Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2012
The Syrian revolution is one of the most complicated events since the winds of the Arab Spring started to blow. The uniqueness of such revolution is that it revealed the details of a huge ball of tangled threads of interests where many powerful states agree that aiding the Syrians against their dictator is not the best choice, at least for now.
Russia’s political, diplomatic, military and economic footprint in the Middle East and North Africa has expanded visibly over the last decade. This Chaillot Paper provides a detailed account of Russia’s spectacular return to the region. The paper depicts how major regional players have adjusted to the new reality but also addresses the question of whether Russia will be able to sustain its geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East.
2019 •
This dissertation mainly focuses on Russia's current foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. During the post-Soviet era. It mainly concentrated after the Arab Spring. Russia's position in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Israel-Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, etc. Plus, how Russia has also managed to open up to a holistic alliance with all these countries as mentioned, and how it has been able to benefit as a regional player in the Middle East.
2017 •
The USSR used to be a very important actor in the Middle East. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Russia's involvement in the region was reduced. However, since the mid-1990s Moscow's efforts on strengthen its position in the region became evident. This article aims to show the determinants and goals of the Russian Federation's foreign policy towards Syria in the 21 st century. It will provide a brief analysis of the reasons and interests for Russia's activity in Syria and support for Bashar al-Assad since the outbreak of the civil war.
Russia’s policy in the Middle East is part of a broader strategy aimed at creating an international order in which Russia would be protected against Western interference in its internal affairs and stand on an equal footing with the United States. From the Kremlin’s point of view, the main aim of the Russian involvement in Syria has been to bring a halt to the Western – and more specifically the American – policy of so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’. The intervention was intended to demonstrate to Washington the limits of its ability to influence the situation in the Middle East and show that the US would have to take the opinions and interests of Russia into account. The success in salvaging Bashar al-Assad’s regime has clearly buoyed Moscow’s ambitions in the Middle East and encouraged it to try to build a new regional order in which Russia would play a key role. That order would consist of a concert of powers that would include, apart from Russia, also Turkey and Iran, as well as the United States; provided the latter shows a willingness to give up its ‘hegemonic habits’. The rebuilding of Russia’s position as a global power in the Middle East has also been an important measure in legitimising Putin’s regime in the eyes of the broadly understood Russian elite and the general public in Russia.
EuroMeSCo Joint Policy Study
The Role of Russia in the Middle East and North Africa Region. Strategy or Opportunism?The Syrian crisis, which started in 2011 as an anti-government protest against President Bashar-al-Assad, transformed into a civil war in the first quarter of 2012. Since then, the war continued unabated resulting as one of the worst humanitarian crises after the Second World War by killing more than 470,000 people and displacing half of the Syria's total population either internally or externally. It has also dragged regional and global powers to wage proxy war in its territory and caused spill-over effects within and beyond the region. In this context, this paper is an attempt to analyse the Syrian crisis, geopolitics behind the crisis and its implications. In doing so, the paper identifies different factors, such as authoritarian nature of President Bashar-al-Assad's government, sectarian division and deteriorated socioeconomic condition within Syria, competing gas export interest from regional as well as global powers, the intervention of foreign powers as major reasons for deepening the crisis and prolonging this war. The ruling Ba'ath Party of Syria headed by President Assad, a coalition of Syrian opposition forces and their military entity, regional and global forces, namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, the United States, Russia, Lebanon's Shiite militia group Hezbollah and different Sunni armed extremist groups like Al-Nusra Front and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are the main actors of this war. The paper argues that apart from its devastating impact on Syria's socio-political and economic condition, the crisis has shaken the entire Middle East in particular and made a corrosive effect on the West's relations with both Russia and China as a whole. It has also caused the biggest wave of disorderly migration since the Second World War and facilitated the emergence of armed extremist organisations like ISIS and Al Nusra Front, which are posing serious threats to national security of Syria and beyond.
The RUSI paper, entitled ‘Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict’ provides a comprehensive assessment of Iran’s involvement in, and degree of influence over Syria and how this is seen by the governments and non-state actors in the region. The paper is the result of field research by RUSI staff and associate fellows who investigated the issue from the perspective of the five main actors in the conflict, including those states from the Gulf region, Russia and non-state groups fighting on the battlefield. The paper points to a consensus amongst non-Iranian actors who see Iran’s objectives to seek in Syria ‘a non-hostile regime that continues to act as a conduit to Hizbullah, a stable and whole country without pockets of independent Kurdish territory that might encourage greater fragmentation in Iraq, and, although not a priority, the degradation of Daesh’. However, there are significant differences between capitals over how far they are willing to accommodate Iranian objectives, even in the case of those fighting on the same side of the conflict. The paper confirms that the apparently close relationship between Moscow and Tehran is far more fragile than is often assumed. In Syria, ‘while Iran and Russia are co-ordinating closely on the ground to advance the war, they are less bound together in terms of their goals, and there is little trust between the two over their respective long-term aims in Syria’. Iran is worried that Russia could use Syria as a bargaining chip to resolve the Ukraine question, at the expense of Iran’s localised interests in Syria, whereas Moscow is concerned about Iran’s activity on the ground and its support for Hizbullah to preserve its long-term territorial influence. The goal for Western policy-makers should thus be to explore ways in which they can ‘work ‘between’ Russia and Iran’. The paper reveals how ‘Damascus is more comfortable dealing with Russia than the seemingly sectarian agenda of Iran. This offers a point of engagement for Western policy-makers to advance their own interests.’ ‘It may be possible to persuade Russia that it can gain from a deal in Syria that counters some of the more objectionable elements of Iran’s behaviour – and in turn make the deal easier to sell to those in the Gulf who are supporting the armed opposition groups.’ At the same time, policy-makers should look closely at the disagreement among GCC states about Iran’s role in Syria and across the region. ‘Through shuttle diplomacy, in particular between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Jordan, it might be possible to increase understanding of the different attitudes toward Iran in the Gulf States.’ This might facilitate finding a common ground between those, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which appear considerably more flexible than Saudi Arabia, and Iran, increasing the likelihood of a political settlement on Syria. This means that there are points of entry and engagement for Western policy-makers with regard to Tehran, particularly on issues such as the future of Assad or the status of Hizbullah forces beyond Lebanese borders. Furthermore, ‘Iran has shown that it is able to strike bargains with some of the anti-Assad forces on the ground in pursuit of specific goals’, and is generally likely to have greater influence than Russia on local issues, such as ceasefires and humanitarian access in specific areas. Calibrating these differences accurately and seeking ways to engage on specific issues in specific places would be a productive way to engage with Iran on Syria. As ‘pragmatic elements in Iran’s leadership are seeking to re-emerge on the international stage, in economic and political terms’, Tehran seems keen to be involved in global geopolitical discussions and has previously demonstrated its ability to compartmentalise specific issues in its engagement with the West. Therefore, it is possible that Syria might allow for a similar approach.
The Role of Russia in the MENA Region. Strategy or Opportunism?
The Interests of Putin's Russia in the MENA Region in Historical Perspective2019 •
NEW CONFLICT DYNAMICS Between Regional Autonomy and Intervention in the Middle East and North Africa, edited by R. A. Boserup, W. Hazbun, K. Makdisi and H. Malmvig
Western Arms Transfers and Arms Control Policies towards the Middle East: Constraining Regional Actors or Fueling Regional Wars?2017 •
Journal of Social Policy and Society
SYRIA IN A TORMENT: AMBIGUOUS ACTORS AND GEOPOLITICAL INTRIGUES2016 •
The War for Syria. Regional and International Dimensions of the Syrian Uprising
The Regional Sectarian War and Syria2020 •
Burke Chair in Strategy Report
The Struggle For The Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for StabilityTransnational Press London (July 5, 2018) ISBN-10: 9781910781845 ISBN-13: 978-1910781845
Post-Cold War Relations between Turkey and Syria2018 •
Middle East Bulletin, CEMMIS
What if Syria had nukes? Lessons from "Operation Orchard"2014 •
ISPI MED Report (chapter, only pp.32-35)
Yemen and the governance of hybrid security orders2019 •
Russian Analytical Digest 128
Civil War, Revolution or Counter-Insurgency? The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes2013 •
The Levant; Search for a Regional Order
The Levant; Search for a Regional OrderSouth-East European Journal of Political Science
Revisiting International and Regional Responses to the War in Syria with a Special Emphasis on Turkish ApproachMED Report 2019
Police Reform in North Africa: a Multilateral Approach2019 •