liberia, South Korea, and Syria, similarly, outbreaks of
political violence occurred against the background of rapidly increasing per
capita food consumption. Thus, Liberian food consumption went up from 2100
kcal/capita/day in 1960 to 2500 (better than the WHO norm) by 1989, the
year of civil war start. Besides, in the year of civil war start Liberia occupied the
first place in Tropical Africa according to the level of per capita food
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Figure 3. Per capita food consumption (kcal/day) in Egypt, Iran, South
Korea, and Syria, 1961–1989 (data source: FAO 2011). Round circles denote
the years of violence outbreak.
consumption. Liberian case is more tragic than the others as not only did the
country ‘stumble’ on its way of increasing food consumption, but it also fell
back very significantly, and so far has not reached the pre-war level. Albanian
case was not so striking, but this country went through a serious upheaval
when its per capita consumption had grown far over the WHO norm, reaching
2700 kcal/capita/day.
South Korean achievements in solving the malnutrition problem were even
more successful than in Albania. By the mid 1960s the average per capita food
consumption in this country exceeded the norm recommended by the WHO
and continued to grow thereafter. In 1980, the year of violent Kwangju
uprising, per capita consumption in South Korea reached about 3000
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Figure 4. Per capita food consumption (kcal/day) in Algeria, El Salvador,
Albania, and Liberia, 1961–2007 (data source: FAO 2011). Round circles
denote the years of violence outbreak.
kcal/day, implying the problem of overeating rather than any
undernourishment. However, the most remarkable progress was made by
Syria: its per capita food consumption grew from 2000 kcal/day in 1960 to the
historical maximum of 3100 in 1982, the year of bloody Hama uprising.
One would be inclined to look for some different dynamics in Egypt, where
the participants of the 1977 ‘Bread Riots’ chanted “Where is our breakfast?”
(Hirst 1977). However, after 1973 per capita food consumption increased
rapidly, exceeding 3000 kcal/day in 1982 (the year after Sadat’s death). Thus,
the problem of overeating became more relevant for Egypt than the one of
undernourishment. This success should be attributed to the Infitah economic
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500
South Korea
Algeria
Syria
Iran
El Salvador
Egypt
GDP Per Capita Index (log-scale)
400
300
200
100
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Figure 5. Relative dynamics of GDP per capita, 1950–80 (index, 1950 = 100
percent.
reforms launched by Sadat administration in 1974 (Weinbaum 1985: 215–216).
Indeed, though population grew by 36.1 percent from 1970 to 1982, Egyptian
GDP grew by 141.1 percent during the same period, the major part of this
growth taking place during Infitah. As a result, GDP per capita grew almost
twofold, which correlated with the similarly rapid growth in per capita
consumption.
Figure 5 clearly shows that in all these countries the period before the
upheaval was characterized by increasing GDP per capita. These successes
commonly stemmed from socioeconomic reforms, e.g. the so-called ‘White
Revolution’ in Iran (Abrahamian 2008: 123–154), and the ‘Infitah’ policy in
Egypt (Weinbaum 1985: 215–216), as well as from agriculture modernization
bringing about significant growth of agricultural output (‘Green revolutions’).
In summary, all the countries discussed in this section were hit by severe
sociopolitical upheavals when GDP growth was outpacing the population
growth, and both per capita GDP and per capita food consumption were
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growing, in other words, as these countries were successfully escaping the
Malthusian trap. However, an escape from the Malthusian trap had certain
unanticipated consequences.
Trap at the Escape from Malthusian Trap: Data
The escape from the Malthusian trap implies the solution of the famine
problem, which in its turn implies a significant decrease in the death rates.
Indeed, for countries with per capita consumption below 2900 kcal/day there
is a strong negative correlation between this indicator and the crude death rate
(r = –0.64, p << 0.0001; data source: SPSS 2010). The effect of increasing per
capita food consumption on infant and child mortality is even greater
(correlation coefficients approach or exceed –0.7 for different model
specifications).
Thus, during the first phase of demographic transition, which tends to
coincide with the escape from the Malthusian trap, death rate declines
dramatically (Vishnevskiy 1976, 2005; Chesnais 1992; Korotayev et al. 2006a),
and the greatest decline occurs in infant and child (under five years) mortality.
