International Perspectives on Pragmatism International Perspectives on Pragmatism Edited by Peter H. Hare, Michel Weber, J.K. Swindler, Oana-Maria Pastae and Cerasel Cuteanu International Perspectives on Pragmatism, Edited by Peter H. Hare, Michel Weber, J.K. Swindler, Oana-Maria Pastae and Cerasel Cuteanu This book first published 2009 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2009 by Peter H. Hare, Michel Weber, J.K. Swindler, Oana-Maria Pastae and Cerasel Cuteanu and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-0194-1, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-0194-2 This volume is dedicated to the memory of Peter H. Hare TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ........................................................................................................ xi Introduction .............................................................................................. xiii Prologue: Modernity between humanism and crisis; towards pragmatism and liberalism by overcoming tradition On Human Dignity: The Testament of the Two Humanisms ...................... 2 Jason Jordan Aspects of the crisis of the West................................................................ 13 Mihaela Stefanescu Part I: Practical Politics Social Contract Theory and Disaster Preparation: The Importance of Including Civilians ................................................................................ 28 Naomi Zack Libertarianism: Old Recipe for a New America? ...................................... 42 Horst Freyhofer Democracy, Liberalism and Freedom........................................................ 52 Simon Glynn William James and the Haymarket Affair: A Case Study of Pragmatic Politics ....................................................................................................... 69 Linda Simon Pragmatism and Political Practice: A Developing Country Perspective ... 76 Jane Skinner viii Table of Contents The Values and Practices of Democracy in Deweyan Pragmatism: A Brief Exploration ................................................................................... 85 Marjorie O’Loughlin The Right to Permanent Residency as a Human Right: A Kantian Inquiry.................................................................................... 102 Jason D. Hill Pragmatic Anarchy in A. N. Whitehead .................................................. 118 Michel Weber Part II: Democratic Theory Rationalist Grounds for Pragmatist Democracy ...................................... 150 J.K. Swindler Humanity and Moral Duty: Contexts with Rorty’s Ideas ........................ 160 Vasil Gluchman The Rortyan Concept of Justice as a ‘Larger Loyalty’ ............................ 174 Susana de Castro Rorty on Democracy and Justification .................................................... 181 Michael Hodges Contemporary Society under the Tyranny of a Democracy of the Truth ... 193 Cerasel Cuteanu Pragmatism and Human Rights ............................................................... 211 Jon Mahoney Teacher, Democratic Values and Methods (Dewey and his Philosophy of Education) ........................................................................................... 220 Marta Gluchmanova A Pragmatic Defense of Justice............................................................... 230 Ned McClennen International Perspectives on Pragmatism ix Part III: Art and Community Community of Art ................................................................................... 254 Krystyna Wilkoszewska Comments and Queries: Krystyna Wilkoszewska’s “Community and Art” ................................................................................................... 264 Peter H. Hare PREFACE The pragmatist discussion on today’s various and complex aspects of our society is one of high interest in contemporary philosophy, especially due to philosophers, such as Richard Rorty, whose work reactivated much of the emphasis on pragmatism lately. In September of ’08, the “Constantin Brancusi” University from Targu-Jiu, Romania, was happy to host some of the well-recognized world’s philosophers at an international conference on pragmatism, society and politics. This volume is the result of a selection of the papers presented during this conference. The topics gravitated around pragmatism and political philosophy, having, at the same time, a solid background in the history of culture. Amongst the themes representing the focus of this international gathering, we would mention a few that are very interesting for recent discussion: democracy and pragmatism, liberalism and democracy as traditions of modernity, liberalism and Marxism, democratic values and democratic practices, the possibility/impossibility of cosmopolitan democracy as a moral achievement, political ideology vs. religion: Dewey – religion and democracy inside pragmatism, democracy: universalism or specificity - the connection with Enlightenment. The structure of the volume reflects a refined mixture between practical – political philosophy and the history of ideas. Consequently, the volume opens up with two papers that create a cultural background for the postmodernist jump towards pragmatism and liberalism (by overcoming tradition in a West characterized both by humanism and crisis). Thus, the focus on practical politics (the division following the prologue) makes possible a discussion on classic topics in an updated manner, such as social contract (Dr Naomi Zack’s “Social Contract Theory…”), but also very vivid stands on issues directly connected to social and political controversies specific to the global world we live in nowadays (dealing