International Perspectives on Pragmatism
International Perspectives on Pragmatism
Edited by
Peter H. Hare, Michel Weber, J.K. Swindler,
Oana-Maria Pastae and Cerasel Cuteanu
International Perspectives on Pragmatism,
Edited by Peter H. Hare, Michel Weber, J.K. Swindler, Oana-Maria Pastae and Cerasel Cuteanu
This book first published 2009
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright © 2009 by Peter H. Hare, Michel Weber, J.K. Swindler, Oana-Maria Pastae
and Cerasel Cuteanu and contributors
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
ISBN (10): 1-4438-0194-1, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-0194-2
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Peter H. Hare
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface ........................................................................................................ xi
Introduction .............................................................................................. xiii
Prologue: Modernity between humanism and crisis; towards
pragmatism and liberalism by overcoming tradition
On Human Dignity: The Testament of the Two Humanisms ...................... 2
Jason Jordan
Aspects of the crisis of the West................................................................ 13
Mihaela Stefanescu
Part I: Practical Politics
Social Contract Theory and Disaster Preparation: The Importance
of Including Civilians ................................................................................ 28
Naomi Zack
Libertarianism: Old Recipe for a New America? ...................................... 42
Horst Freyhofer
Democracy, Liberalism and Freedom........................................................ 52
Simon Glynn
William James and the Haymarket Affair: A Case Study of Pragmatic
Politics ....................................................................................................... 69
Linda Simon
Pragmatism and Political Practice: A Developing Country Perspective ... 76
Jane Skinner
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Table of Contents
The Values and Practices of Democracy in Deweyan Pragmatism:
A Brief Exploration ................................................................................... 85
Marjorie O’Loughlin
The Right to Permanent Residency as a Human Right:
A Kantian Inquiry.................................................................................... 102
Jason D. Hill
Pragmatic Anarchy in A. N. Whitehead .................................................. 118
Michel Weber
Part II: Democratic Theory
Rationalist Grounds for Pragmatist Democracy ...................................... 150
J.K. Swindler
Humanity and Moral Duty: Contexts with Rorty’s Ideas ........................ 160
Vasil Gluchman
The Rortyan Concept of Justice as a ‘Larger Loyalty’ ............................ 174
Susana de Castro
Rorty on Democracy and Justification .................................................... 181
Michael Hodges
Contemporary Society under the Tyranny of a Democracy of the Truth ... 193
Cerasel Cuteanu
Pragmatism and Human Rights ............................................................... 211
Jon Mahoney
Teacher, Democratic Values and Methods (Dewey and his Philosophy
of Education) ........................................................................................... 220
Marta Gluchmanova
A Pragmatic Defense of Justice............................................................... 230
Ned McClennen
International Perspectives on Pragmatism
ix
Part III: Art and Community
Community of Art ................................................................................... 254
Krystyna Wilkoszewska
Comments and Queries: Krystyna Wilkoszewska’s “Community
and Art” ................................................................................................... 264
Peter H. Hare
PREFACE
The pragmatist discussion on today’s various and complex aspects of
our society is one of high interest in contemporary philosophy, especially
due to philosophers, such as Richard Rorty, whose work reactivated much
of the emphasis on pragmatism lately.
In September of ’08, the “Constantin Brancusi” University from
Targu-Jiu, Romania, was happy to host some of the well-recognized
world’s philosophers at an international conference on pragmatism,
society and politics.
This volume is the result of a selection of the papers presented during
this conference. The topics gravitated around pragmatism and political
philosophy, having, at the same time, a solid background in the history of
culture.
Amongst the themes representing the focus of this international
gathering, we would mention a few that are very interesting for recent
discussion: democracy and pragmatism, liberalism and democracy as
traditions of modernity, liberalism and Marxism, democratic values and
democratic practices, the possibility/impossibility of cosmopolitan
democracy as a moral achievement, political ideology vs. religion: Dewey
– religion and democracy inside pragmatism, democracy: universalism or
specificity - the connection with Enlightenment.
The structure of the volume reflects a refined mixture between
practical – political philosophy and the history of ideas. Consequently, the
volume opens up with two papers that create a cultural background for the
postmodernist jump towards pragmatism and liberalism (by overcoming
tradition in a West characterized both by humanism and crisis). Thus, the
focus on practical politics (the division following the prologue) makes
possible a discussion on classic topics in an updated manner, such as
social contract (Dr Naomi Zack’s “Social Contract Theory…”), but also
very vivid stands on issues directly connected to social and political
controversies specific to the global world we live in nowadays (dealing
with terrorism, libertarianism, democracy in South-Africa etc).
