Kurdistan - Turkey

Background

Approximately 20 percent of Turkey's population consists of ethnic and religious minorities. Turkey's Constitution provides a single nationality designation for all Turks and thus does not recognize ethnic groups as national, racial, or ethnic minorities. Therefore a true census has been historically unavailable. Citizens of Kurdish origin have constituted a large ethnic and linguistic group in Turkey. Millions of the country's citizens identified themselves as Kurds and spoke Kurdish. Kurds who publicly or politically asserted their Kurdish identity or publicly espoused using Kurdish in the public domain risked public censure, harassment, or prosecution. However, Kurds who were long-term residents in industrialized cities in the west were in many cases assimilated into the political, economic, and social life of the nation, and much intermarriage has occurred over many generations. Kurds migrating westward (including those displaced by the conflict in the southeast) brought with them their culture and village identity, but often little education and few skills.

The Kurds have been the minority group with the greatest impact on Turkish national politics. The size of the Kurdish population led to a perception as the only minority that could pose a threat to Turkish national unity. Indeed, there was an active Kurdish separatist movement in southeastern Turkey since 1984. In Turkey, the Kurdish national movement dates back to at least 1925, when Atatürk ruthlessly suppressed a revolt against the new Turkish republic motivated by the regime's renunciation of Muslim religious practices. Uprisings in the 1930s and 1940s prompted by opposition to the modernizing and centralizing reforms of the Turkish government in Ankara also were also put down by the Turkish army. Kurdish opposition to the government's emphasis on linguistic homogeneity was spurred in the 1960s and 1970s by agitation in neighboring Iran and Iraq on behalf of an autonomous Kurdistan, to include Kurds from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The majority of Kurds, however, continued to participate in Turkish political parties and to assimilate into Turkish society.

Since the 1930s, Kurds have resisted government efforts to assimilate them forcibly, including an official ban on speaking or writing Kurdish. Since 1984 Kurdish resistance to Turkification encompassed both a peaceful political struggle to obtain basic civil rights for Kurds within Turkey and a violent armed struggle to obtain a separate Kurdish state. The leaders of the nonviolent struggle have worked within the political system for the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights, including the right to speak Kurdish in public and to read, write, and publish in Kurdish. Prior to 1991, these Kurds operated within the national political parties, in particular the SHP, the party most sympathetic to their goal of full equality for all citizens of Turkey. President Özal's 1991 call for a more liberal policy toward Kurds and for the repeal of the ban on speaking Kurdish raised the hopes of Kurdish politicians. Following the parliamentary elections of October 1991, several Kurdish deputies, including Hatip Dicle, Feridun Yazar, and Leyla Zayna, formed the HEP, a party with the explicit goal of campaigning within the National Assembly for laws guaranteeing equal rights for the Kurds.

The government's main strategy for assimilating the Kurds had been language suppression. Yet, despite official attempts over several decades to spread Turkish among them, most Kurds have retained their native language. In Turkey two major Kurdish dialects are spoken: Kermanji, which is used by the majority of Kurds, as well as by some of the Kurds in Iran and Iraq; and Zaza, spoken mainly in a triangular region in southeastern Turkey between Diyarbakir, Ezurum, and Sivas, as well as in parts of Iran. Literate Kurds in Turkey have used Kermanji as the written form of Kurdish since the 17th century. However, almost all literary development of the language since 1924 has occurred outside Turkey. In 1932 Kurds in exile developed a Latin script for Kermanji, and this alphabet continued to be used in the mid-1990s.

Prior to the 1980 military coup, government authorities considered Kurdish one of the unnamed languages banned by law. Use of Kurdish was strictly prohibited in all government institutions, including the courts and schools. Nevertheless, during the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s, Kurdish intellectuals attempted to start Kurdish-language journals and newspapers. None of these publications survived for more than a few issues because state prosecutors inevitably found legal pretexts for closing them down. Between 1980 and 1983, the military government passed several laws expressly banning the use of Kurdish and the possession of written or audio materials in Kurdish.

By 2010 there was a growing division within the Kurdish population and growing fears among a vocal but radical minority that a successful National Unity Project could spell the end of the PKK. The argument that certain elements of the Kurdish population will always oppose a government opening toward the Kurds as a threat to the PKK is becoming more widespread in Turkey as the National Unity Project was increasingly perceived as dividing instead of uniting.