with terrorism, libertarianism, democracy in South-Africa etc). The second division of the volume – “Democratic theory” represents a fascinating discussion around the popular concept of democracy. Since it’s the globally generalized model of political ideal, democracy seems, according to the authors, an ideal that lost its ideality, some of its flaws xii Preface being usually overseen. Agreeing with the fact the Dewey is one of the key-theoreticians of the democratic attitude, some of the papers emphasize the fact that its conceptual fundaments are to be found inside Platonism and Kantianism (Jim Swindler), while others (Gluchman, Cuteanu) go with Rorty and his anti-foundationalist approach, an interpretation quite far from Kantianism, both from a moral and epistemological point of view. Of course, such views “flirt” with a thick touch of relativism, even though dismissed by Rorty. As an example, Michael Hodges’ paper is a very entertaining debate with his colleague at Vanderbilt – Robert Tallisse – and around the fact that the doing away with foundationalism would lower democracy to the level of tyranny. A very interesting discussion is Jon Mahoney’s in his paper “Pragmatism and human Rights”, where he approaches Michael Ignatieff’s arguments from Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry; Jon Mahoney goes against pragmatism and concludes that human rights need a moral foundation. The final part of the volume is one that looks at the concept of art in a pragmatist society and bears the refined debate between Professor Krystyna Wilkoszewska and Doctor Peter Hare about art and how it can build a community of experience. Before ending, we would like to mention the tremendous influence that Peter Hare’s personality had on the success of the conference our university organized last year; Dr Hare generously accepted to be international co-organizer of the conference. As Dr Hare passed away so suddenly last year, it is an honor for us to dedicate this volume to his memory. It has been a privilege to have, amongst us, somebody who has done so much for philosophy for half a century. Adrian Gorun, Ph.D. President of the “Constantin Brancusi” University from Tg- Jiu, Romania INTRODUCTION Undoubtedly one of the most traumatic discoveries in human intellectual history was the realization that the powers that be were neither natural, necessary, nor preordained. This discovery —seemingly so innocuous to our jaded culture in which rebellion is a fashion of selfexpression— germinated in the fecund soil of Europe amply fertilized with the corpses of the wars of religion. The second half of the 17th century was a time much like our own. The peace of Westphalia, an exquisitely warweary and pragmatic accord, ended nearly a century and a half of bitter religious conflicts, sought to codify the inviolable sovereignty of European kingdoms, and established the carefully guarded European balance of power. Kings would continue to fight their dynastic wars, but these were the desultory affairs of squabbling relatives, not great crusades in defense of the faith. The Holy Church had taught the divine right of kings and Luther had admonished his followers to render unto Caesar, but in the post-ideological world of early-modern Europe, where power and sovereignty was protected not by God but by carefully worded treaties and grand alliances, such notions seemed increasingly quaint. The philosophical realization born of this epoch: that the state required legitimation, was to produce practical results like no other intellectual revolution in history. New wars of ideology set Europe ablaze. Outside Canada and the Guyanas, the entirety of the Euro-American western hemisphere revolted from is old masters. Yet, in the old world, the Westphalian alliances and reciprocal structures of power held before the onslaught of the Enlightenment, were re-codified in the Congress of Vienna, and enforced bloodily in 1849. This new pragmatic accord was of surprising longevity, but it too broke, unleashing two bitterly ideological World Wars, and an even more ideological Cold War that split the World in two. Of this we inhabit the wake. Such times may seem uninspiring ones in which to live: it is far more romantic to man the barricades in defense of the Revolution, or a tank in the great crusade against fascism. Nonetheless, such weary times have proven intellectually fecund: the most productive age of Greek philosophy, from Socrates to Aristotle, came after the bloodbath of the Peloponnesian War; as did modern philosophy after the Thirty-Years War, and the scientific revolution after the Napoleonic Wars. xiv Introduction What then of the aftermath Cold War? If there is to be a golden age or intellectual revolution of some sort, it seems obvious that it will not be in philosophy. Or rather, the revolution has already taken place, and the Queen of the Sciences has been deposed. Spared the guillotine but imprisoned within the ivory tower, without a window from which to contemplate the heavens, Lady Philosophy has returned to her old role of comforting the forlorn by rationalizing their failures, and the 20th century has exposed many such failures in need of rationalization. Like Aesop’s Fox, her followers have exhausted themselves in reaching for fruits that were beyond their grasp. “Do not despair” she says, always the voice of reason. “They are probably sour anyway.” Such is the mandate of pragmatism. It is the task of an introduction to such a volume to discern and address some common theme resonating within each essay. This insecurity, of the West and its political order, this weariness that is at the same time a restless searching for some standard or modicum of legitimacy —if the grapes are above our grasp, is it still possible to content ourselves with whatever carrion our history has left us?