Research Paper
Egyptian Revolution:
A Demographic Structural Analysis
Andrey V. Korotayev, Julia V. Zinkina
Abstract: It is not surprising that Mubarak’s administration “overlooked” the social
explosion. Indeed, statistical data righteously claimed that the country was developing
very successfully. Economic growth rates were high (even in the crisis years). Poverty
and inequality levels were among the lowest in the Third World. Global food prices
were rising, but the government was taking serious measures to mitigate their effect on
the poorest layers of the population. Unemployment level (in per cent) was less than in
many developed countries of the world and, moreover, was declining, and so were
population growth rates. What would be the grounds to expect a full-scale social
explosion? Of course, the administration had a sort of reliable information on the
presence of certain groups of dissident “bloggers”, but how could one expect that they
would be able to inspire to go to the Tahrir any great masses of people? It was even
more difficult to figure out that Mubarak’s regime would be painfully struck by its
own modernization successes of the 1980s, which led to the sharp decline of crude
death rate and especially of infant and child mortality in 1975–1990. Without these
successes many young Egyptians vehemently demanding Mubarak’s resignation (or
even death) would have been destined to die in early childhood and simply would not
have survived to come out to the Tahrir Square.
Key-words: Egypt, Arab world, Arab uprisings, revolutions, social change,
regime change...
Russian State University for the Humanities.
Russian Academy of Sciences.
0 Introduction
H
ighlighting the events of Egyptian Revolution 2011, various
mass-media tried to explain what had caused the riots. Most
explanations followed the same pattern, blaming economic
stagnation, poverty, inequality, corruption and unemployment. A typical
explanation is that ―Egyptians have the same complaints that drove
Tunisians onto the streets: surging food prices, poverty, unemployment
and authoritarian rule that smothers public protests quickly and often
brutally‖ (see Al-Arabiya 25.01.2011, al-Lawati 14.02.2011, Stangler,
Litan 12.02.2011, AFP 25.01.2011, etc.).
Such unanimity incited us to investigate to what extent those accusations
reflected the Egyptian reality. So we decided to take each of the
abovementioned ―revolution causes‖ and to look into the actual
dynamics of the relevant socioeconomic indicators in the years preceding
the Egyptian revolution.
1. Economic stagnation?
Let us first consider the dynamics of the most general economic
performance indicator, namely GDP, in Mubarak’s epoch (Fig. 1):
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 1. GDP production dynamics in Egypt
(blns of 2005 dollars, PPP), 1980–2010
Source: World Bank 2011 for 1980-2009.Value for 2010 calculated on the basis of data
from Boubacar et al. 2010.
58
Evidently, during Mubarak’s reign (1981–2011) the Egyptian economy
was developing rather dynamically. The growth by 4.5 times during 30
years was one of the best results among the Third World countries at the
time (see, e.g., Korotayev 2009). Economic growth rates accelerated
particularly visibly after July 2004 when the new government managed to
attract a group of talented economists who worked out an effective
program of economic reforms. These reforms provided for a substantial
acceleration of the Egyptian economic growth (Boubacar et al. 2010).
Regarding Fig. 1, a particular attention should be given to the fact that
during the world financial-economic crisis the Egyptian GDP did not
fall, but continued growing at a rather high rate. Annual economic
growth rates slowed down somewhat, from 7.2% to 4.6% (though many
countries would dream of achieving 4.5% rate of economic growth even
in crisisless years!). Nevertheless, Egyptian government did succeed in
preventing any economic collapse. In 2010 Egyptian economic growth
rates increased again.
It should be noted here that population growth rates were decreasing
quite stably in Egypt during the past few years (Fig. 2):
1,92
1,9
1,88
1,86
1,84
1,82
1,8
1,78
2003
2005
2007
2009
Fig. 2. Relative population growth rates in Egypt,
% per year, 2003-2009
Source: World Bank 2011.
It is easy to deduce that the slowdown in demographic growth further
contributed to the acceleration in GDP per capita growth, and this is
supported by the empirical evidence (Fig. 3):
59
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 3. GDP per capita production dynamics
(constant 2005 dollars, PPP), Egypt, 1980–2010.
Source: World Bank 2011 for 1980–2009.
The value for 2010 has been calculated on the basis of data from Boubacar et al. 2010.
Thus, accusations of Mubarak with ―thirty years in power … during
which the ruling party failed to achieve any substantial development, on
the contrary, led the country to a period of uncertainty and economic
stagnation … and diminishing income‖ (al-Lawati 14.02.2011; see also
Stangler, Litan 12.02.2011, etc.) do not appear to be just. The contrary
will be much closer to reality, i.e. before Mubarak’s regime collapse Egypt
was one of the most dynamically developing countries of the Third
World.
Notably, new Egyptian government that came to power as a result of the
revolution promised that it ―would not retreat from economic reform or
change the basic economic philosophy it has followed since it adopted a
liberal reform programme in 2004‖ (Pitchford 22.02.2011), thus
admitting that the economic policy of Mubarak’s administration was
essentially correct.
2. Corruption?
As regards the corruption level, in the respective map by Transparency
International (2010) Egypt looks as follows (Fig. 4):
60
Fig. 4. Corruption Perceptions Index in the world, 2010
Source: Transparency International 2010: 2–3.
