Skip to article


Assessments of the War
Several report cards, assessing the progress of the war, were issued this summer. A look at how they have assessed the security and political situation in Iraq, as well as statements provided to Congress by Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker.
FARHANA HOSSAIN
TESTIMONIES BY
GENERAL PETRAEUS AND AMBASSADOR CROCKER		 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE 		INDEPENDENT COMMISSION LED BY GEN. JAMES L. JONES NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE		 WHITE HOUSE
INITIAL
ASSESSMENT

Date
Today and yesterday
September
September
August
July

Petraeus statement | Slides
Full Report
Full Report
Full Report
Full Report
Security
The military objectives of the surge are in large measure being met.
In recent months in the face of tough enemies in the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in eight of the past 12 weeks, with the number of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest level seen since June 2006. (Petraeus)
Violence remains high. The average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months. Overall attacks declined in July compared to June largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around major religious and political events.
While security in some parts of Iraq appears to be increasing, the country continues to be plagued by internal violence. Violence has sharply declined in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province — the former stronghold of the insurgency. But attacks have risen in Diyala, Balad, Basra and Amara. Violence remains endemic in Baghdad, despite measurable gains made since February.
There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq's security situation since January 2007. The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high.
The security situation in Iraq remains complex and extremely challenging. As a result of increased offensive operations, coalition and Iraqi forces have sustained increased attacks. The number of suicide and improvised explosive device attacks in March and April approached all-time highs, further exacerbating sectarian tension. These incidents have shown a decrease in May and June.
Sectarian Violence
Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels. (Petraeus)
We could not determine if sectarian violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad security plan. Measuring sectarian violence is difficult since the perpetrator's intent is not always clearly known. The average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months.
Ethnically and religiously mixed areas, such as Baghdad and its ring cities, continue to experience violence and intense sectarian activity. Even some of Iraq's most homogenous Shia areas in the southern part of the country are seeing rising levels of intra-Shia militia violence.
The levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high.
To the extent that coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi security forces, Iraq's security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months, but the levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high.
Though sectarian violence has been reduced, it is not yet reduced to a level the coalition judges acceptable. Though precise measurements of sectarian violence vary, trends data supplied over time by the military demonstrate a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since the beginning of the year. It is too early to determine how sustainable the progress will prove to be.
Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas. There are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police and special operations forces battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. (Petraeus)
The number of Iraqi army units operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July 2007, eventhough the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations. Tribal and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong within many Iraqi military units, hindering efforts to take action against militias. Political interference in the conduct of military operations and law enforcement continues. Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false accusations against Iraqi security forces personnel.
Iraqi security forces, military and police have made uneven progress, but there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide the internal security of Iraq. The commission's assessment ascribes better progress to the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense and less to the Ministry of Interior, where corruption and dysfunction has hampered Iraqi police forces. The Iraqi police are improving at the local level predominantly. They have been vulnerable to infiltration and are often outmatched in leadership, training, equipment and weapons by the terrorists, criminals and the militias they must combat.
The Iraqi security forces have not improved enough to conduct major operations independent of the coalition on a sustained basis in multiple locations, and the Iraqi security forces remain reliant on the coalition for important aspects of logistics and combat support. Political interference in security operations continues to undermine efforts by the coalition and Iraqi security forces.
Continues to show slow progress. Iraqi security forces capability is increasing but further proficiency, improved logistics and expanded forces are needed. There continues to be evidence of sectarian bias in the appointment of senior military and police commanders. Left on their own, many Iraqi security force units still tend to gravitate to old habits of sectarianism when applying the law, but some units have demonstrated the ability to act as responsible partners when employed with coalition influence. Iraqi authorities continue to undermine and make false accusations against Iraqi security forces believed to be nonÐsectarian in their approach.
Militia Control of Local Security
Militia control over local security forces has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and U.N. reports have stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. Militia influence impacts every component of the Ministry of Interior, particularly in Baghdad and other key cities.
Militias continue to play a prominent role in local security and are seen as posing almost as significant a threat to Iraqi stability and security as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Despite the heavy concentration of forces in the capital, the central government does not yet fully control security in Baghdad or its surrounding cities.
Militia and insurgent influences continue to undermine the reliability of some Iraqi security forces units.
Militia presence is still strong and reaches into the security services of a number of ministries. Despite some progress, militias are still a dominant force in parts of Baghdad, Basra, and many provinces in Iraq and will likely remain so until the security situation begins to stabilize over time.
Government Reconciliation
Some of the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad. ... We have come to associate progress on national reconciliation as meaning the passage of key pieces of legislation... What is difficult about these laws is that they take Iraq another step down the road toward a federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. At the provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced, particularly in the north and west of Iraq, with the security — where the security improvements have been in some places dramatic. A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive developments in the provinces to the central government in Baghdad. (Crocker)
The Iraqi government has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance legislative, security and economic measures that would promote national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of particular concern is the lack of progress on the constitutional review that could promote greater Sunni participation in the national government. Despite Iraqi leaders recently signing a unity accord, the polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Shia factions diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation.
The report focuses on the security situation, but it added that the single most important event that could immediately and favorably affect Iraq's direction or security is political reconciliation focused on ending sectarian violence.
Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern. Divisions between Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and the Sadrists have increased, and Shia factions have explored alternative coalitions aimed at constraining Mr. Maliki. The strains of the security situation and absence of key leaders have stalled internal political debates, slowed national decision-making, and increased Mr. Maliki's vulnerability to alternative coalitions. Perceptions that the coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intrasectarian competition.
National leadership from all communities and expression of a common national political will has so far been lacking. The consensus nature of Iraqi politics and the checks and balances built into the Iraqi governance structure inhibit Prime Minister Maliki's ability to govern effectively. These inhibitors slow progress on high-priority legislative benchmarks. The increasing concern among Iraqi political leaders that the United States may not have a long-term commitment to Iraq has also served in recent months to reinforce hedging behaviors and made the hardest political bargains even more difficult to close.