— is, in my opinion, the underlying mood uniting the many variegated perspectives taken by the authors of this volume. As befitting the nature of the questions considered, one must speak in terms of sentiment, for there is most certainly no uniting interpretation; nor should there be, for then we would no longer be thinking in an age of pragmatism, but of ideology. The editors of the volume have divided it into three parts following a philosophical prologue. For the convenience of the reader, I should like here to summarize each section and the essays therein. My essay on humanism in antiquity and the Renaissance was sufficently vague and antiquarian to be included in the prologue. More probing and contemporary considerations were taken up by Mihaela Stefanescu who surveys the culture of the West following the fall of Communism, concluding that it is in a state of irrevocable crisis. This crisis is dualistic, split between two opposing antipodes of power: the European Union, which faces an essentialist crisis stemming from its own impotence following WWII and decolonialization, and the United States, which faces an existential crisis stemming from its hegemony of power following the end of the Cold War. Part One is devoted to essays concerning pragmatism and practical politics in democratic society. Naomi Zack examines the responsibility government has to its citizens during instances of disaster. Following Locke and Hobbes’ premise that government is not inevitable and thus must justify itself practically (i.e. not merely ideologically) by improving International Perspectives on Pragmatism xv the lives of the governed, she rejects the humanitarian approach to disaster response insofar as it is optional, arguing instead that government has a positive obligation to its citizens in times of disaster. Horst Freyhofer outlines the intellectual history of the libertarian movement in America, asking whether such a philosophy provides a viable alternative to the social-democratic order of the post-war West. He argues that while libertarianism has currently lost its luster and been relegated to a minor third party, its ideals remain, and will reappear and offer legitimate solutions should the crises of the modern state lead to its collapse. Simon Glynn provides a critical analysis of modern democracy as having become fundamentally corrupted and serving as little more than a rationalization and cover for the reinscription of structures of power. He argues that American democracy no longer represents the interests of its citizens, in fact actively colludes against them, and has thus lost its mandate to govern. Krystyna Wilkoszewska proposes a connection between Dewey’s notion of a “community of experience” and her conception of a “community of art”. Such communities are pragmatic insofar as they eschew any fundamental ideology or political dictates, are based not on institutions but organic connections, and value participation and engagement rather than disinterested contemplation. Linda Simon looks at William James’ response to the prosecution of anarchist activists in the wake of the Haymarket Affair, arguing that James’ writings on the subject raise serious questions about pragmatist moral reasoning: specifically that concerning the distinction between pragmatism and consequentialism. Jane Skinner examines the challenges facing the fledgling democracies of South Africa and Eastern Europe and argues for a “pragmatism of marginal political utility” which integrates certain Marxist ideas, specifically the notion of false consciousness, into pragmatist political theory. She concludes that the only way to avoid a democratic “false consciousness”, in which citizens unwittingly concede to dogmas of the ruling regime, is through an active education that fosters a “critical consciousness” necessary for a healthy and truly democratic society. Marjorie O’Loughlin writes on Dewey’s work on China and explores the relationship between pragmatist philosophy and the development of democratic dispositions and communities. She argues that a Deweyan approach to democracy emphasizes the cultivation of communities of shared values united under democratic dispositions. (Such an approach to democracy stands in contrast to the Enlightenment Western conception of xvi Introduction rational individuals entering a contract under democratic institutions out of self-interest.) Under the Deweyan pragmatist/ communitarian approach, O’Loughlin and Dewey believe that Western democracy can evolve and become compatible with non-Western “traditional” cultures. Jason Hill deploys Kant’s moral theory and defense of cosmopolitanism to argue that permanent residency be understood as a human right in certain situations. Noting Kant’s insistence that a republican democracy was the only form of government compatible with human dignity and autonomy insofar as it alone allows for the development of a “moral culture,” Hill argues that all human beings, insofar as they are of “innate equality,” have a right not to be excluded from this moral culture. From this principle it follows that those who are currently excluded from moral culture de facto (in their homeland), should be granted residency in a society of moral culture as a basic human right and in accord with the principle of hospitality. Michel Weber takes up Whitehead’s process philosophy as “a defense of liberalism,” and examines the fundamentally pragmatic political structures of the Whiteheadian city. Part Two concerns democratic theory and the legitimacy or nonlegitimacy of the democratic state. J.K. Swindler approvingly takes up Dewey’s notion of the “democratic attitude,” but argues that Dewey’s experiential instrumentalist epistemology is insufficient grounds for such a concept. Swindler instead argues that this notion can only fully be accounted on rationalist grounds, particularly Plato’s idea of the “common good,” and Kant’s idea of the “good will”. Vasil Gluchman takes up Kant’s notion of “humanity”, trying both to de-transcendentalize the concept (i.e. not as homo noumenon), as well as, through Rorty, seek its expansion. He argues that this concept of humanity is central to human life and moral progress and proposes a new progressive humanism for the 21st century. Susana de Castro examines Rorty theory of justice through a distinction she draws between the classical inheritance of rational justice and a more archaic concept that she calls “philial justice”. She argues that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, emphasis on social solidarity, and concept of justice as a “larger loyalty”, represent an attempt to syncretize both positions, but without an appeal to a foundational moral principle. Michael Hodges defends Rorty’s anti-foundationalist politics against the criticism of Robert Talisse. He argues that foundational political or moral principles often serve to stifle debate and thus act against democracy, whereas a purely open discourse without claim to any dogma is the purest expression of democracy. Thus Rorty’s “deflationary” attacks on metaphysical and epistemological justifications serve not to delegitimate democracy, but rather to clear an open space necessary for its International Perspectives on Pragmatism xvii expression as a practical (rather than an ideological) politics. Cerasel Cuteanu proposes an “ironist approach” to democracy and the question of legitimacy. Such an approach he sees as essential (or perhaps merely the only approach left untarnished by history) if we are to give up predicating our democracies on foundational claims or national narratives. Yet the loss of these structures opens up the possibility of a “tyranny of the majority” which lives at the heart of the democratic project, and to which these very foundationalist notions were originally placed against. Cuteanu concludes that a compromise between Rorty and Habermas is necessary to mediate this threat. Jon Mahoney rejects this pragmatic/anti-foundationalist conception of morality and politics. Focusing on Michael Ignatieff’s pragmatic defense of human rights, Mahoney argues that such a notion, the sine qua non of liberal society, cannot be merely pragmatic if it is to be more than dogma or descriptive claims of what Kant would call “moral anthropology”. Maria Gluchmanova examines the relevance of Dewey’s philosophy of education to democratic society. She claims that Dewey’s anti-formalist philosophy of education was essentially democratic insofar as it championed the exchange of experience, critical thinking and independent judgment, and the emergent formation (rather than inculcation) of values. Ned McClennen offers a pragmatic theory of justice based on game theory. Noting that we make “pragmatic” decisions (i.e. those in furtherance of things we value) with ease every day, he argues that the amalgamation of these individual decisions and values into a society generates a social form of the economic problem. Given this similarity, he proposes a fundamentally economic perspective to issues of justice and rights based on the pragmatic criterion that such notions must be mutually advantageous to every member of society. Part Three concludes the volume with a section on art and literature. Peter Hare offers a response to Wilkoszewska’s essay that broadens its scope to examine intellectual culture in general. Hare argues that such communities are exceedingly rare and that ideological fragmentation, specialist balkanization, and institutional hierarchy are the norm. He then looks at the possibility that a pragmatist philosophy or art, by emphasizing its social value, in the end dumbs down art into a form of paternalistic educational entertainment. There were two questions that lingered in my mind when I reread the essays in this volume while preparing this introduction, and I should like to note them in closing. First, it is to me an open question whether or not a pragmatist ethics is ultimately intelligible, is even ethics at all. If it is, then xviii Introduction it must provide some answer to the problem of the criterion, and this answer must be in some sense foundational, if not in the metaphysical sense then in the discursive sense. The dialogue between the authors in Part Two fundamentally centers on this question. Second, in response to the question I opened with, I shall pose another: has the post-modern state become natural again? If the state is not founded on some fundamental ideology, some declaration of inaleniable principles from which it justifies itself, but rather merely on its practical and instrumental ability to provide for the happiness of its citizenry, is there not a danger that we could be bought off by our own democracies? We pay our taxes and complain, but the complaint is more akin to that made of the weather (or of that a medieval serf made against their lord), than that of the tithe or the Stamp Act or the Estates General. When you owe the state thousands of dollars in student loans, are employed by a public university, are provided your water, sewer, and electricity by public utilities, are fed from state subsidized farms…what sort of complaint is one really in the position to make? Jason Jordan Ph.D. Candidate, The University of Oregon