In this map the lighter the color, the lower its perceived corruption level
(accordingly, the darker the higher). Clearly, the situation with Egyptian
corruption is not brilliant. In comparison with most OECD countries
corruption level in Egypt seems to be very high. However, the same can
be attributed to almost all the Third (as well as Second) World countries,
against the background of which corruption level in Egypt does not
seem so high. On the whole, Egypt rates 80th in the world according to
corruption level (Transparency International 2010: 8–14). In other
words, there are dozens of much more corrupted countries (see Fig. 5):
61
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Singapore
Sweden
Switzerland
Germany
Japan
UK
USA
France
Estonia
Slovenia
Malaysia
Tunisia
Italy
Cuba
Bulgaria
China
Greece
India
Egypt
Argentina
Kazakhstan
Algeria
Indonesia
Vietnam
Belarus
Syria
Bangladesh
Ukraine
Iran
Libya
Yemen
Russia
Tajikistan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Guinea
Uzbekistan
Sudan
Iraq
0
Fig. 5. Corruption Index in 2010 in some countries of the world 1
So, according to Transparency International, the level of corruption in
Egypt in 2010 was quite comparable with that in Italy, Greece, China,
and India; meanwhile, it was lower than in Argentina, Indonesia, Viet
Nam and most post-Soviet countries (including Russia).
On the whole, it is obvious that if the Egyptian level of corruption was a
sufficient cause for sociopolitical uprisings, revolutions should be
currently blazing in most countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and
Eastern Europe.
3. Unemployment?
The dynamics of unemployment in Egypt in the past 20 years looked as
follows (Fig. 6):
The index is based on Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International
2010: 8–14.) and is obtained by extracting the basic index out of 10.
1
62
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 6. Unemployment level in Egypt, %, 1990–2010
Sources: World Bank 2011. CAPMAS 2010: 31 (data for the second quarter of 2009); Abd
al-Rahman 2010: 4 (data for the third quarter of 2010).
Thus, in the past 20 years Egyptian unemployment was fluctuating at a
rather high level (8–12%). However, after the launch of economic
reforms in the mid-2000s it started to decrease in a rather stable manner.
Predictably, there was some increase (though not so pronounced as in
most other countries) in unemployment level as a result of the global
financial-economic crisis, but in 2010 unemployment went down again.
Just before the revolution the unemployment level in Egypt in
comparison with other countries of the world looked as follows (see
Fig. 7):
63
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Kuwait (2008)
Singapore (2010)
Norway (2010)
China (2010)
Austria (2010)
Japan (2010)
Germany (2010)
Russia (2010)
Slovenia (2010)
Canada (2011)
UK (2010)
Italy (2010)
Finland (2010)
Sweden (2010)
Belgium (2010)
Egypt (2010)
USA (2011)
Poland (2010)
EU (2010)
Bulgaria (2010)
France (2010)
Algeria (2009)
Portugal (2010)
Hungary (2010)
Greece (2010)
Columbia (2010)
Jordan (2010)
Libya (2005)
Tunisia (2009)
Lithuania (2010)
Albania (2010)
Ireland (2010)
Latvia (2011)
Slovakia (2010)
Iraq (2009)
Croatia (2010)
Estonia (2010)
Spain (2010)
South Africa (2010)
Honduras (2007)
0
Fig. 7. Unemployment level in some countries, %, 20102
As we see, unemployment level in pre-revolutionary Egypt could not be
called ―extremely low‖, but against the global background Egypt
compared rather well. Its unemployment level was less than in the USA,
the EU, France, Poland, Turkey, Ireland, almost twice lower than in
Latvia and Spain, etc.
Data on Iraq are given for 2009, data on Mauritania and Afghanistan are given for 2008.
Sources. Egypt: Abd al-Rahman 2010: 4 (data for 3rd quarter of 2010). Russia: Federal State
Statistics Agency. Employment and Unemployment. (data for December 2010). URL:
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_01/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d12/3-2.htm.
Switzerland:
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Gradual Economic Recovery – Increased Risks for 2011.
Bern,
08.06.2010.
URL:
http://www.seco.admin.ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=en&msgid=33511. China: Xinhua News Agency. China's unemployment down to 4.1% at end of
Q3.
English.xinhuanet.com
2010-10-22.
URL:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/22/c_13570193.htm. Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey,
UK, USA: European Commission. Eurostat. Your key to European statistics. Brussels:
European
Commission,
2011.
URL:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teilm02
0&tableSelection=1&plugin=1 (data for September–December 2010). Afghanistan,
Albania, Bosnia, Columbia, Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Singapore, South Africa,
Tunisia: Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Country Comparison: unemployment
rate. Washington, DC: CIA, 2011. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html.
2
64
4. Inequality?
Gini index is most frequently used for measuring the level of economic
inequality. After 1991 Egypt had the following dynamics of this index
(Fig. 8):
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1991
1996
2001
Fig. 8. Economic inequality (Gini index) in Egypt, 1990–2005
Source: World Bank 2011.
Thus, inequality index in Egypt was fluctuating around 30–33 points. Let
us view how this compared against the global background (Fig. 9).
Obviously, economic inequality in Egypt can be regarded high only by
Scandinavian standards. Compared with the rest of the world, Egyptian
economic inequality was very moderate. Out of 145 countries
represented in the last Human Development Report Egypt rated 120th.