At the same time, birth rates remain high. Thus, out of 6–7 children born by a
woman, 5–6 children survive up to reproductive age, not 2 or 3 as earlier. This
leads not only to the demographic explosion, but also to the formation of a
‘youth bulge,’ because the generation of children turns out to be much more
numerous than the generation of parents. Many researchers regard the rapid
growth of the youth share in population as a major factor of political
instability. For example, Goldstone argues that
the rapid growth of youth can undermine existing political coalitions,
creating instability. Large youth cohorts are often drawn to new ideas
and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of authority. In
addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities for
families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or
political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political
violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a ‘youth
bulge’ (an unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24 relative to the
total adult population) has historically been associated with times of
political crisis. Most major revolutions … [including] most twentiethcentury revolutions in developing countries—have occurred where
exceptionally large youth bulges were present” (Goldstone 2002: 10–
11; see also Goldstone 1991; Moller 1968; Mesquida and Weiner 1999;
Heinsohn 2003; Fuller 2004).
Urbanization is another process generated by modernization in general and
the escape from the Malthusian trap, in particular, which can contribute to
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political instability. The escape from the Malthusian trap stimulates urban
population growth in several ways. Rapid population growth in a still agrarian
economy results in rural overpopulation. The excess population is pushed out
of the rural areas as labor productivity grows and less workforce is required for
agricultural work. This population is well supplied with food resources as per
capita food production increase, which strongly supports the rapid
intensification of urbanization processes, allowing for the urbanization levels
which could not be achieved in agrarian societies.
Thus, the escape from the Malthusian trap engenders a rapid growth of
urban population due to both natural increase and rural-urban migration. This
causes social tensions, as jobs and housing need to be supplied for the fastgrowing mass of people. In order to prevent increasing unemployment, new
workplaces have to be created at the rate of rapidly growing urban population,
which is difficult even for a fast-growing economy. If an economy is not
growing as fast, unemployment rockets up, especially among the youth (i.e.,
among that very age cohort which is most inclined to aggression).
Additionally, rural migrants usually don’t have skills appropriate for urban
settings and can only find unqualified and low-paid jobs, which causes growing
discontent among them. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of
the rural-urban migrants are usually young. The ‘youth bulge’ and intensive
urbanization factors act synergistically. Thus, not only does the most radically
inclined part of population explode numerically, it also becomes concentrated
near the centers of political system, presenting a serious danger for political
stability.
Trap at the Escape from Malthusian Trap: Logical Model
The preceding argument suggests that the emergence of major sociopolitical
upheavals at the escape from the Malthusian trap is not an abnormal, but a
regular phenomenon. What requires explanation is exceptions, when social
systems manage to avoid such shocks during modernization. The logic of the
postulated causal connections can be summarized as follows.
1.
Escape from the Malthusian trap brings about a precipitous death rate
decline and, consequently, an explosive acceleration of the population
growth rates.
2. The escape is accompanied by particularly strong decreases in infant
and child mortality, which, after a time lag, increases the proportion of
the youth in the overall population, resulting in a ‘youth bulge.’
3. The part of population most inclined to radicalism increases rapidly.
4. Explosive growth of the youthful cohorts requires the creation of an
enormous number of new jobs. Job creation, however, typically lags,
and the unemployment among the young grows, creating an ‘army’ of
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potential participants for various political upheavals, including civil
wars, revolutions, and state breakdowns.
5. Escape from the Malthusian trap stimulates vigorous growth of the
urban population. Excessive rural population is pushed out from the
countryside by the growth of agricultural labor productivity. Massive
rural-urban migration almost inevitably creates a significant number
of those dissatisfied with their current position, as initially the ruralurban migrants mostly can only get unskilled low-paid jobs and lowquality housing.
6. Escape from the Malthusian trap is achieved through the development
of new economic sectors and decline of the old ones. Such structural
changes cannot proceed painlessly, as old qualification of workers
loses its value and, not having necessary new skills, these workers are
obliged to take up low-qualified jobs, which make them socially
discontent.
7. The young people make up the majority of rural-urban migrants, so
the youth bulge and intensive urbanization act together, producing a
particularly strong destabilizing effect. Not only does the most
radically inclined part of population explode up in numbers, but it also
becomes concentrated in major cities/political centers.
8. This can result in serious political destabilization even against the
background of a rather stable economic growth. The probability of
political destabilization naturally increases dramatically if an
economic crisis occurs, or if the government loses its legitimacy due to
any other causes (such as military defeats), though the recent Arab
Spring events have demonstrated once again that even such triggers
may not be necessary.