Most Kurds, were more hopeful and less radical than they were in the 1990s, but an increasingly vocal minority had become even more radicalized due to the National Unity Project and other perceived threats to the PKK. An estimated approximately 25 to 30 percent of Turkey's Kurdish population considers Ocalan to be its political leader and is open to violent mobilization. The more moderate 70 percent is not prepared to counter-demonstrate because, by nature, they are not people prone to political mobilization.

Most of the radicalization was among Kurdish youth who have no particular political goal and are frustrated with what they view as a hopeless situation. The youth bulge suggests that radicalization will continue: 48 percent of the population of Diyarbakir is under the age of 19. Around 40 percent of Turkey's Kurds are young and increasingly politicized partly because of their embrace of technology, such as the internet. This population is "like a treasury" of recruits for the PKK. The older generation of Kurds - those now middle aged - are the last generation which can act as a bridge between the state and the PKK. The young generation, should be called the "separatist generation" due to their radical political views.

Expectations of the peace deal never came close to being satisfied. Turkey wanted the PKK to disarm and to leave Turkish soil. It had not fully done either. The PKK, seeking an independent homeland including parts of Iraq, Syria and Turkey itself wishes to be recognised as a legitimate body with a right to defend itself.

With the Kurdish solution process underway since 2013, in 2014 the government and Kurdish opposition groups greatly reduced roadway checkpoints. PKK members and supporters at times blocked roads and set up checkpoints to protest the construction of new security outposts, military facilities, dams, and other infrastructure projects, temporarily restricting movement in the East and Southeast.

Kurdish civil society organizations and political parties continued to experience problems exercising the freedoms of assembly and association. When large groups of Kurds rallied, they were usually met with a large police presence, which often led to skirmishes. For a second year, in 2014 rallies in cities nationwide freely celebrated the Kurdish new year holiday of Newroz. No police-imposed restrictions or interventions were observed during the event; 36 persons were detained and 30 persons were injured during Newroz.

The Democratization Package approved by the parliament on 03 March 2014 allowed private schools to teach in languages other than Turkish. The law allowed citizens to open private education institutions to provide education in languages and dialects they traditionally use in their daily lives, on the condition that the schools are subject to the provisions in the Private Educational Institutions Act and are inspected by the Ministry of National Education. At least three universities provided Kurdish-language programs, and the government received an application to establish a university in Diyarbakir where courses would be taught primarily in Kurdish, but also in Turkish, Armenian, Syriac, and English. The Diyarbakir university remained in the establishment phase at 2014 end.

In October 2014 security forces responded aggressively to protests, predominantly by Kurdish citizens of Turkey, throughout the Southeast in response to the government’s perceived inaction to an ISIL attack on the largely Kurdish town of Kobani, Syria. During the week of October 6, at least 40 civilians were killed during two days of protests and associated violence. According to the HRF, security forces killed 15 persons, while clashes between various Kurdish groups resulted in 31 deaths. As a result of the protests, authorities imposed curfews and travel restrictions in various predominately Kurdish populated provinces, such as Diyarbakir and Mardin. When the Kurdish-dominated HDP won 82 seats in parliament in the June 2015 election the PKK interpreted it as a ‘Yes’ vote in a referendum on self-rule. The PKK potentially lost leverage over Kurdish politicians who now had a direct mandate from the people. One way for the PKK leadership to ensure they maintained their positions in Kurdish political life was to move the focus away from talking and back to direct armed struggle. On 12 July 2015 the leaders of the PKK announced that their members would disrupt the construction of dams and kidnap workers.

Resumption of Fighting - July 2015

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fought the Turkish state for over 30 years until a 2013 ceasefire was declared as the two sides were engaged in talks. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said it was impossible to continue a peace process with Kurdish fighters and that politicians with links to "terrorist groups" should be stripped of their immunity from prosecution. After months of reluctance, Turkey started military operations on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) targets in Syria.

On 24 July 2015, Turkey officially launched its two-front campaign against PKK in northern Iraq and the Islamic State jihadist group in Syria, marking Turkey's first military involvement in the US-led campaign against ISIL. The week had seen a surge in violence in Turkey, which shares southern borders with war-torn Syria and Iraq, stretching 510 miles and 220 miles respectively.

Turkish air force F-16 jet fighters attacked Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) targets in northern Iraq as a three-year ceasefire came to end. Turkish jets, scrambled from the Diyarbakir airbase, struck PKK positions in the area of Harkurk along the Iraqi-Turkish borders on 26 June 2015. The airstrikes followed operations on 25 July 2015, reportedly involving 50 warplanes and striking up to 400 targets in northern Iraq.

The Turkish military launched a new round of airstrikes on Islamic State group (IS) militants and rebel Kurdish bases in northern Iraq on 28 July. Two F-16 jets also hit positions belonging to the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey, hours after NATO voiced unequivocal support for Ankara's response to what it called "terrorism" within its own borders.

The president of Iraq’s Kurdistan region called on the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) 01 August 2015 to “withdraw” from Iraq’s Kurdish territory to prevent civilian casualties during Turkey’s airstrikes. The PKK “should withdraw its fighters from the Kurdish region so to ensure the civilians of Kurdistan do not become victim of that fighting and conflict,” the office of the region's president, Massoud Barzani, said in a statement. The statement also condemned Turkey’s airstrikes against civilians, following reports of casualties and property damage during bombing campaigns in northwestern region of the country.

On 21 November 2015 Turkish warplanes struck Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militant targets in northern Iraq and southeast Turkey, the latest raids in a military campaign against the rebel group. The Turkish army said it hit 23 PKK targets, including shelters and supply points, in Zap, Avasin-Baysan, Hakurk and Qandil areas in northern Iraq with 22 fighter jets.