(Klugman 2010: 152 – 155). Thus, UNDP observed a lower rate of
inequality only in 23 countries, while 119 countries had higher inequality
than Egypt, including France, Ireland, Spain, and India, to say nothing of
Georgia, USA, China, Russia, and Mexico.
65
80
70
60
50
40
30
Denmark
Japan
Sweden
Norway
Finland
Germany
Belarus
Bulgaria
Bangladesh
Slovenia
Egypt
France
Albania
Tajikistan
Ireland
Tanzania
Spain
Algeria
Italy
United Kingdom
New Zealand
India
Jordan
Yemen
Viet Nam
Iran
Israel
Senegal
United States
Georgia
Tunisia
Morocco
China
Russia
Philippines
Uruguay
Congo
Nepal
Kenya
Brazil
South Africa
Haiti
Botswana
Namibia
20
Fig. 9. Gini index (economic inequality level)
in the world, 2000–2010
Source: Klugman 2010: 152–155.3
Low level of economic inequality inherent to Egypt is connected with a
very specific character of Egyptian poverty which, by the way, is most
frequently called among the causes of Egyptian revolution.
5. Poverty?
Some acrimonious Egyptian poverty is most frequently mentioned
among the causes of the Egyptian revolution. The common notion is
that 40% of Egyptians live below $2 a day income poverty line.
Remarkably, nobody mentions the Egyptian level of extreme poverty, i.e.
proportion of people living below $1 a day income poverty line4. This
omission is not surprising at all, as Egypt is among the best performing
countries in the world according to this indicator (see Figs 10 and 11):
This UNDP issue presents the values of Gini index for the latest year available in the
interval 2000–2010.
4 More exactly, on $1.25 a day (in purchasing power parity), which is the currently
adopted level of extreme poverty (see, e.g., Klugman 2010: 161–163).
3
66
Fig. 10. Percent of people living below
$1.25 a day income poverty line, 2000–20085
In this map Egypt is marked with the same color as, say, Sweden,
France, the USA, or Australia, which indicates an almost full eradication
of extreme poverty in Egypt. Meanwhile, for dozens of countries the
extreme poverty still remains an acute problem (see Fig. 11).
Thus, according to 2005–2008 data there were 13.4% living below the
extreme poverty line in Georgia, 15.9% in China, 21.5% in Tajikistan and
Viet Nam, 22.6% in the Philippines, 26.2% in South Africa, 29.4% in
Indonesia, 41.6% in India, 49.6% in Bangladesh, 54.9% in Haiti, 70.1%
in Guinea, 83.7% in Liberia (Klugman 2010: 161–163).
5Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Percentage_population_living_on_less_than_1_dollar
_day_2007-2008.png. The map data have been checked for reliability on the basis of
(Klugman 2010: 161–163) and found full confirmation.
67
Slovenia
Estonia
Egypt
Morocco
Tunisia
Venezuela
Armenia
Mexico
Brazil
Peru
Bolivia
Georgia
Sri Lanka
China
Yemen
Kenya
Mauritania
Tajikistan
Viet Nam
Philippines
South Africa
Indonesia
Senegal
Timor-Leste
Ethiopia
India
Laos
Uzbekistan
Bangladesh
Haiti
Nepal
DRC
Chad
Nigeria
Niger
Guinea
Mozambique
Burundi
Liberia
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Fig. 11. Proportion of population living below $1.25 a day income poverty
line in some countries, %, data for 2000–2008
Source: Klugman 2010: 161 – 163.
The dynamics of the extreme poverty level in Egypt after 1991 had the
following shape (see Fig. 12):
4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Fig. 12. Share of population living
below $1.25 a day income poverty line in Egypt, %, 1991-2005
Source: World Bank 2011.
Let us note that 2% (more exactly, less than 2%) is the minimum level of
the extreme poverty recorded by UNDP. Thus, during his stay in power
Mubarak managed to eradicate almost completely the extreme poverty in
Egypt. Indeed, as we have already mentioned, on the eve of the
68
Revolution as regards this indicator Egypt belonged to the group of the
best performing countries of the world.
The situation with more moderate poverty (the share of population
living below $2 a day6 income poverty line) in Egypt is not so brilliant
(see Fig. 13):
Fig. 13. Share of population living below $2 a day income poverty line,
2000–2007 data7
As we see, Egypt is not among the most well-to-do countries in this
respect, as about 20%8 of Egyptians live on less than $2 (but on more
than $1.25) a day. Meanwhile, against the background of other Third
World countries the situation with poverty in Egypt is not at all
desperate. According to this indicator, Egypt rather belongs to the most
successful Third World countries (see Fig. 14):
In purchasing power parity.
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Percentage_population_living_on_less_than_$2_per_
day_2009.png. The data presented in this map have been checked for reliability on the
basis of Klugman (2009: 176–178) and found full confirmation.
