What do you think?
Rate this book
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870
Recasting labor studies in a long-term and global framework, the book draws on a major new database on world labor unrest to show how local labor movements have been related to world-scale political, economic, and social processes since the late nineteenth century. Through an in-depth empirical analysis of select global industries, the book demonstrates how the main locations of labor unrest have shifted from country to country together with shifts in the geographical location of production. It shows how the main sites of labor unrest have shifted over time together with the rise or decline of new leading sectors of capitalist development and demonstrates that labor movements have been deeply embedded (as both cause and effect) in world political dynamics. Over the history of the modern labor movement, the book isolates what is truly novel about the contemporary global crisis of labor movements. Arguing against the view that this is a terminal crisis, the book concludes by exploring the likely forms that emergent labor movements will take in the twenty-first century.
260 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2003
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
June 3, 2023
Written in the early 2000s amidst a crisis of labor movements, this book tried to stem left-wing pessimism by tracing out the history of labor movements throughout the world, showing that labor setbacks might be temporary and forces of labor was gathering strength.
The book first sets out by defining the source of workers’ bargaining power. Using Erik Wright’s typology, there are two distinct types:
- Associational power consists of "the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organization of workers" (most importantly, trade unions and political parties).
- Structural power, in, contrast, consists of the power that accrues to workers "simply from their location... in the economic system."
Wright further divides "structural" power into two subtypes.
- Marketplace bargaining power, which can take several forms including (1) the possession of scarce skills that are in demand by employers, (2) low levels of general unemployment, and (3) the ability of workers to pull out of the labor market entirely and survive on non-wage sources of income
- Workplace bargaining power, on the other hand, accrues to workers who are enmeshed in tightly integrated production processes, where a localized work stoppage in a key node can cause disruptions on a much wider scale than the stoppage itself. Such bargaining power has been in evidence when entire assembly lines have been shut down by a stoppage in one segment of the line, and when entire corporations relying on the just-in-time delivery of parts have, been brought to a standstill by railway workers' strikes (Note: comparing this to the software engineering profession is interesting. The best software engineer is the one whose code is so readable and so filled with documentation such that the company can replace the original programmer with another programmer without too much disruption in software production process. Essentially, the best software engineers are they who succeeded in reducing their own workplace bargaining power)
The increasing power and consciousness of labor can and will manifest in an unrest. The resistances that encompass labor unrest include both:
- Marxian type of struggle against being treated as a commodity at the point of production (ie., Marx's focus on the struggle over the extraction of surplus labor). Resulting in the demand for more representation and power in the workplace.
- Polanyian type of struggle against being treated as a commodity on the labor market (i.e., Polanyi's focus on the struggles for protection against the ravages of the self-regulating market system). Resulting in the demand for welfare and employment protection.
Against the demand of organized labor, capitalist can provide four type of fixes:
- Spatial fix. The geographical relocation of production from sites where labor movements are strong to sites where they are weak. Colloquially known as “globalization”, this phenomena entails the hypermobility of capital and the restriction of labor’s mobility
- Product fix. The movement of capital into new industries and product lines subject to less competition. As production process matures, profit declines due to inter-capital competition and worker’s demand for increased share of the profit. Capital is relentlessly seeking for a new product line to invest in.
- Organizational fix. Best represented by the post-Fordist Japanese just-in-time production, also adopted by the west with modification
- "lean and dual” - the original Japanese” Toyotist" model - which offers employment security to a core labor force in exchange for cooperation, but at the same time creates a large buffer of less privileged workers without the same rights and benefits
- “lean and mean" flexible work rules, just-in-time delivery systems, teamwork, quality circles, and a move away from vertical integration toward the extensive use of subcontracted inputs (outsourcing)
- Financial fix. For just as capital shifts to new industries and product lines to escape intense competitive pressures in established spheres of production (our product fix), so, in periods of widespread, intense competition, capital has tended to shift out of trade and production entirely and into finance and speculation. (Note: This is what’s happening in Indonesian startups. Instead of developing new product lines, capital is invested into marketing and the development of ‘pinjaman online’ and e-wallets)
Different industries and locations yielded different results in labor movements, and different fixes utilized by capitalists. For example, within the textile industry in 19th century England, workers were extremely militant but they were mostly unsuccessful in extracting concessions from capital and/or the state. This is primarily due to the lower value of capital needed in the textile industry than, say, the automotive or semiconductor industry, so spatial fixes are effective. Capitalists could just pack up and move to an area with lower cost of labor. In the semiconductor/automotive industry, however, the initial investment of capital are so huge that relocating production means abandoning a huge amount of investment.