Figure 6 illustrates the causal interactions postulated by this conceptual
model. Mathematical models describing the formation of the youth bulge (that,
in combination with some other factors, can lead to major sociopolitical
upheavals are well-developed and are widely used in demographic research. A
mathematical model based on standard population pyramid calculus and the
hypothesis of logistic growth of urbanization (Korotayev 2006) is described in
Appendix A, and the urbanization component is in Appendix B.
Testing the Model with Cross-National Data
Our theory predicts that there should be a strong correlation between the
growth rate of urban youth population and political violence (see Appendix C
for the data on conflicts). Our cross-national test indicates that violent
conflicts should be expected in cases when the young urban population grows
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by more than 30 percent during 5 years. When this indicator exceeds 45
percent it is very difficult for a country to avoid such upheavals (see Table 1).
Figure 6. Trap at the escape from Malthusian trap: a flowchart illustrating
the model.
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Table 1. Correlation between the maximum growth rates of young urban
population (percent, per 5-year periods) and the intensity of internal violent
conflicts, 1960–2005 (ρ = 0.59, p << 0.0001; γ = 0.74, p << 0.0001). Conflict
intensity categories: low = less than 500 violent deaths), medium = between
500 and 100,000 deaths, and high = over 100,000 deaths.
Maximum growth rates
of young urban population
per 5-year period
Very low (< 15 percent), n = 9
Low (15–20 percent), n = 5
Medium (20–30 percent), n = 26
High (30–45 percent), n = 53
Very high (> 45 percent), n = 35
Conflict Intensity
Low
89
60
54
26
–
Medium
11
40
46
49
53
High
–
–
–
25
47
Our results indicate that for 1960–2005 the probability of major internal
violent conflicts in countries with very low young urban population growth
rates (less than 15 percent increase per 5 years) was very low. For countries
with intermediate values of these rates (20–30 percent increase per 5 years)
the probability of such conflicts was close to 50 percent. However, even for this
group of countries there was not a single occurrence of a particularly violent
internal political upheaval in the given period. In countries with high young
urban population growth rates (30–45 percent increase per 5 years) the
probability of avoiding major political upheavals falls down to a very low level
(about one chance out of four). Additionally, the probability of a particularly
violent civil war becomes very high in these countries (also about one chance
out of four).
In countries in which the young urban population growth rates were very
high (>45 percent increase in 5 years) not a single one managed to avoid major
political shocks. The risk of a particularly violent civil war was very high for
these countries (about one chance out of two).
A Forecast of Sociopolitical Instability in African
countries, 2011–2050
These empirical results can be used for predicting the risks of sociopolitical
instability for the countries being on the verge of escape from Malthusian trap,
in the process of escape, or having escaped from it recently. The United
Nations Population Division has developed urbanization dynamics forecasts
for all the African countries, as well as forecasts of age structure dynamics up
to 2050 (UN Population Division 2010). Synthesis of these predictions allowed
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us to make a synthetic forecast regarding the dynamics of demographicstructural instability for the African countries in this period.
It is noteworthy that in our prediction only ‘positive results’ are really
significant (i.e. the results revealing the presence of high political instability
risk in a certain country in a certain period). We are inclined to interpret such
results as evidence for a real risk of political instability in the given place at the
given time—assuming that respective governments do not undertake adequate
measures in time. On the other hand, in our opinion, ‘negative results’ cannot
be viewed as a guarantee of absence of political upheavals in the given country
up to 2050, because we do not claim that the reasons of violent political
upheavals can be reduced to demographic-structural factors only.
Let us now consider our forecast of the young urban population dynamics
for several African countries. As regards most North African countries, they
have advanced in both demographic and urbanization transitions and no
significant risks, of the kind studied in this paper, are forecasted for them after
2011 up to 2050. Their young urban population is already close to the
saturation level and the prevailing pattern of dynamics in the given period will
be mostly produced by demographic waves engendered by the demographic
explosion of c.1960–85 and subsequent rapid birth rate decline.
However, in early 2011 a number of North African countries were still in the
youth bulge zone, with the bulge just having reached its peak and about to start
declining (Figure 7). Youth bulges certainly played a crucial role in the Arab
Spring. Hence, recent political upheavals in North Africa can be classified as a
very special sort of the trap, a ‘trap at the very escape from the Malthusian
trap.’ Note that this sort of trap has its rather important peculiarities.