The second division of the volume – “Democratic theory” represents a
fascinating discussion around the popular concept of democracy. Since it’s
the globally generalized model of political ideal, democracy seems,
according to the authors, an ideal that lost its ideality, some of its flaws
xii
Preface
being usually overseen. Agreeing with the fact the Dewey is one of the
key-theoreticians of the democratic attitude, some of the papers emphasize
the fact that its conceptual fundaments are to be found inside Platonism
and Kantianism (Jim Swindler), while others (Gluchman, Cuteanu) go
with Rorty and his anti-foundationalist approach, an interpretation quite
far from Kantianism, both from a moral and epistemological point of view.
Of course, such views “flirt” with a thick touch of relativism, even though
dismissed by Rorty. As an example, Michael Hodges’ paper is a very
entertaining debate with his colleague at Vanderbilt – Robert Tallisse –
and around the fact that the doing away with foundationalism would lower
democracy to the level of tyranny.
A very interesting discussion is Jon Mahoney’s in his paper
“Pragmatism and human Rights”, where he approaches Michael Ignatieff’s
arguments from Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry; Jon Mahoney
goes against pragmatism and concludes that human rights need a moral
foundation.
The final part of the volume is one that looks at the concept of art in a
pragmatist society and bears the refined debate between Professor
Krystyna Wilkoszewska and Doctor Peter Hare about art and how it can
build a community of experience.
Before ending, we would like to mention the tremendous influence that
Peter Hare’s personality had on the success of the conference our
university organized last year; Dr Hare generously accepted to be
international co-organizer of the conference. As Dr Hare passed away so
suddenly last year, it is an honor for us to dedicate this volume to his
memory.
It has been a privilege to have, amongst us, somebody who has done so
much for philosophy for half a century.
Adrian Gorun, Ph.D.
President of the “Constantin Brancusi”
University from Tg- Jiu, Romania
INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly one of the most traumatic discoveries in human
intellectual history was the realization that the powers that be were neither
natural, necessary, nor preordained. This discovery —seemingly so
innocuous to our jaded culture in which rebellion is a fashion of selfexpression— germinated in the fecund soil of Europe amply fertilized with
the corpses of the wars of religion. The second half of the 17th century was
a time much like our own. The peace of Westphalia, an exquisitely warweary and pragmatic accord, ended nearly a century and a half of bitter
religious conflicts, sought to codify the inviolable sovereignty of European
kingdoms, and established the carefully guarded European balance of
power. Kings would continue to fight their dynastic wars, but these were
the desultory affairs of squabbling relatives, not great crusades in defense
of the faith. The Holy Church had taught the divine right of kings and
Luther had admonished his followers to render unto Caesar, but in the
post-ideological world of early-modern Europe, where power and
sovereignty was protected not by God but by carefully worded treaties and
grand alliances, such notions seemed increasingly quaint.
The philosophical realization born of this epoch: that the state required
legitimation, was to produce practical results like no other intellectual
revolution in history. New wars of ideology set Europe ablaze. Outside
Canada and the Guyanas, the entirety of the Euro-American western
hemisphere revolted from is old masters. Yet, in the old world, the
Westphalian alliances and reciprocal structures of power held before the
onslaught of the Enlightenment, were re-codified in the Congress of
Vienna, and enforced bloodily in 1849. This new pragmatic accord was of
surprising longevity, but it too broke, unleashing two bitterly ideological
World Wars, and an even more ideological Cold War that split the World
in two. Of this we inhabit the wake.
Such times may seem uninspiring ones in which to live: it is far more
romantic to man the barricades in defense of the Revolution, or a tank in
the great crusade against fascism. Nonetheless, such weary times have
proven intellectually fecund: the most productive age of Greek philosophy,
from Socrates to Aristotle, came after the bloodbath of the Peloponnesian
War; as did modern philosophy after the Thirty-Years War, and the
scientific revolution after the Napoleonic Wars.
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Introduction
What then of the aftermath Cold War? If there is to be a golden age or
intellectual revolution of some sort, it seems obvious that it will not be in
philosophy. Or rather, the revolution has already taken place, and the
Queen of the Sciences has been deposed. Spared the guillotine but
imprisoned within the ivory tower, without a window from which to
contemplate the heavens, Lady Philosophy has returned to her old role of
comforting the forlorn by rationalizing their failures, and the 20th century
has exposed many such failures in need of rationalization. Like Aesop’s
Fox, her followers have exhausted themselves in reaching for fruits that
were beyond their grasp. “Do not despair” she says, always the voice of
reason. “They are probably sour anyway.” Such is the mandate of
pragmatism.