The book uses these concepts as a lens to examine the history of democracy. While multinational capital was attracted by the promise of cheap and controllable labor, the transformations wrought by the expansion of the industry also transformed the balance of class forces. The strong labor movements that emerged succeeded in raising wages, improving working conditions, and strengthening workers' rights. Moreover, they often played a leading role in democracy movements, pushing onto the agenda social transformations that went well beyond those envisioned by pro-democracy elites. Such phenomena was observed even in the early 20th century by Karl Polanyi:
In the 19th century, the leading industry was textile. In the 20th it was the automotive industry. It might be too early to tell, but it seems the semiconductor industry is the leading industry of the 21st century. However, we haven’t seen too much labor movement organizing within the semiconductor industry. This might be because most of it is outsourced to China, so most of us don’t hear much about it due to the repressive communist state. The book predicts that China will be the next center of labor movement. I guess we’ll see
The book first sets out by defining the source of workers’ bargaining power. Using Erik Wright’s typology, there are two distinct types:
- Associational power consists of "the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organization of workers" (most importantly, trade unions and political parties).
- Structural power, in, contrast, consists of the power that accrues to workers "simply from their location... in the economic system."
Wright further divides "structural" power into two subtypes.
- Marketplace bargaining power, which can take several forms including (1) the possession of scarce skills that are in demand by employers, (2) low levels of general unemployment, and (3) the ability of workers to pull out of the labor market entirely and survive on non-wage sources of income
- Workplace bargaining power, on the other hand, accrues to workers who are enmeshed in tightly integrated production processes, where a localized work stoppage in a key node can cause disruptions on a much wider scale than the stoppage itself. Such bargaining power has been in evidence when entire assembly lines have been shut down by a stoppage in one segment of the line, and when entire corporations relying on the just-in-time delivery of parts have, been brought to a standstill by railway workers' strikes (Note: comparing this to the software engineering profession is interesting. The best software engineer is the one whose code is so readable and so filled with documentation such that the company can replace the original programmer with another programmer without too much disruption in software production process. Essentially, the best software engineers are they who succeeded in reducing their own workplace bargaining power)
The increasing power and consciousness of labor can and will manifest in an unrest. The resistances that encompass labor unrest include both:
- Marxian type of struggle against being treated as a commodity at the point of production (ie., Marx's focus on the struggle over the extraction of surplus labor). Resulting in the demand for more representation and power in the workplace.
- Polanyian type of struggle against being treated as a commodity on the labor market (i.e., Polanyi's focus on the struggles for protection against the ravages of the self-regulating market system). Resulting in the demand for welfare and employment protection.
Against the demand of organized labor, capitalist can provide four type of fixes:
- Spatial fix. The geographical relocation of production from sites where labor movements are strong to sites where they are weak. Colloquially known as “globalization”, this phenomena entails the hypermobility of capital and the restriction of labor’s mobility
- Product fix. The movement of capital into new industries and product lines subject to less competition. As production process matures, profit declines due to inter-capital competition and worker’s demand for increased share of the profit. Capital is relentlessly seeking for a new product line to invest in.
- Organizational fix. Best represented by the post-Fordist Japanese just-in-time production, also adopted by the west with modification
- "lean and dual” - the original Japanese” Toyotist" model - which offers employment security to a core labor force in exchange for cooperation, but at the same time creates a large buffer of less privileged workers without the same rights and benefits
- “lean and mean" flexible work rules, just-in-time delivery systems, teamwork, quality circles, and a move away from vertical integration toward the extensive use of subcontracted inputs (outsourcing)
- Financial fix. For just as capital shifts to new industries and product lines to escape intense competitive pressures in established spheres of production (our product fix), so, in periods of widespread, intense competition, capital has tended to shift out of trade and production entirely and into finance and speculation. (Note: This is what’s happening in Indonesian startups. Instead of developing new product lines, capital is invested into marketing and the development of ‘pinjaman online’ and e-wallets)
Different industries and locations yielded different results in labor movements, and different fixes utilized by capitalists. For example, within the textile industry in 19th century England, workers were extremely militant but they were mostly unsuccessful in extracting concessions from capital and/or the state. This is primarily due to the lower value of capital needed in the textile industry than, say, the automotive or semiconductor industry, so spatial fixes are effective. Capitalists could just pack up and move to an area with lower cost of labor. In the semiconductor/automotive industry, however, the initial investment of capital are so huge that relocating production means abandoning a huge amount of investment.
