General Sir Michael Jackson: We must maintain our will in Afghanistan

The recent tragic deaths of British soldiers in Afghanistan – including the first woman to be killed there – together with the announcement of the modest increase to the British military contingent by about 200 have sharpened the public focus on our operations in that country.

The question "is it worth it" is being asked more loudly.

Why is the UN, Nato and the coalition in Afghanistan? In the immediate aftermath of the horrific attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, it became clear that the al-Qa'eda perpetrators – mostly of Saudi origin – had trained and prepared themselves in Afghanistan.

It was also clear that the then Taliban regime had at least acquiesced in, even actively encouraged, these preparations.

Paradoxically, the Taliban had its origins in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation of the 1980s.

The coalition rapidly took military action to remove that regime, which had also treated many Afghans abominably.

Much of the fighting on the ground was conducted by Afghans themselves. The Taliban was swiftly defeated – but it was not completely destroyed, and the survivors sought sanctuary across the Pakistan border.

The Bonn Conference of December 2001 laid out a constitutional, electoral and judicial road-map for Afghanistan's future, and established an International Security Force (ISAF) to assist with security initially in and around Kabul.

Arrangements for non-military assistance and reconstruction were also put in place. These measures were given UN authority by virtue of Security Council Resolution 1386.

The coalition main effort then switched to Saddam Hussein and Iraq; inevitably this meant that the eye was taken off the Afghan ball. But by late 2005 it had become clear that more needed to be done, not least in expanding ISAF's area of operations to include the country as a whole.

he UN agreed that Nato would act on its behalf, with the coalition forces engaged on counter-terrorist operations eventually integrating with ISAF into a single command structure.

The United Kingdom offered to take, and was given, operational responsibility for Helmand Province. The first substantial British deployment to this major poppy-growing province of southern Afghanistan took place in the early summer of 2006; not surprisingly, this deployment was resisted by re-formed Taliban forces crossing into Afghanistan from Pakistan.

For the Taliban, the concept of a free and democratic Afghanistan was anathema; it would, given the chance, re-impose its despotic rule over the Afghan people.

There was fierce fighting, of a largely conventional nature; the Taliban lost every tactical battle. As the campaign has progressed over the past two years, the Taliban has realised that it cannot defeat the British Army and its coalition partners in conventional manoeuvres; it has accordingly turned towards unconventional, asymmetric tactics – in particular, the use of improvised explosive devices. Such tactics cannot defeat Nato forces militarily; the Taliban no doubt seeks to defeat our will to succeed.

So much for the narrative of how we got to where we are now. But we must be clear about our strategic purpose: to prevent Afghanistan reverting to being a training centre for global terrorism.

As with other interventions, it is to help a country move from some dark past to a better future. It is to achieve a country that is stable, at peace with itself and its neighbours, with a representative government, institutions becoming embedded, effective security forces, refugees returned home, reconstruction and economic regeneration in progress, all underpinned by the rule of law. This is a complex and difficult challenge in Afghanistan, as it is elsewhere – and it will take time.

We should remember in this context that healing past wounds and rebuilding a country can be a lengthy process: the British Armed Forces were deployed in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland for nearly 38 years; there is still an international military presence in Bosnia after 16 years, in Kosovo after nine years (where there is still not a universally accepted settlement); and while the circumstances are very different from those of Afghanistan, there is still considerable work for the coalition to do in Iraq.

Our opponents are, in all probability, of the view that the West has not got the stomach for a long campaign – we must have the strategic endurance to more than match them.

If we were not to do so, I believe that the Taliban would again impose itself by violence on Afghanistan; we would be back to square one, or worse, with the Taliban harbouring international terrorists and imposing terror internally. We must not allow this to happen, and so we must maintain our will and accept the cost in blood and treasure, remembering that risk-free soldiering is a contradiction in terms.

The question of when the campaign will successfully conclude is not, therefore, one of dates, but one of achieving the right conditions for Afghanistan to stand alone without international assistance. It is of strategic importance that the international community holds its nerve, with Pakistan having a particularly crucial role in handling terrorism in that country.

Pakistan walks a difficult tightrope between moderate and immoderate – extreme – Islam. While the former should be applauded, the latter harbours extremism. I have little doubt that al-Qa'eda represents as much a long-term threat to Pakistan as it does elsewhere.

Poppy cultivation is a difficult additional dimension of the campaign, with the UK as lead nation for counter-narcotics. There are a number of paradoxes: the vast majority of heroin illegally consumed in this country and internationally originates from the Afghan poppy fields; poppy cultivation is illegal under Afghan law; there is a world-wide shortage of opiates for medical use; the poppy is far more valuable to the farmers of southern Afghanistan as a cash crop than any other.

Over time, a long-term solution to these paradoxes must be found; in the short term, the effect of counter-narcotic operations on Afghan hearts and minds must be very carefully weighed.

It is a mistake to see all of this through purely British eyes focused on Helmand Province. There is a very large multinational effort – civilian and military – being made throughout the country to achieve a stable Afghanistan.

Much of the country is relatively peaceful; most of the violence takes place in the south-east. There are considerable reconstruction successes, and the fact that about five million refugees have returned to their homes sends its own message.

The campaign in Afghanistan demands great commitment and considerable risk-taking by all concerned – obviously by the Afghans themselves, but also on the part of the wider world.

We must understand that it will take time, and we must have the will to achieve what we have set out to do. It follows that we must, therefore, be willing to provide the means required.

I close these thoughts by paying tribute to the British Armed Forces whose professionalism and courage are such an example to us all.

While we mourn the loss of brave people, let us remember that, as with many past and current operations, our Armed Forces are making a real difference for the greater and wider good in Afghanistan. Their selfless commitment on the nation's behalf deserves to be given the fullest recognition and support.

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