8 But nothing close to 40% of the population that many media sources claimed.
6
7
69
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
S.Korea
Slovenia
Russia
Estonia
Croatia
Belarus
Chile
Bulgaria
Romania
Jordan
Malaysia
Venezuela
Argentina
Thailand
Tunisia
Morocco
Kazakhstan
Egypt
Algeria
Moldova
Georgia
China
Sri Lanka
Kenya
South Africa
Armenia
Philippines
Yemen
Viet Nam
Mongolia
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Pakistan
Senegal
Cambodia
Haiti
India
Sierra Leone
Uzbekistan
Laos
Timor-Leste
Nepal
Bangladesh
Nigeria
Niger
Guinea
Liberia
0
Fig. 14. Proportion of population living below $2 a day income poverty
line, %, 2000–2007
Source: Klugman 2009: 176–178.
Indeed, on the eve of the Revolution about 20% of the Egyptian
population lived on less than $2 a day compared with 36.3% in China,
42.9% in South Africa, 43.4% in Armenia, 45% in the Philippines, 48.4%
in Viet Nam. In a considerable number of countries more than a half of
the population live under $2 poverty line: 50.8% in Tajikistan, 60.3% in
Pakistan, 72.1% in Haiti, 75.6% in India, 81.3% in Bangladesh, 87.2% in
Guinea, and 94.8% in Liberia.
When talking about the poverty level in Egypt it appears reasonable to
scrutinize one more image (Fig. 15):
70
Fig. 15. Wikipedia illustration to poverty
as a major cause of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution9
This photo is called A poor Cairo neighborhood. However, in Wikipedia this
photo is very small, but if you take a closer look at it in a larger scale,
―Egyptian poverty‖ appears to be a very specific thing. ―Poor
neighborhood‖ abounds in satellite dishes, while the Arabic signboard at
the left bottom corner shows the direction to the nearest computer and
software center.
This is very far from what the real abject poverty looks like. Let us
review photos which we took in the slums of Nairobi, Kenya. It is far
not the worst Sub-Saharan country in terms of poverty, as not a half, but
―only‖ one-fifth of Kenyans live on $1.25 a day (Klugman 2010: 161–
163). Still, these photos (see Fig. 16) (taken in 2008 and 2009 together
with Darya Khaltourina) vividly illustrate the difference between the
extreme poverty of the Third World (living on less than $1.25 a day) and
moderate (not desperate!) Egyptian poverty.
9
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt_Revolution_of_2011#Economic_challenges.
71
Fig. 16. What real Third World poverty looks like: slums of Nairobi, Kenya
(2008-09)
BBC and CNN news reports covering the events of the 2011 Egyptian
Revolution frequently featured some Egyptians complaining that after
buying all the necessary food for their families they had no money left to
pay the electricity bills. News reporters felt natural sympathy for those
Egyptians, and so do we. Still, it is necessary to account for the fact that
the truly poor Third World people would never make such complaints as
they simply do not have electricity installed in their places of living to pay
for.
Still, poverty problems were not irrelevant to triggering the 2011
Egyptian Revolution. Why?
72
A brilliant paper by Egyptian economists Gamal Siam and Hanady
Mostafa Abdel Radi showed that the recent dynamics of Egyptian
poverty bore a seemingly paradoxical character. At the peak of the world
economic boom in 2007 and early 2008 when Egypt reached 25-yearrecord annual economic growth rates of 7.2%, the proportion of
Egyptians living below $2 a day poverty line increased significantly from
17.8% to 23%. On the contrary, global financial-economic crisis of
2008–2009 was accompanied not only by economic growth rates
slowdown, but also by a visible decrease in the proportion of Egyptians
living on less than $2 a day – from 23% to 19.5% (Siam , Abdel Rady
2010).
Paradoxical as it may seem, the answer appears to be most logical and
obvious as soon as you know it (though not a single economist whom
we asked managed to deduce it). Indeed, a characteristic feature (and
product) of economic booms (especially the latest one) is the blowing of
price bubbles. On the verge of global financial-economic crisis start
there were a lot of such bubbles; Russians best remember the oil price
bubble (especially its burst). However, along with the oil price bubble
there were lots of others, including copper bubble, nickel bubble,
phosphate bubble, etc. Basic food commodities were not an exception, as
wheat, rice, maize and other food price bubbles started growing. This
was a painful strike to all the poor in the world who spend a major part
of their household income on buying food. Egypt strongly depends on
food imports10, so poor Egyptians felt the price growth very perceptibly.
The $2 a day income poverty line is calculated by the UN accounting for
purchasing power parity (PPP); as a result, several millions of Egyptians
found themselves below this poverty line.
Global financial-economic crisis was accompanied by bubble bursts (the
only major ―survivor‖ was the gold price bubble [Akayev et al. 2010]).
Food price bubbles were not an exception; prices for many food
commodities fell significantly during the crisis. As a result, despite some
slowdown in economic growth rates the poor people of Egypt rather
benefited from the crisis, and about three millions of poor Egyptian
managed to come above the poverty line11.
Thus, Egypt imports about 60% of its consumed wheat, being one of the leading
global importers of this crop (see, e.g., Abdel Aziz, el-Talawi 30.06.2010).
11 However, it should be noted that though the food prices fell considerably during the
crisis, still they did not reach their pre-bubble level, remaining significantly higher. As a
result, the proportion of Egyptians living on less than $2 a day decreased in the second
half of 2008 – first half of 2009, but did not return to the level of 2007 (Siam, Abdel
Rady 2010).