The book uses these concepts as a lens to examine the history of democracy. While multinational capital was attracted by the promise of cheap and controllable labor, the transformations wrought by the expansion of the industry also transformed the balance of class forces. The strong labor movements that emerged succeeded in raising wages, improving working conditions, and strengthening workers' rights. Moreover, they often played a leading role in democracy movements, pushing onto the agenda social transformations that went well beyond those envisioned by pro-democracy elites. Such phenomena was observed even in the early 20th century by Karl Polanyi:
“Inside and outside England ... there was not a militant liberal who did not express his conviction that popular democracy was a danger to capitalism “
In the 19th century, the leading industry was textile. In the 20th it was the automotive industry. It might be too early to tell, but it seems the semiconductor industry is the leading industry of the 21st century. However, we haven’t seen too much labor movement organizing within the semiconductor industry. This might be because most of it is outsourced to China, so most of us don’t hear much about it due to the repressive communist state. The book predicts that China will be the next center of labor movement. I guess we’ll see
October 26, 2020
Beverly Silver ve ekibi 1870-1996 arası gazeteleri tarayarak işçi eylemlerini sayısal veriye dönüştürüyor ve bazı sorulara cevap arıyor. 168 ülkede 91.847 adet eylemi The Times ve New York Times’tan elde ediyorlar.
1980’lerden itibaren işçi hareketlerinin zayıflaması kalıcı mıdır? Sermaye hareketliliği, sermayenin karlılık krizlerine yönelik geliştirdiği mekansal, teknolojik, finansal çözümler, devletin egemenliğinin zayıflaması işçi hareketlerini ezmiş midir? Bu benzersiz bir dönem midir de işçi hareketlerinin gücünü kaybettiğini söylüyoruz. 19. Yy’da itici sektör tekstil, 20. Yy’da otomotiv olmuştur. 21. Yy’da ise hizmet sektörü genişlemiştir. 21. Yy’ın yeni emek piyasası için geçmişten bir örüntü çıkarılabilir mi? Silver işçi hareketlerinin belirleyenlerini bulmak için geçmişe bakalım diyor.
Diğer yandan devlet-piyasa ikiliği ile düşünmemeyi öneriyor. Devlet sermaye baskı yaptığı için değil işbirliği içinde pazardan elini çekme stratejisine sahiptir.
İşçi hareketleri Marx ya da Polanyi tarzı olabilir. Sendika gibi örgütsel güç ya da emek piyasasındaki güç (kalifiye olmak gibi) ve kilit sektörde olup olmamak hareketlerin gücünü belirler. Diğer yandan üretim sürecinin sektöre göre örgütlenmesi de önemlidir. Otomotiv’de bir makinanın durması diğerlerini de durdurur ama tekstilde durdurmaz.
Yazarın geleceğe dair bir formülü olmasa da bugün emek hareketlerinin zayıflamasına neden olarak görülenlerin geçmişte de olduğunu tespit ediyor. Otomotivin Amerika’dan çekilmesi oradaki işçi sınıfını zayıflatmış ancak gittiği yerdekini güçlendirmiştir. Fordizm zanaatkarlığı bitirmiş ama makinayla aşina bir işçi sınfı yaratmıştır.
Son not çeviri çok iyi.
1980’lerden itibaren işçi hareketlerinin zayıflaması kalıcı mıdır? Sermaye hareketliliği, sermayenin karlılık krizlerine yönelik geliştirdiği mekansal, teknolojik, finansal çözümler, devletin egemenliğinin zayıflaması işçi hareketlerini ezmiş midir? Bu benzersiz bir dönem midir de işçi hareketlerinin gücünü kaybettiğini söylüyoruz. 19. Yy’da itici sektör tekstil, 20. Yy’da otomotiv olmuştur. 21. Yy’da ise hizmet sektörü genişlemiştir. 21. Yy’ın yeni emek piyasası için geçmişten bir örüntü çıkarılabilir mi? Silver işçi hareketlerinin belirleyenlerini bulmak için geçmişe bakalım diyor.