In 2016 the PKK and groups linked to it declared autonomy in some cities in the Southeast and undertook attacks on security forces, sparking government responses. Clashes resulted in the death of more than 600 security forces, at least 200 civilians, and an unknown number of PKK terrorists. The violent conflict displaced an estimated 300,000 persons, many of whom remained displaced at year’s end. The PKK, its subgroups, and Da’esh also conducted terror attacks throughout the country, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties. Despite limits placed on the use of the antiterror law during 2013 and 2014 by the Fourth and Fifth Judicial Packages, prosecutors continued to use a broad definition of terrorism and threats to national security to launch criminal charges against a broad range of defendants, including hundreds of mostly pro-Kurdish politicians, party officers, and supporters. Antiterror laws were broadly used against Kurds, suspected PKK sympathizers, and alleged members of the Gulen movement. Human rights groups alleged that many detainees had no substantial link to terrorism and were detained to weaken the pro-Kurdish HDP and DBP or to silence critical voices. Authorities used both the antiterror laws and increased powers accorded to the government under the state of emergency to detain individuals and seize assets, including those of media companies, charities, and businesses, of pro-Kurdish groups accused of supporting the PKK, and of individuals alleged to be associated with the Gulen movement. In 2017 the government removed from office numerous local elected opposition politicians, primarily in Kurdish-majority areas, on national security grounds, subsequently detaining or prosecuting some. As of 12 December 2017, the Prime Ministry reported the government had removed a total of 106 elected mayors from office. These included 93 pro-Kurdish Democratic Regions Party (DBP) or HDP mayors, nine AKP mayors, three National Movement party (MHP) mayors, and one CHP mayor. A majority were removed, detained or arrested for allegedly supporting PKK terrorism. Human rights groups alleged that many detainees had no substantial link to terrorism and were detained to silence critical voices or weaken political opposition to the ruling AKP, particularly the pro-Kurdish HDP or its sister party, the DBP. Authorities used both the antiterror laws and increased powers under the state of emergency to detain individuals and seize assets, including those of pro-Kurdish groups accused of supporting the PKK. Pro-Kurdish demonstrations of many kinds faced violent police responses throughout the year. According to a July 2017 International Crisis Group report, in 2016 at least 653 security force members, 865 PKK terrorists, 263 civilians, and 139 youth of unknown affiliation died in PKK-related fighting. The Human Rights Association (HRA) claimed that in the first 11 months of the year, 183 security officers, 52 civilians, and 460 PKK affiliates were killed during clashes; 282 security officers and 28 civilians were reportedly injured. It reported that another 23 persons, including six children, were killed and 46 were injured in accidents involving the vehicles of security forces. PKK tactics included assault with conventional weapons, vehicle-borne bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and targeted killings, inter alia. At times IEDs or unexploded ordinance, usually attributed to the PKK, killed or maimed civilians. The HRA reported that, in the first 11 months of the year, IEDs generally attributed to the PKK killed one adult and five children and injured 25 persons, including 18 children. PKK attacks also targeted political figures with assassination campaigns. On July 1, the PKK-affiliated Women’s Civil Protection Unit kidnapped the ruling AKP deputy district chair for Diyarbakir’s Lice District, Orhan Mercan, in the middle of the night and shot and killed him near his home in Diyarbakir. On July 2, the PKK-affiliated People’s Defense Force kidnapped the AKP deputy district chair for Van’s Ozalp District, Aydin Ahi, in the middle of the night and killed him in front of his home. Police later detained 16 persons in connection with the killing. The PKK abducted both officials and civilians throughout the year. According to media reports, the PKK claimed it had abducted 20 persons, including two National Intelligence Organization (MIT) employees. The government alleged the PKK recruited and forcibly abducted children for conscription, while many in the country’s Kurdish community asserted that youth generally joined the terrorist group voluntarily. The PKK used a variety of pressure tactics that limited freedom of speech and other constitutional rights in the southeast. In the aftermath of curfews enacted in 2016 in response to PKK violence, some journalists, political party representatives, and residents of the southeast reported pressure, intimidation, and threats if they spoke out against the PKK or praised government security forces. Nearly all private Kurdish-language newspapers, television channels, and radio stations remained closed on national security grounds under government decrees. Publishers often exercised self-censorship, avoiding works with controversial content (including government criticism, erotic content, or pro-Kurdish content) that might draw legal action. In some cases prosecutors considered the possession of some Kurdish-language, pro-Kurdish, or Gulenist books to be credible evidence of membership in a banned organization. In July 2017 parliament amended its by-laws to prohibit the use of the word “Kurdistan” or other sensitive terms by members of parliament on the floor of parliament, providing for the possible issuance of fines to violators. On December 13, parliament suspended HDP spokesperson and Sanliurfa member of parliament Osman Baydemir for two General Assembly sessions after he referred to himself as a “representative of Kurdistan” during a discussion in parliament. Lawmakers, mostly from the pro-Kurdish HDP, were also targeted in a significant number of insult-related cases. At year’s end nine HDP lawmakers were in prison for a variety of charges related to terrorism and political speech. In 2018 clashes between security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization and its affiliates continued throughout the year, although at a reduced level compared with previous years, and resulted in the injury or death of security forces, PKK terrorists, and an unknown number of civilians. The government did not release information on efforts to investigate or prosecute personnel for any wrongful or inadvertent deaths of civilians linked to counter-PKK security operations. According to media reports, the government removed the elected mayors of 99 municipalities from office. These included 94 pro-Kurdish Democratic Regions Party (DBP) or HDP mayors, four Justice and Development Party (AKP) mayors, and one National Movement party (MHP) mayor. The government removed, detained, or arrested the majority for allegedly supporting PKK terrorism. According to January Ministry of Interior statistics, out of 102 HDP or DBP-controlled municipalities, the government had installed trustees in all but four. During the first quarter of the 2018, the government targeted nearly 1,000 critics of Operation Olive Branch, the country’s military operation in northern Syria, with detention and prosecution. Nearly all private Kurdish-language newspapers, television channels, and radio stations remained closed on national security grounds under government decrees, although a Kurdish-language radio and television station, Amed Radio-Television, opened following the end of the state of emergency in July 2018. Pro-Kurdish demonstrations of many kinds faced violent police responses throughout 2018. For example, police tear gassed and sprayed pressurized water at supporters of the pro-Kurdish HDP celebrating the party’s elections performance in June after the demonstrators began throwing stones at police vehicles. More than 15 million citizens were estimated to be of Kurdish origin and spoke Kurdish dialects. Security force efforts against the PKK disproportionately affected Kurdish communities in rural areas throughout much of the year. Some predominantly Kurdish communities experienced government-imposed curfews, generally in connection with government security operations aimed at clearing areas of PKK terrorists. Kurdish and pro-Kurdish civil society organizations and political parties reported increasing problems exercising freedoms of assembly and association. Hundreds of Kurdish civil society organizations and Kurdish-language media outlets closed by government decree in 2016 and 2017, after the coup attempt remained closed. On 19 December 2018, the HRA reported that 2,854 persons including military, police, village guards, PKK members, and civilians, had lost their lives during government-PKK clashes in the southeast since 2016.