No serious demographic-structural risks of the type in question are
forecasted after 2011 for some Sub-Saharan countries (especially in Southern
Africa). Thus, in Gabon and Botswana the young urban population growth
curve quite clearly demonstrates the absence of major demographic- structural
risks (Figure 8).
A bright example is represented by Ghana (see Figure 7), where the
forecasted situation may seem truly threatening, as by 2050 the young urban
population there is likely to grow almost threefold (i.e., 200 percent; while in
the cases considered above this growth did not exceed 50 percent). However,
analysis of the corresponding time series shows that in the following decade
urban youth relative growth rates are forecasted to be decreasing in Ghana up
to a quite safe level of less than 14 percent during 5 years; in 2020s these rates
are going to stabilize (at the same rather safe level), while after 2030 they will
decline further. A similar dynamics is demonstrated by the absolute growth
rates of the young urban population.
Nevertheless, the forecast indicates the presence of high demographicstructural risks for a wide range of Tropical African countries (see Table 2
below for a full list). Fortunately, in no case the urban youth
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Figure 7. Young urban population dynamics (in thousands) in Algeria,
Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Niger, forecast to 2050.
growth rates are forecasted to exceed the critical level of 45 percent per 5 years.
Still, a number of tropical African countries are forecasted to get into a very
dangerous zone of 30–45 percent (only a quarter of countries in this zone
managed to avoid major internal political conflicts, while in a quarter of cases
the upheavals were particularly violent). Kenya is among the countries of high
demographic-structural risk. In 2005–2050 a 4.5-time increase in the young
urban population is forecasted for Kenya, while in the 2020s the relative
growth rates of this indicator will exceed the critical level of 30 percent per 5
years. However, the most serious demographic-structural risks are predicted
for Niger, where in 2000–2050 the young urban population will increase by an
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Figure 8. Young urban population dynamics (thousands) in Botswana,
Congo, Eritrea, and Gabon, forecast to 2050.
order of magnitude; in late 2010s the relative growth rates of this indicator will
exceed the critical level of 30 percent per 5 years, while in the early 2020s they
will exceed an even more dangerous level of 40 percent during 5 years. These
rates will decrease to relatively safe levels only in the late 2040s (Figure 9).
Postscript: the Arab Spring of 2011
This article was submitted to review before the events of the Arab Spring and
this Postscript was added after the first round of reviews. First, we would like
to acknowledge that our model does not capture all possible causes of
revolutions. Therefore the purpose of the Postscript is to examine the events of
the Arab Spring in light of the model, and to see how the model fares.
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Table 2. Summary forecast of demographic-structural risks of political
destabilization in African countries to 2050
Urban
DemographicCountry
Years of
High risks of
youth
structural risk
maximum
political
urban youth growth
destabilization level
growth rates rates in
those years
Niger
2021–2025
41.8
2021–2030
Very high
Malawi
2011–2015
39.0
2011–2020
High
Burkina Faso
2021–2025
38.7
2021–2030
High
Uganda
2021–2025
33.1
2021–2030
High
Eritrea
2021–2025
32.5
2021–2030
High
Tanzania
2021–2025
30.6
2021–2030
High
Kenya
2021–2025
30.2
2021–2030
High
Rwanda
2021–2025
29.6
2021–2030
Medium
Chad
2016–2020
28.5
2016–2025
Medium
Burundi
2026–2030
28.1
2026–2035
Medium
Congo, Dem.
2011–2015
27.7
2011–2020
Medium
Rep.