10
73
However, global economic post-crisis recovery led to the blowing of new
price bubbles in the world food market almost reaching or even
exceeding the peak levels of 2008. Basing on the model by Gamal Siam
and Hanady Mostafa Abdel Radi, we have to expect that the proportion
of Egyptians living below the $2 a day income poverty line should have
reached the 2008 level by the start of the Egyptian Revolution (see Figs
17–20):
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
Dec-04
Mar-05
Jun-05
Sep-05
Dec-05
Mar-06
Jun-06
Sep-06
Dec-06
Mar-07
Jun-07
Sep-07
Dec-07
Mar-08
Jun-08
Aug-08
Nov-08
Feb-09
May-09
Aug-09
Nov-09
Feb-10
May-10
Aug-10
Nov-10
Feb-11
0
Fig. 17. World wheat prices, $/ton, 2005-2011
Source: IMF 2011.
250
230
210
190
170
150
130
110
Fig. 18. World cooking oil prices (FAO price index, 2002–2004 = 100,
deflated), 2003–2011
Source: FAO 2011a.
74
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
90
190
170
150
130
110
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
90
Fig. 19. FAO food price index (2002–2004 = 100, deflated), 2003–2011
Source: FAO 2011a.
29
27
25
23
21
19
17
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 20. Proportion of population living below $2 a day income poverty line,
Egypt, %, 1991-201012
Sources: World Bank 2011 (1991–2005); Siam, Abdel Rady 2010 (2007–2009); for 2010
we use our own estimates based on the model developed by Siam and Abdel Radi.
12
75
Did this food price dynamics and the respectivew dynamics of Egyptian
poverty headcount have some influence on destabilization of Egyptian
sociopolitical system? Definitely, it did. Indeed, though both in spring
2008 and in January 2011 Egypt remained one of the most well-to-do
Third World countries in terms of poverty, the fast growth of the world
food prices (taken that Egypt highly depends on food imports) led to a
fast growth in the number of Egyptians living below the internationally
recognized poverty line. In both cases more than three millions of
Egyptians fell below the poverty line during a short period (several
months).
In spring 2008 the protests against food price growth surged in Egypt.
The central event was the strike of spinning and weaving factory workers
in the industrial city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra which started on the 6th of
April, 2008. The worker’s dissent was aimed first and foremost at the
decrease of living standards caused by food price growth. Egyptian
bloggers supporting the strikers launched a Facebook group called «April
6 Youth Movement». It is known that this movement played a crucial
role in the Egyptian Revolution 2011. Still more important was social
self-organization through Facebook which was first successfully tried in
spring 2008 by this youth movement and proved its efficiency in 2011
events.
Incidentally, Fig. 21 indicates that some external influence seems to have
also taken place.
We can see that the emblem of the Egyptian ―April 6‖ youth movement
is astonishingly similar with the ones of some other youth movements
which played an exceptionally important role in organizing the ―color
revolutions‖, such as Serbian ―Otpor!‖ and Georgian ―Kmara!‖, which
led Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Interestingly, ―Kmara‖ is translated
from Georgian as ―Enough‖, the same as Egyptian ―Kifaya!‖
(predecessor of ―April 6‖ movement) is translated from Arabic.
76
Fig. 21. Emblems of some youth movements:
top left – Egyptian youth movement «April 6»13;
top right – Serbian youth movement «Otpor!»14;
bottom left – Georgian youth movement «Kmara!»15;
bottom right – Russian youth movement «Oborona»16.
In late 2010 – early 2011 food prices again reached the same critical level
which was observed in spring 2008, and, in our view, this certainly made
a contribution to political destabilization in Egypt in January 2011.
Still it is fairly obvious that food price increase is hardly to be recognized
as the main cause for the Egyptian events. Indeed, it was a global rather
than local phenomenon, and it struck painfully all the poor throughout
the Third World, including, say, Latin America, where no wave of
revolutions was triggered.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:April_6_Youth_Movement.jpg.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Otpor.png.
15 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Kmara.png.
16 Source: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ф
:Л
_О
ы.jpg.
13
14
77
We should also keep in mind that the poor in Egypt were hit by the
world food prices rather weaker than in most other Third World
countries, since Mubarak's administration took very serious measures to
protect them through the system of subsidies.
Currently, the system of food subsidies in Egypt is divided into two
types. The first type is subsidizing the baladi bread. Since 1989 the
government has kept the price for this type of bread at 5 piastres (1
cent!) per loaf (weighing 130 gram). This type of subsidy is universal, i.e.
any inhabitant of Egypt has the right to buy 20 loaves of baladi bread
every day at a low (subsidized) price in the state cooperative stores (ElFiqi 2008). The second type of subsidies is ration cards. They allow
families to purchase every month a certain amount of some basic food
commodities (such as sugar, cooking oil, etc.) at a subsidized price.
In the period of rapid growth in world food prices, including wheat
prices, Mubarak's regime made heroic (and successful!) efforts to
preserve the price of baladi bread at the same level. Accordingly, even in
the midst of crisis, any Egyptian could still buy 20 loaves (130 grams
each) of subsidized bread a day for 1 pound (about 20 cents) – more
than 2 kg of bread! So, even for those who live on less than $2 per day
starvation was out of question in such a situation. But what then caused
the massive protests in the spring of 2008?