It is the task of an introduction to such a volume to discern and address
some common theme resonating within each essay. This insecurity, of the
West and its political order, this weariness that is at the same time a
restless searching for some standard or modicum of legitimacy —if the
grapes are above our grasp, is it still possible to content ourselves with
whatever carrion our history has left us?— is, in my opinion, the
underlying mood uniting the many variegated perspectives taken by the
authors of this volume. As befitting the nature of the questions considered,
one must speak in terms of sentiment, for there is most certainly no uniting
interpretation; nor should there be, for then we would no longer be
thinking in an age of pragmatism, but of ideology.
The editors of the volume have divided it into three parts following a
philosophical prologue. For the convenience of the reader, I should like
here to summarize each section and the essays therein. My essay on
humanism in antiquity and the Renaissance was sufficently vague and
antiquarian to be included in the prologue. More probing and
contemporary considerations were taken up by Mihaela Stefanescu who
surveys the culture of the West following the fall of Communism,
concluding that it is in a state of irrevocable crisis. This crisis is dualistic,
split between two opposing antipodes of power: the European Union,
which faces an essentialist crisis stemming from its own impotence
following WWII and decolonialization, and the United States, which faces
an existential crisis stemming from its hegemony of power following the
end of the Cold War.
Part One is devoted to essays concerning pragmatism and practical
politics in democratic society. Naomi Zack examines the responsibility
government has to its citizens during instances of disaster. Following
Locke and Hobbes’ premise that government is not inevitable and thus
must justify itself practically (i.e. not merely ideologically) by improving
International Perspectives on Pragmatism
xv
the lives of the governed, she rejects the humanitarian approach to disaster
response insofar as it is optional, arguing instead that government has a
positive obligation to its citizens in times of disaster.
Horst Freyhofer outlines the intellectual history of the libertarian
movement in America, asking whether such a philosophy provides a
viable alternative to the social-democratic order of the post-war West. He
argues that while libertarianism has currently lost its luster and been
relegated to a minor third party, its ideals remain, and will reappear and
offer legitimate solutions should the crises of the modern state lead to its
collapse.
Simon Glynn provides a critical analysis of modern democracy as
having become fundamentally corrupted and serving as little more than a
rationalization and cover for the reinscription of structures of power. He
argues that American democracy no longer represents the interests of its
citizens, in fact actively colludes against them, and has thus lost its
mandate to govern.
Krystyna Wilkoszewska proposes a connection between Dewey’s
notion of a “community of experience” and her conception of a
“community of art”. Such communities are pragmatic insofar as they
eschew any fundamental ideology or political dictates, are based not on
institutions but organic connections, and value participation and
engagement rather than disinterested contemplation.
Linda Simon looks at William James’ response to the prosecution of
anarchist activists in the wake of the Haymarket Affair, arguing that
James’ writings on the subject raise serious questions about pragmatist
moral reasoning: specifically that concerning the distinction between
pragmatism and consequentialism.
Jane Skinner examines the challenges facing the fledgling democracies
of South Africa and Eastern Europe and argues for a “pragmatism of
marginal political utility” which integrates certain Marxist ideas,
specifically the notion of false consciousness, into pragmatist political
theory. She concludes that the only way to avoid a democratic “false
consciousness”, in which citizens unwittingly concede to dogmas of the
ruling regime, is through an active education that fosters a “critical
consciousness” necessary for a healthy and truly democratic society.
Marjorie O’Loughlin writes on Dewey’s work on China and explores the
relationship between pragmatist philosophy and the development of
democratic dispositions and communities. She argues that a Deweyan
approach to democracy emphasizes the cultivation of communities of
shared values united under democratic dispositions. (Such an approach to
democracy stands in contrast to the Enlightenment Western conception of
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Introduction
rational individuals entering a contract under democratic institutions out of
self-interest.) Under the Deweyan pragmatist/ communitarian approach,
O’Loughlin and Dewey believe that Western democracy can evolve and
become compatible with non-Western “traditional” cultures.
Jason Hill deploys Kant’s moral theory and defense of cosmopolitanism
to argue that permanent residency be understood as a human right in
certain situations. Noting Kant’s insistence that a republican democracy
was the only form of government compatible with human dignity and
autonomy insofar as it alone allows for the development of a “moral
culture,” Hill argues that all human beings, insofar as they are of “innate
equality,” have a right not to be excluded from this moral culture. From
this principle it follows that those who are currently excluded from moral
culture de facto (in their homeland), should be granted residency in a
society of moral culture as a basic human right and in accord with the
principle of hospitality. Michel Weber takes up Whitehead’s process
philosophy as “a defense of liberalism,” and examines the fundamentally
pragmatic political structures of the Whiteheadian city.
Part Two concerns democratic theory and the legitimacy or nonlegitimacy of the democratic state. J.K. Swindler approvingly takes up
Dewey’s notion of the “democratic attitude,” but argues that Dewey’s
experiential instrumentalist epistemology is insufficient grounds for such a
concept. Swindler instead argues that this notion can only fully be
accounted on rationalist grounds, particularly Plato’s idea of the “common
good,” and Kant’s idea of the “good will”. Vasil Gluchman takes up
Kant’s notion of “humanity”, trying both to de-transcendentalize the
concept (i.e. not as homo noumenon), as well as, through Rorty, seek its
expansion. He argues that this concept of humanity is central to human life
and moral progress and proposes a new progressive humanism for the 21st
century. Susana de Castro examines Rorty theory of justice through a
distinction she draws between the classical inheritance of rational justice
and a more archaic concept that she calls “philial justice”. She argues that
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, emphasis on social solidarity, and concept of
justice as a “larger loyalty”, represent an attempt to syncretize both
positions, but without an appeal to a foundational moral principle.
Michael Hodges defends Rorty’s anti-foundationalist politics against
the criticism of Robert Talisse. He argues that foundational political or
moral principles often serve to stifle debate and thus act against
democracy, whereas a purely open discourse without claim to any dogma
is the purest expression of democracy. Thus Rorty’s “deflationary” attacks
on metaphysical and epistemological justifications serve not to
delegitimate democracy, but rather to clear an open space necessary for its
International Perspectives on Pragmatism
xvii
expression as a practical (rather than an ideological) politics. Cerasel
Cuteanu proposes an “ironist approach” to democracy and the question of
legitimacy. Such an approach he sees as essential (or perhaps merely the
only approach left untarnished by history) if we are to give up predicating
our democracies on foundational claims or national narratives. Yet the loss
of these structures opens up the possibility of a “tyranny of the majority”
which lives at the heart of the democratic project, and to which these very
foundationalist notions were originally placed against. Cuteanu concludes
that a compromise between Rorty and Habermas is necessary to mediate
this threat.
Jon Mahoney rejects this pragmatic/anti-foundationalist conception of
morality and politics. Focusing on Michael Ignatieff’s pragmatic defense
of human rights, Mahoney argues that such a notion, the sine qua non of
liberal society, cannot be merely pragmatic if it is to be more than dogma
or descriptive claims of what Kant would call “moral anthropology”.
Maria Gluchmanova examines the relevance of Dewey’s philosophy of
education to democratic society. She claims that Dewey’s anti-formalist
philosophy of education was essentially democratic insofar as it
championed the exchange of experience, critical thinking and independent
judgment, and the emergent formation (rather than inculcation) of values.
Ned McClennen offers a pragmatic theory of justice based on game
theory. Noting that we make “pragmatic” decisions (i.e. those in
furtherance of things we value) with ease every day, he argues that the
amalgamation of these individual decisions and values into a society
generates a social form of the economic problem. Given this similarity, he
proposes a fundamentally economic perspective to issues of justice and
rights based on the pragmatic criterion that such notions must be mutually
advantageous to every member of society.
Part Three concludes the volume with a section on art and literature.
Peter Hare offers a response to Wilkoszewska’s essay that broadens its
scope to examine intellectual culture in general. Hare argues that such
communities are exceedingly rare and that ideological fragmentation,
specialist balkanization, and institutional hierarchy are the norm. He then
looks at the possibility that a pragmatist philosophy or art, by emphasizing
its social value, in the end dumbs down art into a form of paternalistic
educational entertainment.
There were two questions that lingered in my mind when I reread the
essays in this volume while preparing this introduction, and I should like
to note them in closing. First, it is to me an open question whether or not a
pragmatist ethics is ultimately intelligible, is even ethics at all. If it is, then
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Introduction
it must provide some answer to the problem of the criterion, and this
answer must be in some sense foundational, if not in the metaphysical
sense then in the discursive sense. The dialogue between the authors in
Part Two fundamentally centers on this question. Second, in response to
the question I opened with, I shall pose another: has the post-modern state
become natural again? If the state is not founded on some fundamental
ideology, some declaration of inaleniable principles from which it justifies
itself, but rather merely on its practical and instrumental ability to provide
for the happiness of its citizenry, is there not a danger that we could be
bought off by our own democracies? We pay our taxes and complain, but
the complaint is more akin to that made of the weather (or of that a
medieval serf made against their lord), than that of the tithe or the Stamp
Act or the Estates General. When you owe the state thousands of dollars in
student loans, are employed by a public university, are provided your
water, sewer, and electricity by public utilities, are fed from state
subsidized farms…what sort of complaint is one really in the position to
make?
Jason Jordan
Ph.D. Candidate, The University of Oregon