Mozambique
2021–2025
27.4
2021–2030
Medium
Somalia
2016–2020
27.4
2016–2025
Medium
Ethiopia
2011–2015
26.7
2011–2020
Medium
Gambia
2011–2015
26.5
2011–2020
Medium
Sierra Leone
2016–2020
25.4
2016–2025
Medium
Madagascar
2011–2015
25.2
2011–2020
Medium
Guinea
2021–2025
24.2
2021–2030
Low
Mali
2021–2025
24.1
2021–2030
Low
Zimbabwe
2011–2015
23.5
2011–2020
Low
Benin
2021–2025
22.6
2021–2030
Low
Comoro
2021–2025
22.6
2021–2030
Low
Islands
Sudan
2011–2015
22.4
2011–2020
Low
Zambia
2016–2020
22.3
2016–2025
Low
Namibia
2011–2015
22.0
2011–2020
Low
Equatorial
2026–2030
21.6
2026–2035
Low
Guinea
Angola
2011–2015
21.5
2011–2020
Low
Guinea2021–2025
21.5
2021–2030
Low
Bissau
Liberia
2011–2015
21.2
2011–2020
Low
Côte d’Ivoire
2011–2015
20.3
2011–2020
Low
Togo
2011–2015
19.8
Very low
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Table 4, continued. Summary forecast of demographic-structural risks of
political destabilization in African countries to 2050
Urban
DemographicCountry
Years of
High risks of
youth
structural risk
maximum
political
urban youth growth
destabilization level
growth rates rates in
those years
Togo
2011–2015
19.8
Very low
Senegal
2021–2025
19.3
Very low
Nigeria
2011–2015
19.2
Very low
Cameroon
2021–2025
17.4
Very low
Lesotho
2011–2015
16.7
Very low
Swaziland
2026–2030
16.4
Very low
Mauritania
2021–2025
16.0
Very low
Sao Tome
2016–2020
15.7
Very low
and Principe
Ghana
2011–2015
15.3
Very low
2016–2020
15.0
Very low
Central
African Rep.
Congo
2011–2015
14.0
Absent
Libya
2016–2020
12.3
Absent*
Egypt
2021–2025
11.6
Absent*
Algeria
2021–2025
10.7
Absent*
West. Sahara
2026–2030
10.2
Absent
Gabon
2011–2015
9.7
Absent
Botswana
2026–2030
9.6
Absent
Morocco
2026–2030
8.6
Absent*
Mauritius
2031–2035
8.4
Absent
Tunisia
2026–2030
7.3
Absent*
Djibouti
2011–2015
6.0
Absent
Cape Verde
2011–2015
5.4
Absent
South Africa
2021–2025
5.3
Absent
Reunion
2021–2025
4.6
Absent
*Absent after 2011
The ‘Escape from the Trap’ dynamic has been an important contributor to
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and to most of other Arab Spring uprisings.
However, the mechanisms of the “Arab Spring” explosions have certain
peculiarities that differentiate them from the classical model of the ‘Escape
from the Trap’ discussed above.
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Korotayev et al.: Escaping the Trap. Cliodynamics (2011) Vol. 2, Iss. 2
Growth Rate (percent per 5 years)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Figure 9. Forecasts of relative growth rates of the young urban population in
Niger to 2050 (percent per 5-year periods).
To start with, the Arab spring explosions (with a notable exception of
Yemen that we will discuss in more detail below) occurred when the respective
countries were at the very end of the Escape from the Trap. The year 2011 was
one of the last years when these countries had critically high youth:adult
ratios, and the post-2011 forecast suggests that these ratio will rapidly decline
to safe levels (Figure 10). In terms of absolute numbers, on the other hand,
have been growing rapidly in the last two decades and peaked right around
2010 (Figure 11).
Let us consider the Egyptian Revolution in greater detail. It is not
surprising that Mubarak’s administration ‘overlooked’ the social explosion.
Indeed, statistical data correctly indicated that the country was developing
very successfully. Economic growth rates were high (even in the crisis years).
Poverty and inequality levels were among the lowest in the Third World.
Global food prices were rising, but the government was taking serious
measures to mitigate their effect on the poorest layers of the population.
Unemployment level (in percent) was less than in many developed countries
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40
Youth:Adult Ratio (percent)
Tunisia
Egypt
35
30
25
20
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
Figure 10. Youth bulges in North African countries: the proportion of youth
(aged 20–29) to overall adult (> 19 year old) population for 1965–2010 with a
forecast to 2020.
1100
10000
Tunisia (left scale)
Egypt (right scale)
Numbers (x1000)
8000
900
7000
800
6000
700
600
1980
Numbers (x1000)
9000
1000
5000
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
4000
2020
Figure 11. Dynamics of the absolute numbers (× 1000) of the young (20–24
year old) in Tunisia and Egypt, 1985–2010, with a forecast to 2015 (data
source: UN Population Division 2011).
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and, moreover, was declining, and so were population growth rates. What
would be the grounds to expect a full-scale social explosion? Naturally, the
administration was aware of the presence of certain groups of dissident
‘bloggers,’ but how could one expect that they would be able to inspire great
masses of people to go to Tahrir?