Actually, at that time baladi bread subsidy system in Egypt began to work
with more and more fails as the bakeries did not use much of the statesubsidized flour for making bread, but re-sold it in the black market,
where a sack of flour costs 100 times more than the state
price. Accordingly, the bakeries produced significantly less baladi bread,
which led to huge queues and strong discontent of the poor.
To soothe the strikers the Egyptian administration took several
measures, in particular, public sector workers were promised wage
increase by 30%. Also several important changes were made to the
subsidy system. So, it was decided that the baladi bread should not be
sold in bakeries, but in special shops (separation of production and retail
sales in order to reduce queues). The list of products subsidized through
ration cards was amended (unpopular products were removed) (AARDO
2010: 159). However, the most important change was that the
government significantly increased the number of beneficiaries of
subsidies (from 39.5 million to 63 million people), as the system has been
expanded also to the Egyptians who were born in 1989–2005 (AARDO
2010: 159).
78
Enhanced number of ration card beneficiaries led to a substantial
increase in government spending on subsidies. Thus, in 2008/09 fiscal
year food subsidizing cost the government a total of LE 21.5 billion17 (of
which 16 billion for baladi bread), compared with 10 billion in 2007/08
(AARDO 2010: 159). Expenditures on food subsidies accounted for
1.4% GDP in 2005 and for 1.8% in 2008 (Adams, Valstar, Wiles 2010:
1).
Thus, at the beginning of a new round of world food price increase
100% of the Egyptian people were provided with cheap subsidized bread
and nearly 80% had ration cards and bought sugar, butter, and rice at
subsidized prices. Interestingly, at the same time, according to Egyptian
Demographic and Health Survey (conducted in 2008) 40% of Egyptian
women and 18% of men were overweight because of overeating (Egypt
Ministry of Health 2009). Accordingly, it is hardly reasonable to state
that insufficient subsidies put a significant portion of the population on
the brink of starvation (for the dynamics of per capita food consumption
in Egypt see Fig. 22 below).
Nevertheless, though the Egyptian system of subsidies mitigated the
strike blown by global food price rises to the poor (Adams, Valstar,
Wiles 2010: 33), it could not outdo its effect completely. Indeed, the
system does not cover all necessary food commodities. Besides, the
average Egyptian family having a ration card bought at a subsidized price
about 60% of its consumed sugar, 73% of oil and 40% of rice (El
Nakeeb 2009). The rest of these goods the family had to buy at market
prices (that are, of course, much higher than the subsidized ones).
6.Structural-demographic factors of the 2011 Egyptian
Revolution
Let us first regard the long-term dynamics of per capita calorie intake in
Egypt (Fig. 22):
17
About $4 billion.
79
3400
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2000
Fig. 22. Dynamics of per capita calorie intake in Egypt, 1961–2007,
kcal/capita/day
Source: FAO 2011b.
It should be noted that the WHO18-recommended rate of per capita
food consumption is 2300–2400 kcal per capita per day (see, e.g., Naiken
2002). Thus, in Egypt in the early 1960s malnutrition was quite real, and
per capita food consumption was lower than the WHO recommended
standards. By the mid-1960s Egypt came to this level but until 1974
could not exceed it. After 1973 per capita food consumption rocketed up
sharply, surpassing the threshold of 3000 kcal in 1982 (one year after the
death of Sadat) and never falling below this level. After that, the majority
of Egyptians encountered the problem of overeating rather than
malnutrition. All this should be associated with Sadat’s administration
launching rather successful economic reforms in 1974 (the so-called
Infitah).
Thus, we can say that in the 1970s – 1980s Egypt managed to escape the
so-called Malthusian trap. Recall that the Malthusian trap19 is a rather
typical for pre-industrial societies situation when the growth of output
(as it is accompanied by a faster demographic growth) does not lead in
the long-range perspective to the increase in per capita output and the
improvement of living conditions of the majority of population that
The World Health Organization of the United Nations.
In terms of non-linear dynamics it can also be called a low-level equilibrium attractor (see
Nelson 1956).
18
19
80
remains close to the bare survival level. In complex pre-industrial
societies the Malthusian trap was one of the main generators of severe
political upheavals (up to the state breakdowns) (see, e.g., Korotayev,
Malkov, Khaltourina 2006; Korotayev, Khaltourina 2006; Turchin,
Korotayev 2006; Turchin, Nefedov 2009; Turchin 2003; Turchin 2005;
Artzrouni, Komlos 1985; Kögel, Prskawetz 2001; Komlos, Artzrouni
1990; Steinmann, Prskawetz, Feichtinger 1998; Wood 1998).
However, we have shown that the escape from the Malthusian trap
somewhat paradoxically (a social explosion comes amid long-term trends
of improving material conditions of life for most people) can also be
systematically (and quite naturally) accompanied by serious social and
political upheavals (of which many modern revolutions serve as
examples). We have called this phenomenon ―a trap at the escape from
the trap‖ (Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011). The 2011 Egyptian Revolution
can well be considered as an example of this phenomenon (with some
rather specific features).
Let us first answer a really simple question: What impact could the
escape from the Malthusian trap have on life expectancy and mortality?