Diğer yandan devlet-piyasa ikiliği ile düşünmemeyi öneriyor. Devlet sermaye baskı yaptığı için değil işbirliği içinde pazardan elini çekme stratejisine sahiptir.
İşçi hareketleri Marx ya da Polanyi tarzı olabilir. Sendika gibi örgütsel güç ya da emek piyasasındaki güç (kalifiye olmak gibi) ve kilit sektörde olup olmamak hareketlerin gücünü belirler. Diğer yandan üretim sürecinin sektöre göre örgütlenmesi de önemlidir. Otomotiv’de bir makinanın durması diğerlerini de durdurur ama tekstilde durdurmaz.
Yazarın geleceğe dair bir formülü olmasa da bugün emek hareketlerinin zayıflamasına neden olarak görülenlerin geçmişte de olduğunu tespit ediyor. Otomotivin Amerika’dan çekilmesi oradaki işçi sınıfını zayıflatmış ancak gittiği yerdekini güçlendirmiştir. Fordizm zanaatkarlığı bitirmiş ama makinayla aşina bir işçi sınfı yaratmıştır.
Son not çeviri çok iyi.
July 15, 2016
There should be more history books that examine events and progress from the perspective of the working class. Although Prof. Silver, who heads the Sociology department at Johns Hopkins University, is obviously not a member of that class, that does not preclude her from effectively tracing the history of workers' movements from the late 19th to the early 21st centuries.
To date, organized labor (a form of labor consciousness) has emerged as a large-scale social and politcal force in response to capitalist industry manifested primarily in two sectors: textile production and automobile manufacturing. As capital has moved around the globe in search of opportunities to pay lower wages (a phenomenon known colloquially as the 'race to the bottom'), in each new venue, labor has organized, pressured its employers, and secured better wage and working conditions before capital has moved on to find the next host. A memorable example from this book concerns South Korea, which was a preferred destination for the transnational automotive manufacturing industry seeking cheap labor in the 2nd half of the 20th century, but where workers eventually organized and developed bargaining power to improve their conditions.
The book does mention the accommodationism of American labor unions to corporate employers in the automotive industry as a factor in the gutting of such unions (e.g. UAW), which now have a fraction of the political power they once had. But it does not go into detail about the political and other deals made to produce such an outcome. In fairness, the book does not aspire to such a scope. But it would be interesting to examine the processes of corruption and degradation of US labor unions by tracking specific agreements with corporate heads. In retrospect such deals were a betrayal of workers' interests, since the employers that secured them ultimately packed up and left the United States for cheaper markets, leaving once bustling American urban-industrial centers dead human landscapes with collapsing infrastructures, plagued by poverty and crime. Notably, in the 2016 presidential elections, it is widely believed that the surprise victory of Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders - a self-described socialist - in the Michigan Democratic primary was in large part due to union members having voted against their own leadership (which would have instructed votes for Hillary Clinton), meaning that the level of trust within the unions must be at an all-time low. In 1966, Detroit was the wealthiest city in America in terms of per capita income. Fifty years later, it is one of America's 'dead cities.'
'Forces of Labor' leaves off by speculating as to how workers' movements will look in the 21st century, now that the automotive industry unions are a shadow of their former selves, and suggests that the sector to watch in this century is services. There is some discussion of service industry workers in California, and of course the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is now unquestionably politically powerful. But the book was published at the beginning of the new millennium, and over ten years later, the casual observer is not filled with hope at the prospects of organized labor improving the lot of workers in the services sector worldwide. For one thing, division of labor - and thus the prospects for disruptions through strikes - is much more pronounced in the process of manufacturing finished goods than in the performance of services such as cleaning, etc. As such, the reader is left wondering how it will all pan out, and what method - if any - exists for developing a consciousness among the international working class that can transcend national borders and generate a truly global strike, bringing the whole globalized corporate behemoth to a halt until global society can be reorganized and rebuilt along humane and civilized lines.
