“Why Keep Such an Army?” Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions (Q86245167)
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Working Paper 19, Cold War International History Project
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | “Why Keep Such an Army?” Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions |
Working Paper 19, Cold War International History Project |
Statements
“Why Keep Such an Army?” Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions (English)
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December 1997
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24 February 2020
19
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Eisenhower, who oversaw an unprecedentedly massive buildup of nuclear-weapons production facilities, weapons, and delivery vehicles, seems at times to have been inclined toward notions of “minimum deterrence” compatible with Khrushchev's ... .: In August 1955, he told the members of his National Security Council that, “he thought we should develop a few of these missiles as a threat, but not 1000 or more ... if the Russians can fire 1000 a day at us and we can fire 1000 a day at them, then he personally would want to take off for the Argentine.”[107] A few weeks earlier he had expressed the same view to Soviet Premier Bulganin ... .: “He said that the development of modern weapons was such that a country which used them genuinely risked destroying itself. Since the prevailing winds went east to west and not north to south a major war would destroy the Northern Hemisphere and he had no desire to leave all life and civilization to the Southern Hemisphere.”[108] The Soviet leaders made comparable statements about the suicidal consequences of using nuclear weapons. (pp. 38-39) (English)
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