Naturally, when undernourished people solve the problem of starvation
and start eating enough, their life expectancy increases and the death rate
of the population decreases. This was observed in all the known cases of
the escape from the Malthusian trap, and Egypt was no exception (see
Figs 23 and 24):
81
66
64
62
60
58
56
54
52
50
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Fig. 23. Life expectancy in Egypt, years, 1970-1995
Source: World Bank 2011.
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Fig. 24. Crude death rate per 1000 population, Egypt, 1970–1995
Source: World Bank 2011.
82
Thus, the Egyptian escape from the Malthusian trap was accompanied by
impetuous life expectancy growth, while death rate decreased nearly
twice (!) in just 20 years (1970–1990).
In full accordance with the theory of demographic transition (see, e.g.,
Chesnais 1992; Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006) decrease of birth
rates followed with a usual remarkable lag (Fig. 25):
50
Death
rate
Birth
rate
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
5
Fig. 25. Crude birth and death rates per 1000 in Egypt, 1970–1990,
logarithmic scale
Source: World Bank 2011.
Mubarak’s administration was well aware of the threat hidden in the
growing gap between declining death rate and stably high birth rate, and
almost since the beginning of Mubarak’s reign (1981) it started taking
measures aimed at bringing down the birth rate (see, e.g., Fargues 1997:
117–118). However, only in the second half of the 1980s the
government managed to develop a really efficient program of such
measures. This program was performed by the Egyptian government in
collaboration with USAID program aimed at wide-scale introduction and
distribution of family planning (Moreland 2006). Religious leaders (from
al-Azhar sheikhs to local imams) were involved in the program to
83
disseminate (in their fatwahs and sermons) the idea that family planning
was not adverse to al-Qur’an; on the contrary, it is good, as having less
children makes it easier for the parents to give them a happy childhood
and good education (Ali 1997). This strategy proved essentially effective,
as during 5 years (1988–1992) total fertility rate in Egypt fell from 5 to 4
children per woman.
However, until the second half of the 1980s the gap between birth and
death rates was increasing. As a result, population growth in Egypt in the
1970 and 1980s acquired explosion-like shape (Fig. 26) and started to
decline significantly only in the late 1980s.
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
0
1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
Fig. 26. Population of Egypt, thousands, 1836–199020
Naturally, such a rapid population growth is bound to create serious
structural strains in any system. However, it was not the only force
contributing to the emergence of structural strains.
Let us view the curve of absolute growth rates of Egyptian population
(see Fig. 27):
20
The sources for this diagram are described in Korotayev, Khaltourina 2006.
84
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
1975
1980
1985
1990
Fig. 27. Dynamics of absolute population growth rates, Egypt, 1975–1992
(thousands of people per year)21
As we see, the absolute population growth rates reached their maximum
in 1985–1989. Extracting 1985–1989 out of 2010 we obtain 21–25,
which is the age of the numerous generation of young Egyptians who
came out to the Tahrir Square in Cairo in January 2011.
Let us move to the next question – how could the escape from the
Malthusian trap influence the infant and child mortality. Children are
most vulnerable to malnutrition, so they benefit most when it is
eradicated; besides, in a modernizing country escaping from the
Malthusian trap the health system usually develops rapidly, contributing
to the decline of infant and child mortality in a very significant way. This
can be seen in all cases of the escape from the Malthusian trap, including
Egypt (see Fig. 28):
21
Calculated on the basis of the World Bank (2011) data.
85
300
250
Infant mortality
200
Under-5
mortality
150
100
50
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
0
Fig. 28. Infant (per 1000 live births) and child (per 1000 under-5 children)
mortality in Egypt in 1970–1995
Source: World Bank 2011.
Thus, while crude death rate decreased twice during 1975–1995, infant
and under-5 child mortality declined thrice during the same period.
Thus, at the first phase of demographic transition (that tends to coincide
with the escape from the Malthusian trap) death rate declines
dramatically (В ш е
1976, 2005; Chesnais 1992; Korotayev,
Malkov, Khaltourina 2006a), the greatest decline occurring in infant and
under-5 mortality, while birth rates still remain high. Thus, out of 6–7
children born by a woman, 5–6 children survive up to reproductive age,
not 2 or 3 as earlier. This leads not only to the demographic explosion,
but also to the formation of the ―youth bulge‖, as the generation of
children turns out to be much larger in number than their parents’
generation. This is exactly what happened in Egypt (see Fig. 29):
86
Fig. 29. Egyptian “youth bulge”. Dynamics of the proportion of youth
cohort (aged 20-24) in the Egyptian population, 1990-2010
(with forecast till 2020)22
Jack Goldstone notes that «the rapid growth of youth can undermine
existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large youth cohorts are
often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older
forms of authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer
responsibilities for families and careers, they are relatively easily
mobilized for social or political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent
role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence
of a ―youth bulge‖ (an unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24
relative to the total adult population) has historically been associated with
times of political crisis. Most major revolutions … [including] most
twentieth-century revolutions in developing countries—have occurred
where exceptionally large youth bulges were present» (Goldstone 2002:
11–12).
Let us now view the dynamics of the number of Egyptians aged 20–24
(see Fig. 30):
Calculated on the bases of the data from the UN Population Division Database (UN
Population Division 2011). The calculations have been made by Justislav Bogevolnov.
22
87
9 000
8 000
7 000
6 000
5 000
4 000
3 000
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Fig. 30. Number of Egyptian youths aged 20-24, thousands,
with forecast till 201523
In absolute numbers the growth of this cohort is really astonishing, as it
almost doubled during 15 years. Namely this cohort enters the labor
market in more or less developed societies (including Egypt), so even for
a fast-growing economy it was virtually impossible to create millions of
workplaces necessary to absorb the young labor force.
As we have seen above, at the beginning of the 2011 Egyptian
Revolution the unemployment level in Egypt was about 9% which was
not very high according to global standards. However, the most
important circumstance (caused just by the ―youth bulge‖) is that about
half of all the Egyptian unemployed belonged to the 20–24 age cohort
(Al-jihaz… 2010)! Total number of the unemployed on the eve of the
Egyptian Revolution was about 2.5 million (Abd al-Rahman 2010: 4).
Accordingly, on the eve of the Revolution Egypt had about one million
of unemployed young people aged 20–24 who made up the main striking
force of the Revolution.
It is not surprising that Mubarak’s administration ―overlooked‖ the
social explosion. Indeed, statistical data righteously claimed that the
country was developing very successfully. Economic growth rates were
high (even in the crisis years). Poverty and inequality levels were among
the lowest in the Third World. Global food prices were rising, but the
government was taking serious measures to mitigate their effect on the
poorest layers of the population. Unemployment level (in per cent) was
less than in many developed countries of the world and, moreover, was
Calculated on the bases of the data from the UN Population Division Database (UN
Population Division 2011). The calculations have been made by Justislav Bogevolnov.
23
88
declining, and so were population growth rates. What would be the
grounds to expect a full-scale social explosion? Of course, the
administration had a sort of reliable information on the presence of
certain groups of dissident ―bloggers‖, but how could one expect that
they would be able to inspire to go to the Tahrir any great masses of
people?
It was even more difficult to figure out that Mubarak’s regime would be
painfully struck by its own modernization successes of the 1980s, which
led to the sharp decline of crude death rate and especially of infant and
child mortality in 1975–1990. Without these successes many young
Egyptians vehemently demanding Mubarak’s resignation (or even death)
would have been destined to die in early childhood and simply would not
have survived to come out to the Tahrir Square. The rate of
unemployment in Egypt stayed almost unchanged, but the number of
the young doubled. This means that the absolute number of the
unemployed young people also increased at least twice (this, incidentally,
indicates how risky this could sometimes be to rely on percentages rather
than absolute numbers).
Moreover, the investigation carried out at the end of 2010 by the
Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
discovered that at the eve of the Revolution more than 43% of the
Egyptian unemployed had university degrees (Al-jihaz… 2010)! Thus,
the impact force of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution was not only young,
but also very highly educated. We suppose that this circumstance
stipulated the relative ―non-bloodiness‖ of the revolution, i.e. a relatively
small number of victims. Indeed, though the scale of the events was truly
colossal and millions of people were involved for weeks, only 300 were
killed (mostly by the security forces and criminal elements employed by
the security forces, but not by the protesters). Let us remember that
during the ―bread riots‖ of 1977 (when low-educated Egyptian urban
youth was the main striking force) 800 people were killed just during two
days (see, e.g., Hirst 1977). In this regard the 2011 Egyptian Revolution
was closer to the youth uprisings of 1968 type – and ―velvet revolutions‖
– in Europe and North America of the past decades than to violent and
bloody (involving dozens and hundreds thousands [if not millions] of the
deathtoll) Third World civil wars.
However, the Egyptian Revolution 2011 would hardly have acquired its
scale if its protest base had been limited to unemployed highly-educated
youth. The youths were supported by millions of Egyptians (of various
age, occupation, and education level) who found themselves below the
poverty line as a result of world food price growth (despite all the serious
89
countermeasures undertaken by Mubarak’s administration). Namely this
combination created the socially explosive material necessary for the
revolution.
However, these were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the
Egyptian social explosion. Not only some explosive material, but also
some spark was needed. So let us recollect some other factors, without
which the revolution might not have happened. First of all, some
protesters’ complaints were justified. Thus, the decades of the State of
Emergency created the situation of uncontrolled activity of security
forces which led to massive usage of tortures against those opposed to
the regime. We should also keep in mind the diffusion of the Internet,
which supplied Egyptian educated youths with unprecedentedly
powerful means of self-organization, as well as the Arabic satellite
channels and their talented journalists who translated exceptionally vivid
images of people uprisings to all countries of the Arab world. We also
share a widespread opinion that the Egyptian events would hardly have
been possible if the revolution in Tunisia had not been so fast and
bloodless, if it had not created the feeling that changes of power in Arab
countries could be fast and non-violent.
Thus, we would maintain that the Egyptian Revolution was not possible
without certain objective pre-requisites, but still it was not unevitable.
Indeed, the ―youth bulge‖ in Egypt was bound to start decreasing rapidly
(annually weakening the pressure on the labor market). The program of
economic reforms allowed to expect Egypt to reach the level of
economic miracle growth rates (about 10% annually) just within 3 or 4
forthcoming years. All this (together with the political liberalization
expected from Gamal Mubarak) was bound to dissolve the social
―explosive material‖ in the forthcoming years.
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