To date, organized labor (a form of labor consciousness) has emerged as a large-scale social and politcal force in response to capitalist industry manifested primarily in two sectors: textile production and automobile manufacturing. As capital has moved around the globe in search of opportunities to pay lower wages (a phenomenon known colloquially as the 'race to the bottom'), in each new venue, labor has organized, pressured its employers, and secured better wage and working conditions before capital has moved on to find the next host. A memorable example from this book concerns South Korea, which was a preferred destination for the transnational automotive manufacturing industry seeking cheap labor in the 2nd half of the 20th century, but where workers eventually organized and developed bargaining power to improve their conditions.
The book does mention the accommodationism of American labor unions to corporate employers in the automotive industry as a factor in the gutting of such unions (e.g. UAW), which now have a fraction of the political power they once had. But it does not go into detail about the political and other deals made to produce such an outcome. In fairness, the book does not aspire to such a scope. But it would be interesting to examine the processes of corruption and degradation of US labor unions by tracking specific agreements with corporate heads. In retrospect such deals were a betrayal of workers' interests, since the employers that secured them ultimately packed up and left the United States for cheaper markets, leaving once bustling American urban-industrial centers dead human landscapes with collapsing infrastructures, plagued by poverty and crime. Notably, in the 2016 presidential elections, it is widely believed that the surprise victory of Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders - a self-described socialist - in the Michigan Democratic primary was in large part due to union members having voted against their own leadership (which would have instructed votes for Hillary Clinton), meaning that the level of trust within the unions must be at an all-time low. In 1966, Detroit was the wealthiest city in America in terms of per capita income. Fifty years later, it is one of America's 'dead cities.'
'Forces of Labor' leaves off by speculating as to how workers' movements will look in the 21st century, now that the automotive industry unions are a shadow of their former selves, and suggests that the sector to watch in this century is services. There is some discussion of service industry workers in California, and of course the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is now unquestionably politically powerful. But the book was published at the beginning of the new millennium, and over ten years later, the casual observer is not filled with hope at the prospects of organized labor improving the lot of workers in the services sector worldwide. For one thing, division of labor - and thus the prospects for disruptions through strikes - is much more pronounced in the process of manufacturing finished goods than in the performance of services such as cleaning, etc. As such, the reader is left wondering how it will all pan out, and what method - if any - exists for developing a consciousness among the international working class that can transcend national borders and generate a truly global strike, bringing the whole globalized corporate behemoth to a halt until global society can be reorganized and rebuilt along humane and civilized lines.
September 21, 2018
Solid book which examines labor unrest over a period of 120 years by using a newspaper dataset. Silver notices a pattern whereby industry offers concessions to labor before relocating to find find new, more compliant work forces. This has the effect of spreading labor radicalism around the globe, and the author targets China as the place where it will next emerge. Another long term pattern is that labor has become dependent on the nation state through welfare, but as the state weakens the calls for international solidarity may gain renewed significance. Global capital must be fought on a global level.
Having said that, labor today is weakened by both the emergence of post-fordism (The service industry today is far more vulnerable than the industrial workers of the c.20th) and the alienation of Westerners from war, which denies us a key socialising experience and source of labor solidarity.
Quotes.
1.
“The bargaining power of worker-citizens vis-à-vis their states increased with the escalation of inter-imperialist rivalries and warfare in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as workers became increasingly important cogs in the war machines.” (12)
2.
“Automobile corporations responded to each successive wave of labor unrest by shifting production to new sites with relatively cheap and controllable labor. This strategy of capital mobility had a significant weakening effect on labor movements in the sites from which capital was relocated, but created and strengthened new labor movements in each successive site of industry expansion.” (38-39)
3.
“With the geographic diffusion of the industry, strong workplace bargaining power also diffused... if past patterns are any guide to the future, then we should expect major waves of industrial labor unrest to occur in those regions that have been experiencing rapid industrialization and proletarianization (of great world-historical significance, in this regard, is the case of China.)” (169)
4.
“The bargaining power of many of today’s low-wage workers in producer and personal services is closer to that of workers in the nineteenth-century textile industry than that of workers in the twentieth-century automobile industry.” (172)
5.
“The more First World states move toward the automation of war, the more they emancipate themselves from dependence on their worker-citizens for success in war. As such, one of the most powerful processes underlying the expansion of workers' and democratic rights is being reversed.” (175)
Having said that, labor today is weakened by both the emergence of post-fordism (The service industry today is far more vulnerable than the industrial workers of the c.20th) and the alienation of Westerners from war, which denies us a key socialising experience and source of labor solidarity.