It was even more difficult to predict that Mubarak’s regime would be
painfully struck by its own modernization successes, which led to the sharp
decline of crude death rate and, especially, of infant and child mortality in
1975–1990. Without these successes many young Egyptians vehemently
demanding Mubarak’s resignation (or even death) would have been destined
to die in early childhood and simply would not have survived to come out to
the Tahrir Square (Korotayev and Zinkina 2011a, 2011b). Indeed, as great
successes were achieved in bringing down infant and child mortality rates
(while birth rates still remained high and started to decline only after a long
lag) a very numerous generation of children emerged in the Egyptian
population structure, which after 20 years fed the huge youth bulge (Figure
20).
Note further that the rate of unemployment in Egypt stayed almost
unchanged in the recent two decades while the number of the young doubled.
At the beginning of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution the unemployment level in
Egypt was about 9 percent which was not particularly high according to global
standards. However, the most important circumstance (caused solely by the
youth bulge) is that about half of all the Egyptian unemployed belonged to the
20–24 age cohort (Al-jihaz… 2010). Total number of the unemployed on the
eve of the Egyptian Revolution was about 2.5 million (Abd al-Rahman 2010:
4). Accordingly, on the eve of the Revolution Egypt had about one million of
unemployed people aged 20–24 who made up the main striking force of the
Revolution. The absolute number of the unemployed young people increased
by a factor of at least two.
Moreover, the investigation carried out at the end of 2010 by the Egyptian
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics discovered that on the
eve of the Revolution more than 43 percent of the Egyptian unemployed had
university degrees (Al-jihaz… 2010). Thus, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (and
most of the other Arab Spring events) was fueled by not only young, but also
highly educated. This circumstance may explain a relatively small number of
victims during these uprisings. Indeed, though the scale of the events was truly
colossal and millions of people were involved for weeks, only 300 were killed
(mostly by the security forces and criminal elements employed by the security
forces, but not by the protesters). In contrast during the bread riots of 1977
(when low-educated Egyptian urban youth was the main striking force) 800
people were killed just during two days (Hirst 1977). In this regard the 2011
Egyptian Revolution was closer to the youth uprisings of the 1968 type and
‘velvet revolutions’ in Europe and North America of the past decades, than to
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Numbers of the 20-24 Cohort (100 = 1985)
300
Jordan
Oman
Syria
Morocco
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Figure 12. Relative dynamics of the young (20–24) population, 100 = 1985
(1985–2010, with a forecast to 2015) in Jordan, Oman, Syria, and Morocco
(data source: UN Population Division 2011).
violent and bloody civil wars in the Third World (involving dozens and
hundreds thousands, if not millions deaths).
The peak of the 20–24 year old young cohort population was also observed
in Syria, Oman, and Jordan (Figure 12). The Moroccan youth bulge was the
least pronounced, and perhaps it was not a coincidence that the Arab Spring
events in this country were the least pronounced.
In other Arab countries the 20–24 cohort reached a peak either before
2011, or is predicted to peak in the future (see supplementary figures in
Appendix D). Libya and Algeria are in the first group, because the 20–24
cohort peaked there in 2005. Correspondingly, 2010 was the peak of the 25–29
cohort. Perhaps this is the reason why the Arab Spring events there were of
relatively low intensity (in comparison with Tunisia and Egypt). On the other
hand, the 20–24 cohort will reach a peak in Bahrain and Yemen only in the
future—around 2020 in Bahrain and towards 2050 in Yemen. This difference
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is caused by the fact that Yemen lagged far behind the other Arab countries as
regards both life expectancy/death rate and the total fertility/crude birth rates.
Other Arab countries that lag significantly behind the rest of the Arab world in
their demographic transition and where, consequently, significant
demographic-structural risks of sociopolitical destabilization will persist in the
forthcoming future are Mauritania, Iraq, and, especially, the Palestinian
Autonomy (see supplementary figures in Appendix D). While the absolute
numbers of young population in the countries of the Arab ‘mainstream’ will
stabilize in the forthcoming decade, in Iraq this cohort will continue to grow
rapidly up to the 2020s. In Mauritania growth of the 20–24 cohort will
continue up to the 2030s, although it will be not as fast as in Iraq. However,
the Arab countries with the highest future demographic-structural risks are
Yemen and Palestine, where the numbers of youths will continue to grow
rapidly into the 2040s.
Acknowledgement
This research has been supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic
Research (Project # 10-06-00344: Forecasting Risks and Threats to Stability
of Sociopolitical Systems).
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