An election bombshell

BY UNEXPECTEDLY returning the Socialists to power, the Spanish election on March 14th has delivered almost as big a shock to Spain, and the world, as the train bombings in Madrid did three days earlier. But, though many were quick to accuse Spanish voters of appeasement in the face of terror, the truth of what happened and what it means is more complex.

The March 11th bombings merit first attention. The death toll is now 201, making this the most savage attack that Spain has suffered since the civil war of 1936-39. At first it was blamed by the People's Party (PP) government of José María Aznar on the Basque terrorist group, ETA, which was known to be planning a spectacular outrage in Madrid. But all later evidence has pointed to Islamist terrorists, possibly linked to al-Qaeda (see article).

The cack-handed attempt to blame ETA, combined with renewed doubts over Mr Aznar's support for the war in Iraq, turned the election round. Though the party's lead had been narrowing, opinion polls had pointed to a win for the PP, under Mr Aznar's hand-picked successor, Mariano Rajoy. In the event, the Socialists under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero won 42.6% of the votes and 164 seats in the 350-seat Cortes, a big jump from the 125 it won in 2000. The PP got only 37.6% of the votes and 148 seats, down from 183 in 2000. Turnout rose to 77%, from 69% in 2000.

The result sent tremors round the world, especially when Mr Zapatero's first announcement as prospective prime minister was that he would, as promised, withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. He unceremoniously reproached George Bush and Tony Blair for going to war “on the basis of lies”. And he promised a more emollient approach to old European Union allies, delighting France and Germany.

What caused the upheaval? A frightened and disorientated electorate voted with a knee-jerk reaction, said senior PP officials. The voters have done the work of al-Qaeda, some added bitterly. In that the bombings changed the result, they were right. But the underlying reasons may be less flattering to the PP.

The biggest was the three days when the government and the heavily state-influenced media insisted that ETA was the culprit. The assumption was that, if it was ETA, that would be good for the PP,as it would vindicate Mr Aznar's hardline stand against both terrorism and Basque separatism; but if it was an Islamic terrorist group, the PP would suffer, because 90% of Spaniards had opposed the war in Iraq. “A critical point was reached in a spectacular way. We stressed for years: the PP are lying and distorting the truth. It took an important time, when people needed the truth, to discover the level of manipulation, and that day was March 11th,” says Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar, a confidant of Mr Zapatero and member of the Socialist Party's national executive.

The second important factor was higher turnout. The emotional impact of the bombings seems to have persuaded many Spaniards to do their democratic duty and vote. Most were hitherto dormant Socialist supporters. As many as 2m were new young voters, who came of age during Mr Aznar's mishandling of the Prestige oil spill in 2002 and the subsequent war on Iraq. “For the first time in 10-15 years, the majority of 18-30-year olds were voting for the Socialists, but again the message that people wanted change did not surface, because of the PP's stranglehold on the media,” says Mr Lopez Aguilar.

Also, after eight years of the PP and a growing fatigue over Mr Aznar's authoritarian style, Mr Rajoy's chances of winning may never have been as sure as they looked. The bid to sell him as the same product but with an improved tone did not mobilise voters. The PP even began to believe its own propaganda. Strangely, so did everybody else: it was no secret that hardly anyone in the Socialist camp expected to win. Yet Mr Aznar was never as personally popular as his charismatic Socialist predecessor, Felipe González. In a crisis, people proved ready to back away from him and his party.

In Catalonia and the Basque country, both the blaming of the bombings on ETA and Mr Aznar's fierce anti-regional rhetoric backfired spectacularly. His government demonised the Socialists when their coalition partner in the Catalan regional government, the Catalan Republican Left (ERC), was found to have done a secret deal that led ETA to declare a ceasefire limited to Catalonia. The ERC jumped to fourth political power in Spain, with eight seats in the Cortes, up from one in 2000. In Catalonia the Socialists won almost four times as many seats as the PP, which has now become almost a fringe party in the region. In the Basque country, the PP slumped from second to third, behind both PNV nationalists and Socialists.

Mr Zapatero, known for his youth as Bambi, will form a minority government that will function, like some previous governments, by forming informal alliances with nationalist and left-wing parties. He lacks the fiery rhetoric of Mr González, who was prime minister from 1982 to 1996. But his style is attractive after the years of bad blood created by Mr Aznar's high-handed manner.

In a marked change, Mr Zapatero telephoned the Basque leader, Juan José Ibarretxe, instantly restoring relations between Madrid and the region. Mr Aznar had not spoken to Mr Ibarretxe since 2001. Mr Zapatero's first statements on foreign policy signalled that Spain would return to its old loyalties in Europe (see article) rather than its newer pro-American stance. He also wants to revive the notion of Spain as a link between Latin America and the EU.

Mr Zapatero's domestic policy is less clear. Before the election, he appointed a committee of notables who are a mixture of new savvy and safe old guard. According to his circle, Miguel Sebastián, who is not a party member, will be finance minister. An economist and a former banker, he wants to reduce government intervention in business, combat tax fraud and support innovation, research and development. But the new government may also reintroduce labour-market regulations that Mr Aznar had sensibly junked.

Elsewhere José Bono, regional president of Castile La Mancha and a party strongman, is expected to be security minister. Javier Solana may be recalled from Brussels to be foreign minister. Jesus Caldera, Mr Zapatero's right-hand man, will surely have a plum job; a grand old man of the left, Gregorio Peces Barba, could head the culture ministry; María Jesús Sansegundo will get education.

Optimistic Socialist voters talk of a second democratic transition. Areas where Mr Aznar had failed to make improvements, such as government control of the powerful state media and Madrid's testy relations with the regions, may see early action. As crowds gathered to celebrate Mr Zapatero's victory in Madrid, hundreds of young people chanted: “Don't let us down!” No doubt he will try not to; but assuming office when his country has just been bloodied by international terrorists will present a huge challenge to an inexperienced prime minister.