Quotes.
1.
“The bargaining power of worker-citizens vis-à-vis their states increased with the escalation of inter-imperialist rivalries and warfare in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as workers became increasingly important cogs in the war machines.” (12)
2.
“Automobile corporations responded to each successive wave of labor unrest by shifting production to new sites with relatively cheap and controllable labor. This strategy of capital mobility had a significant weakening effect on labor movements in the sites from which capital was relocated, but created and strengthened new labor movements in each successive site of industry expansion.” (38-39)
3.
“With the geographic diffusion of the industry, strong workplace bargaining power also diffused... if past patterns are any guide to the future, then we should expect major waves of industrial labor unrest to occur in those regions that have been experiencing rapid industrialization and proletarianization (of great world-historical significance, in this regard, is the case of China.)” (169)
4.
“The bargaining power of many of today’s low-wage workers in producer and personal services is closer to that of workers in the nineteenth-century textile industry than that of workers in the twentieth-century automobile industry.” (172)
5.
“The more First World states move toward the automation of war, the more they emancipate themselves from dependence on their worker-citizens for success in war. As such, one of the most powerful processes underlying the expansion of workers' and democratic rights is being reversed.” (175)
February 9, 2014
Beverly J. Silver writes:
Indeed, there is some irony in the fact that early-twentieth-century observers of the transformations associated with Fordism were certain that these changes spelled the death of labor movements. Fordism not only made the skills of most unionized (craft) workers obsolete but also allowed employers to tap new sources of labor, resulting in a working class that was seen as hopelessly divided by ethnicity and other ascriptive differences, as well as isolated from each other by “an awesome array of fragmenting and alienating technologies”. It was only post facto – with the success of mass production unionization – that Fordism came to be seen as inherently labor strengthening rather than inherently labor weakening. Is there a chance that we are on the eve of another such post-facto shift in perspective?
And:
By the turn of the century, rulers had learned that little victorious wars could provide a “diversion” and bolster governments. The Spanish-American War (for the United States) and the South African War (for the United Kingdom) were two such examples. However, the revolutionary upheavals that shook the Russian Empire in the wake of its 1905 defeat by Japan also showed the potential boomerang effect of lost (or otherwise unpopular) wars. On the even of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Russian interior minister had openly stated that “this country needs… a short victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.” If European rulers hoped in 1914 for a popular little war, they badly misjudged the changed conditions that the industrialization and nationalization of warfare had brought about.
.
Indeed, there is some irony in the fact that early-twentieth-century observers of the transformations associated with Fordism were certain that these changes spelled the death of labor movements. Fordism not only made the skills of most unionized (craft) workers obsolete but also allowed employers to tap new sources of labor, resulting in a working class that was seen as hopelessly divided by ethnicity and other ascriptive differences, as well as isolated from each other by “an awesome array of fragmenting and alienating technologies”. It was only post facto – with the success of mass production unionization – that Fordism came to be seen as inherently labor strengthening rather than inherently labor weakening. Is there a chance that we are on the eve of another such post-facto shift in perspective?
And:
By the turn of the century, rulers had learned that little victorious wars could provide a “diversion” and bolster governments. The Spanish-American War (for the United States) and the South African War (for the United Kingdom) were two such examples. However, the revolutionary upheavals that shook the Russian Empire in the wake of its 1905 defeat by Japan also showed the potential boomerang effect of lost (or otherwise unpopular) wars. On the even of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Russian interior minister had openly stated that “this country needs… a short victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.” If European rulers hoped in 1914 for a popular little war, they badly misjudged the changed conditions that the industrialization and nationalization of warfare had brought about.
.
March 28, 2013
good book. good information--sociology lacks the poetic quality that history and other theory has which is fun to read. i also thought a closer look at the marxian value category (and it's evolution over time) would have helped the analysis--the author mentioned, but didn't explain, crises of profitability, leading to some conflation of 'labor militancy' with alinskyism. overall a very good historical look though.
March 13, 2022
The political economy paradigm.
An attempt to tandem the labour movement, the workings of capital and the economic crisis.
An attempt to tandem the labour movement, the workings of capital and the economic crisis.
November 13, 2010
Brilliant.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews